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RANALD SLIDELL MACKENZIE.

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RANALD SLIDELL MACKENZIE, who died January 19, 1889, at New Brighton, Staten Island, New York, was the eldest child of Commander ALEXANDER MACKENZIE of the navy, and of his wife CATHERINE ALEXANDER, the daughter of MORRIS ROBINSON, of New York. He was born in that city on the 27th of July, 1840, and, a few weeks later his parents moved to a farm on the Hudson, between Tarrytown and Sing Sing. After a slight sunstroke when he was three years old, he was never thoroughly strong until he went to college, and any long confinement to the house was certain to bring on headache and depression of spirits.

To those who really knew him well, his character as a child was remarkable. He was entirely truthful, entirely brave. He was never known to tell a lie or to make even the slightest untruthful excuse. From the time he could understand anything, his mother had impressed upon him that he must never hurt anyone smaller or weaker than himself, and her words had sunk deep into his generous nature.

His father returned from the Mexican War in the spring of 1848, safe but with broken health. It was only a few months later that

the child's first sorrow came. He was playing alone by the gate one morning when his father rode down, and the child ran to open it for him. Captain MACKENZIE spoke to him for a moment, leaned from the saddle to kiss him good-bye, then rode off, and was never seen alive again. He fell from his horse in an attack of the heart, and within a short distance of his wife and his home died quite alone.

From that time began the thoughtful, protecting affection for his mother, which no one who knew him could fail to remark.

Very close upon his father's death followed the loss of his home, his mother removing to Morristown, in New Jersey, in the spring of 1849.

When he was fifteen the time came when something must be decided as to his future life. He had showed no leaning toward any profession, and quietly agreed to the wish of his uncles that he should go to college with the prospect of studying law in New York afterwards. In the autumn of 1855, therefore, he entered the Freshman class at Williams College. He had not finished his Junior year, however, when his life was changed by his decision to enter the army. This determination was not caused by any change in his own wishes. It was only a change in his family circumstances, which made him feel that it would be better for his mother that he should be able at once to provide for himself. He discussed it with no one, asked no one's advice, but thought it over quietly by himself, and, when he had fully made up his mind, wrote for his mother's consent, and asked her to get the appointment for him.

Another thing which seems a little unusual in the light of his after success, was that nearly everyone of his acquaintances and relations expected him to fail at West Point. It was perhaps natural that the strength of his mind and character should be misunderstood. He was very shy and reserved, his speech was slow and a little indistinct, his manner diffident and hesitating; the great brilliancy of his youngest brother, too, threw him more into the shade, from which he was perfectly happy to admire his brother's gifts of mind and manner, and quite contented with second place himself.

His uncle, on hearing his resolution, wrote to say that he could get the appointment for him, certainly, but he must warn him of the great disadvantage it would be to him to be found deficient. Other relatives urged upon him the disappointment and grief that his failure would be to his mother—the opinion of his little public, in short, was summed up in the words of their old clergyman, who, on hearing later that RANALD stood second in his class, absolutely



refused to believe it. "No," he exclaimed to MRS. MACKENZIE, "it is not possible," and when informed that it was not only possible but true, he went on: "Madam, you surprise me; I had ventured to hint to my wife—in strict confidence—my certainty of the disappointment in store for you."

The same certainty was felt at first by the other cadets at West Point, who, in talking over their chances before they had left their first encampment, had unanimously agreed that MACKENZIE would be one of those to be "found" at the first examination. Only a few of his family, and all his teachers at school or college, held a different opinion. They alone understood the boy's quiet courage and uncommon ability, and to them no honor that came to him could ever be a surprise. As Mr. MORRIS, his former teacher, had written of him three years before, "With time he will always be equal to what is required of him."

He entered the Military Academy on the 1st of July, 1858. His sterling qualities of heart and mind soon made him a great favorite in his class and very popular with the whole corps. He was looked upon as a high-spirited, model gentleman; modest, determined, fearless, generous, loyal to his friends, and slow to anger unless he thought an insult was intended, when no one would resent it more quickly. He had a very sociable disposition, loved to be with his comrades, and was full of good nature. His love of sport and fondness for the society of his friends was the cause of his getting more than the average number of demerits, but in all essentially military matters his conduct was exemplary.

At the end of his first year he stood fifth in his class; at the end of the second year he stood second. In his third year, 1860-61, the outbreak of the Civil War and the events that immediately preceded it, produced an excitement throughout the country that was also deeply felt at West Point. At that time MACKENZIE lived in Company "D," where many Southern cadets also lived. It was probably due to his interest in his friends from the South and the exciting incidents of that year, that at its end he had fallen to twelfth place, for in the year following, although he was acting assistant professor of mathematics, and much of his time was necessarily taken up with instructing the lower classes, he graduated with ease at the head of his class. His letters show that for months before graduation he was also deeply engaged in studying the problems of the war, and that his able mind had realized in a great measure the gigantic proportions the conflict would assume. He chafed at his enforced detention at West Point, and longed to be in a life of

activity and danger, with so many gallant men, fighting for a great cause.

Upon graduating in June, 1862, he was appointed second lieutenant in the Corps of Engineers, and almost immediately reported for duty to General BURNSIDE, as engineer officer on his staff. In a few weeks, however, he was transferred to the staff of General RENO, with whom he served at the second battle of Manassas, in August. On the afternoon of the second day of that battle, while carrying a message, he stopped to ask information of a wounded soldier, and at that moment was shot from behind a fence, the ball entering at the right shoulder, passing over the shoulder blade and spine without breaking the skin, and grazing the left shoulder blade as it went out, making a serious and painful but not dangerous wound. After he fell, two of the men that had fired upon him, came up. He asked for water, and they said they would gladly give it but they had none themselves. They took his pistol and money, leaving him his watch, and then hurried off. He lay on the ground all that night, and next day was picked up and sent to Centreville, where he was placed in one of the crowded ambulances and hurried to Washington. There his brother, after a long search, found him with other wounded officers in a hotel, and though very weak and worn, quite happy in feeling that his first fight had left him nothing to be ashamed of. When his mother arrived next morning his first words were: "I am wounded in the back, but I was not running away." For his gallant conduct in this battle he received the brevet of first lieutenant.

His wound healed rapidly, and on October 9th he again reported for duty. General RENO having been killed at South Mountain, he was placed for a while on the staff of General BURNSIDE, but the chief of engineers soon had him assigned to duty with the Engineer Battalion, and he remained with it almost uninterruptedly, participating in many skirmishes, and all the great battles of the Army of the Potomac, until June, 1864.

For gallant and meritorious service at the battle of Chancellorsville he received the brevet of captain. At the battle of Gettysburg he was temporarily attached to the staff of General MEADE, was again wounded, though not seriously enough to incapacitate him, and for his gallantry was brevetted major.

Until June, 1864, his duties had been those of an engineer officer only, and by regular promotion he had reached the rank of captain. But while he performed his duties zealously and well, they were hardly of an agreeable kind, and neither suited his taste nor gave

scope for his talents. He speaks in his letters, of a pontoon as a "bore," and a pontoon train as his "pet aversion." He was far more deeply interested in the tactical employment of troops, and in the lessons to be learned from the various battles, than in the duties of his position. But his attention to those duties, his great energy, and the courage and intelligence he so frequently displayed, could not fail to attract the notice of his superiors, and when officers of the Second Connecticut Heavy Artillery—a regiment that was artillery only in name, being armed and equipped as infantry—wished to have a regular officer appointed to fill the vacancy caused by the death of its colonel at Cold Harbor, General UPTON recommended them to apply to Captain MACKENZIE. This they did, and the application received the favorable endorsement of Generals UPTON, RUSSELL, WRIGHT, MEADE and GRANT.

On June 6th, Colonel MACKENZIE, not yet twenty-four years old, took command of his regiment at Cold Harbor. He was now in a position that gave him an opportunity to display his high soldierly qualities and great genius for war, and he made use of that opportunity. He now entered upon the most brilliant portion of his military career, and considering how late in the war the opportunity came, his subsequent advancement was phenomenal. For gallant and meritorious service in front of Petersburg on the 18th of June he received the brevet of lieutenant-colonel in the regular army. On the 22d he was shot in the right hand, losing two fingers, and much against his will was compelled to take a short leave and go home. In less than three weeks he was back again with his regiment, which belonged to the Sixth Army Corps, and went with it to Washington when the Confederate General EARLY threatened that city, after which the corps was transferred to General SHERIDAN's army in the Shenandoah Valley. At the battle of Opequan MACKENZIE was slightly wounded in the leg by a piece of shell, but retained command of his regiment, and for his gallantry on that occasion and at Fisher's Hill and Middletown he subsequently received the unusual distinction of being appointed brigadier-general of volunteers—unusual because the honor was conferred as a reward for distinguished services specially mentioned. In those three battles his regiment lost more heavily, probably, than any other in General SHERIDAN's command, and bore three-fourths of the losses of its own brigade. At Cedar Creek MACKENZIE commanded his brigade, and was wounded early in the morning, was wounded in the leg later in the day, and was finally knocked from his horse by some missile, which struck him in the chest and

stunned him for a moment, bruising him badly but not breaking the skin. His arms partially paralyzed for a few moments, he made his men replace him on his horse, where he remained for a short time to see that the victory was assured. In his report of the battle General SHERIDAN says: "Colonel MACKENZIE, though severely wounded, refused to leave the field." On this occasion he won the brevet of colonel in the regular army.

MACKENZIE's high standard of discipline caused his men to consider him unreasonably strict, and until they knew him well, his rigid administration caused considerable feeling against him. The following extract from a history of the regiment, written by the adjutant, First Lieutenant T. F. VAILL, will be appreciated by General MACKENZIE's friends:

"The circumstances under which Colonel MACKENZIE became connected with the Second Connecticut are related in Chapter VI. He had chosen the trade of war before the Rebellion commenced, and it soon became evident that he had a remarkable taste and aptitude for the business. He arrived and assumed command while we lay at Cold Harbor, \* \* \* and when the survivors were lying so supine and stupid that they could hardly be called survivors. \* \* \* Being himself in no such exhausted condition, Colonel MACKENZIE found not the slightest difficulty in becoming master of the situation. His military experience and his thorough competency in all respects would have enabled him, under any circumstances, to command the respect of subordinate officers, but the condition of things just at that time made it a peculiarly easy task. For some days he did not tighten the screws of his discipline, but contented himself with observing his command and finding out what kind of stuff it was made of. \* \* \* By the time we had reached the Shenandoah Valley he had so far developed as to be a greater terror to both officers and men than EARLY's grape and canister. \* \* \* There is a regimental tradition to the effect that a well defined purpose existed among the men, prior to the battle of Winchester, to dispose of this commanding scourge during the first fight that occurred. If he had known it, it would only have excited his contempt, for he cared not a copper for the good will of any except his military superiors, and certainly feared no man of woman born, on either side of the lines. But the purpose, if any existed, quailed and failed before his audacious pluck on that bloody day. He seemed to court destruction all day long. With his hat aloft, on the point of his saber, he galloped over forty-acre fields, through a perfect hailstorm of Rebel lead and iron, with as much impunity as though he had been a ghost. The men hated him, \* \* \* but they could not draw bead on so brave a man as that. \* \* \* His fingers were shot off at Petersburg while his hand was stretched out in the act of giving an order, but he was in command again in twenty days. At Winchester his leg was skinned by a shell that

cut his horse asunder, but tying a handkerchief around it, and remarking with grim jocoseness that this 'was dismounting without numbers,' he went on with the regiment, through the battle of Fisher's Hill and the chase up the valley, never for a moment relinquishing command until the battle of Cedar Creek, on which day another horse was killed under him, and two wounds—one received during EARLY's morning call, and the other during SHERIDAN's return call in the afternoon—at length cleared him out. That was the last of his immediate command of the regiment. He returned, however, and took command of the brigade, which he retained until appointed to a cavalry command in the spring of 1865."

His wounds kept him from duty until about the middle of November, when he rejoined his brigade, and later accompanied it when the Sixth Corps returned to General GRANT in front of Petersburg. A good feeling had long been firmly established between him and his old regiment, and he would have liked to keep it. Nothing of striking interest occurred during the winter, though MACKENZIE was doing what he could "to try and justify General SHERIDAN's opinion in having him promoted." About the middle of March, 1865, General GRANT transferred him to the command of a division of cavalry, with which he rendered conspicuous service at Five Forks, and in the operations that terminated with the surrender of General LEE. His command was designated by General GRANT to assist in the last formalities and receive the arms and munitions of war of the Rebel army.

For gallant and meritorious services during the war he received the brevets of brigadier-general in the regular army, and major-general of volunteers.

After being mustered out of the volunteer service he returned to his duties as captain of Engineers, and from February, 1866, to May, 1867, was stationed at Portsmouth, New Hampshire.

In the reorganization of the regular army he thought it possible he might be given the rank of major in the line, but in the spring of 1867 some of his friends informed him that the colonelcy of the Forty-first Infantry, a new regiment, had been offered to several officers, who in turn had declined it, because the regiment was composed of colored men. Unknown to himself, he had been mentioned in connection with the appointment, and he was advised, if it was offered to him, not to refuse it. Eventually it was offered to him, and he accepted it, and in June was in command of the post at Baton Rouge, Louisiana. In July he went to Texas, and began at once to try and make his regiment the best colored regiment in the army, by getting its recruiting stations changed from the Southern

to the Northern States, and having great care taken to enlist only intelligent men. Until 1870 he was stationed along the Rio Grande and at Forts Clark and McKavett, the monotony of garrison life being broken by hunting and scouting. He was transferred to the Twenty-fourth Infantry, upon the reduction of the army in 1869, and while East on duty in 1870 General GRANT informed him that he would be transferred to the Fourth Cavalry. Although he had been very anxious to have a cavalry regiment, he had made no effort to obtain one, and now that his wish was to be gratified, he had the satisfaction of knowing that in this instance, as in every other, whatever promotion or favor had been conferred upon him during all his military service, had not been obtained by the slightest personal solicitation.

Upon joining his new regiment, in the spring of 1871, he wrote home: "I intend that it shall not be on account of any laziness of mine if it falls below any other," a resolution that not a single officer or man of the regiment will say he failed to follow to the letter. At that time all of that portion of Texas west of the one hundredth meridian, particularly the region known as the Staked Plains, was overrun by various bands of Indians, who were constantly making depredations upon the settlements further east. The Cheyennes and Arapahoes roamed over northern Texas, Kansas and Colorado, from the Red River to the Platte, while the Comanches, Kiowas, Mescalero Apaches, Kickapoos and Lipans had actual control of western Texas and eastern New Mexico, and wandered from the southern boundary of Colorado to many miles south of the Rio Grande. The bands of Comanches, Kiowas and Apaches were the ones that gave the most trouble on the Texas frontier, and were comfortably located on the Staked Plains south of the Canadian River, a region that had never been fully explored, and that, to the troops, was unknown. Secure in their retreats, they were constantly prowling about the settlements in small parties, mainly for the purpose of stealing horses, but also ready to attack any persons that came in their way, provided the danger was not too great to themselves. In some of these expeditions the Indians have been known to penetrate the settlements to the Gulf of Mexico. The troops intended to protect the settlers were scattered among the frontier posts, sometimes hundreds of miles apart, and employed in small detachments in trying to overtake and punish the raiders. Although the troops were constantly in a state of activity, their efforts were usually fruitless and without effect. If the Indians were followed to the vicinity of their homes, they would receive



such reinforcements as to make it necessary for the small detachments of troops to turn back. General MACKENZIE concluded that the only plan to be followed to bring the Indians to terms was to send one or more large columns of troops, each strong enough to take care of itself, into the country occupied by the Indians and make it untenable for them. Accordingly in the summer and fall of 1871 he conducted an expedition to the Staked Plains. He considered his expedition very unsuccessful, as he was not able to surprise any large party of Indians, and only a few were killed. Still, the experience gained and the knowledge obtained of the topography of the country were of the greatest value to him subsequently. In this campaign, during an affair with a few Indians, MACKENZIE became concerned about the safety of a daring young officer who had gone well to the front, and while ordering him back he was himself shot in the leg by an arrow.

In the summer and fall of 1872 he again conducted a similar expedition to the Staked Plains, and in September surprised a large camp on McClellan's Creek, defeated the Indians with considerable loss, and captured over one hundred women and children. He and his command were congratulated upon their success in general orders from the War Department.

In the meanwhile the southern frontier of Texas was exposed to raids by Kickapoo and Lipan Indians, who, when closely pressed, were in the habit of crossing the Rio Grande River into Mexico, where they were safe from pursuit, and where, unmolested by the Mexicans, they had their homes.

In the spring of 1873, MACKENZIE's headquarters were transferred from northern Texas, where they had been for two years, to Fort Clark, about twenty miles from the Rio Grande. He at once set to work to ascertain the location of the principal Indian camps in Mexico, and this accomplished, he crossed the Rio Grande one evening in May, made a forced march during the night, attacked the Indians at daylight, destroyed their camp, which was only four or five miles from a Mexican town, and then encumbered with his wounded, forty captured women and children, and two hundred captured horses, he succeeded in regaining the north bank of the Rio Grande before sunrise the following morning, his men having had no rest for nearly fifty hours.

This affair caused a great deal of excitement at the time, and was the cause of considerable correspondence between our government and that of Mexico, but MACKENZIE had the assurance of the



support of General SHERIDAN and also of the Secretary of War, and in time the matter was amicable adjusted.

In 1874 many of the Comanches, Kiowas and Cheyennes on their reservations in Indian Territory, became discontented and joined the renegades who lived habitually on the Staked Plains. Columns of troops from New Mexico, Kansas, Indian Territory and Texas were sent out to punish them, and MACKENZIE was placed in command of the two from Texas. One he commanded personally and the other was under General BUELL, lieutenant-colonel of the Eleventh Infantry. MACKENZIE's command had a skirmish with a war party of several hundred Indians during the night of the 26th and morning of the 27th of September. At daylight on the morning of the 28th, after a night march of about forty miles, he attacked their main camp, killing several, destroyed the camp and killed or captured nearly two thousand horses. The next day, after selecting such of the captured horses as were needed for the use of the command, one thousand and forty, by actual count, were shot to keep them from falling again in the hands of the Indians. Several other small engagements took place in November and December, after which the troops returned to their posts.

In 1875 the Fourth Cavalry was ordered to take station in Indian Territory with headquarters at Fort Sill. MACKENZIE also commanded the troops at the Cheyenne Agency, where Fort Reno has since been located, and those at the cantonment on the present site of Fort Elliott. The Indians had returned to their reservations, but owing to the depredations of white horse thieves on the Indians' herds, it was a difficult matter to hold them there. It was not an unusual thing for a hundred head of ponies to be stolen from an Indian camp in one night, and horses belonging to officers and picketed near their quarters, were stolen at midday. Before the year was out, the energetic measures taken by MACKENZIE produced a complete change in that condition of affairs.

After CUSTER was killed in 1876, General MACKENZIE was ordered with six troops of his regiment to Camp Robinson, Nebraska, and on arrival was assigned to the command of the District of the Black Hills, which placed under his orders the Indians at Red Cloud and Spotted Tail Agencies. As RED CLOUD had shown a disposition to ignore his authority, and failed to obey the instructions to move his camp close to the agency, he was awakened one morning by the troops, who had ridden forty miles during the night and surrounded his camp. He was required to surrender his arms and

horses, and the latter were taken away and sold, while he was deposed by General CROOK from his position of authority in his tribe.

From November 1 to December 31, 1876, MACKENZIE commanded the cavalry force of the Powder River expedition under General CROOK. On the morning of November 25th, after a night march the cavalry surprised a hostile camp in the Big Horn Mountains, destroyed 173 lodges, captured 600 ponies, and killed and wounded probably 100 Indians. MACKENZIE's loss was one officer and six men killed and twenty-five wounded.

In May, 1877, he was ordered back to Fort Sill, where he remained until winter, when he was transferred to Texas with headquarters at Fort Clark, and placed in the command of the District of the Nueces. He crossed the Rio Grande with a large force in June, 1878, intending to operate against raiding Indians and cattle thieves, but the expedition failed owing to the illness of a guide and the failure to find water. While leisurely returning to the north side of the Rio Grande, Mexican troops appeared in his front, and demanded that he turn around and return to Texas by the route he came. This he refused to do, but notified them that he intended to return by the road to the nearest ford, which was about thirty miles distant, and that as they had formed across that road in his front, he would fight if they attempted to stop him. On his advancing the Mexicans retired, though they hovered about till the third day afterward when he re-crossed the river into Texas. The vigilance of our troops during the summer, and the measures taken by MACKENZIE soon put an end to the border troubles in his district.

In the fall of 1879, after the murder of Agent MEEKER by the Utes, and the death of Major THORNBURGH, General MACKENZIE was ordered from Texas to Fort Garland, Colorado, where he was employed during the winter in preparing an expedition, known as the Fort Garland Column, to proceed in the spring to the Los Pinos Agency on the reservation of the Uncompahgre Utes. The following summer was passed quietly in the vicinity of the agency, and in the fall MACKENZIE was ordered East. While there, the Department of Arkansas was organized, and the President assigned him to its command, placing him on duty according to his brevet rank. In April the department was broken up, when he was again sent to the Los Pinos Agency.

In that year, 1881, after certain formalities had been concluded as agreed in a treaty, the Utes were to surrender their reservation and move to another in Utah. When the time came for them to go, they at first demurred, and then flatly refused. MACKENZIE had

made himself acquainted with their views and disposition, and several months before the time for them to move, saw that their opposition would probably lead them to take this step. The military had no authority to assume control over them until they committed some act of open hostility, and no power to prevent an act of hostility taking place. A refusal to go would merely be a matter between the Indians and the Interior Department, but if they felt strong enough to defy the government to that extent and were not at once taken in hand by the troops, it was extremely probable that they would commence hostilities. MACKENZIE repeatedly represented this danger to his military superiors, and asked for instructions to govern him, but could get no satisfactory answer. The only one he got was that when the Indians refused to move he should refer the matter to Washington, where the case would be laid before the Secretary of the Interior, who would decide what should be done. MACKENZIE replied that when the emergency arose there would be no time to refer to the Secretary of the Interior or to any one else, but that action would have to be taken at once, on the spot, by the officer in command of the troops; that the responsibility for such action would therefore have to be borne by himself, and by himself alone, which placed him in a false position, for if blame should afterwards attach to any one, he would be the one that would have to bear it; but as the responsibility was to be forced upon him, he would assume it and do the best he could. Then, in a spirit of perfect subordination and in order to reduce to a minimum the danger that would result from delaying to exercise military control over a tribe of hot-tempered Indians, while waiting orders from Washington, he hurriedly constructed eighty miles of telegraph line that put him in communication with that city, and had it completed only three days before the Indians were to start. When they finally refused, the agent asked them to wait till he heard what the Secretary of the Interior had to say, to which they consented. The Secretary at once turned them over to the War Department, and the next day when the chiefs and head men came to the agency to get their answer, the agent told them that General MACKENZIE would give it to them, and was waiting to receive them at the cantonment, about four miles distant. Accordingly they went over to see him, about twenty in number, with their arms in their hands, their bows strung and in a very ugly humor. After the talk began, it soon became evident that the Indians were trying to temporize and to avoid committing themselves, proposing all sorts of expedients and compromises, and that they had no intention of moving at

all. At this point MACKENZIE told them that he had no time to waste words; that he was ordered to see that they moved to their new reservation, and he was going to see that they did; that there was no other question under discussion; that it remained with them to decide whether they would go peaceably or by force, and he wanted an answer as to whether they intended to go peaceably, yes or no. He would leave them alone in his office to come to a decision, and when they reached it, if they would send for him he would come to hear it. With that he put on his hat and went to his quarters. The Indians were dumfounded. They were unaccustomed to such summary treatment, and were so impressed by his decision, his coolness, his daring, his strong personality, that in less than ten minutes they sent for him, their air of defiance all gone, and the Ute question in Colorado was settled. It was an emergency, and MACKENZIE had been equal to it. He considered what he did on this occasion as the greatest deed of his life. The scene was intensely dramatic. MACKENZIE, with a few officers, all unarmed and surrounded by about twenty armed and defiant warriors, by his earnestness, by his determined manner, by his bold attitude, by his great force of character, in one moment struck the Indians with awe, and inspired the officers with profound admiration. As he rose to leave the meeting it seemed as if there were no one present but him, and the silence was that of death. There was hardly another man in the army that could have done it. An Indian war, with the loss of many valuable lives and millions of property, was averted.

Before the Utes were out of the country, news was received that there was an outbreak of Apaches in Arizona, and that—which happily was untrue—General CARR and his command had been massacred. General MACKENZIE was at once ordered to Fort Apache, and on his arrival was placed by General SHERMAN in command of all the forces in the field, but he did not see that he could be of any use, and asked to be recalled, which was soon done. He was then sent to Santa Fe to command the District of New Mexico, where he remained till the fall of 1883. In October, 1882, he was promoted to the grade of brigadier-general, and in November, 1883, was placed in command of the Department of Texas. A few weeks afterwards his health gave way, and in March, 1884, he was placed on the retired list for disability contracted in the line of duty.

His career was one of the most brilliant in the annals of the American army. In less than two weeks after joining his volunteer regiment he earned his fourth brevet for gallantry. In less than four months, for gallantry in his next three battles, he was pro-

moted brigadier-general of volunteers; and in the fourth battle won another brevet. He held higher rank during the war than any man in his class, and higher rank than any other officer whose military life began in the second year of the war. When made colonel of the Forty-first Infantry, he was only twenty-six years old, and, except PENNYPACKER, the youngest colonel in the army. In the next three years he converted a regiment of ignorant Southern field hands into an efficient body of troops.

In 1872 his victory over a large band of Indians was followed by comparative peace for a number of months. Called to the Rio Grande frontier in 1873, in less than eight months Indian depredations had practically ceased. After his campaign in 1874, the haunts of the Indians on the Staked Plains were abandoned by them forever. Transferred to the Indian Territory in 1875, when the country was swarming with horse thieves, in six months a horse could be tied and left alone within a day's march of the post, and there it would remain till the wind blew its dust away. In 1876 there was an Indian outbreak in the North, and CUSTER's command was massacred. MACKENZIE must go. In one fight he gave a band of hostiles a more thorough thrashing than any Indians had received during the year, destroyed their camp and left the fugitives without food, clothing or ammunition. They were the first to surrender the next spring, and were followed by the bands of ROMAN NOSE and CRAZY HORSE. In nine months after his arrival the Indians at Red Cloud and Spotted Tail Agencies were at peace. In 1878 the border troubles again called him to the Rio Grande. In less than eight months the depredations of cattle thieves and marauders ceased and have not been resumed since. In 1879 the Utes in Colorado killed their agent and afterward killed Major THORNBURGH. Whenever there was a formidable outbreak of any kind there was one man relied upon to suppress it. In poor health, physically weak, and suffering intensely, he went with no complaint as to himself but begging some little respite for the hard-worked officers and men of his regiment who had served him so faithfully. After a delay of nearly two years, caused by a policy to which he was opposed, when he was finally allowed to use his own untrammelled judgment, in one sublime moment he averted war, and the Ute question was settled. And now there was an outbreak in Arizona; who could be trusted to quell it but MACKENZIE? There were more troubles there in 1882, and not a hostile Indian was able to set foot within the limits of the District of New Mexico. In 1883 the troubles were renewed and, though his health was rapidly failing,

only one small party succeeded in crossing the boundary line between Arizona and New Mexico. More than twenty years of active life; always equal to any responsibility; always equal to any emergency; always brilliantly successful; without a single failure, and never surpassed.

In his memoirs General GRANT says: "I regarded MACKENZIE as the most promising young officer in the army. Graduating at West Point as he did, during the second year of the war, he had won his way up to the command of a corps before its close. This he did upon his own merit and without influence."

It was upon his own merit, without personal solicitation and without influence, that he was promoted to colonel of volunteers, that General SHERIDAN recommended him for promotion to brigadier general of volunteers, and that General GRANT afterwards gave him a division of cavalry. And in various ways General GRANT afterward showed great faith in his military capacity. His influence went far toward securing MACKENZIE his colonelcy in the line of the army. When President he transferred him to a cavalry regiment, and in the critical condition of affairs following the Presidential election in 1876, when it seemed that the necessity for using troops might arise, General GRANT selected him out of the whole army and ordered him, then in the field in the Powder River expedition, to proceed to Washington to take command of all the forces that might be collected at the National Capital. And as a vacancy in the list of brigadier-generals was about to take place in 1882, it was General GRANT who finally influenced President ARTHUR to confer the promotion upon MACKENZIE, by going to the President and asking him to do this as a deserved reward for many years of active, gallant and most distinguished service, as a matter of simple justice, and as a personal favor to himself.

In 1873 the exposure incident to so much field service on the frontier brought on an attack of inflammatory rheumatism that compelled him to take a long sick leave, and impaired his health ever afterward. During the remainder of his active life there was hardly a day that he did not suffer. In 1875, at Fort Sill, a horse starting suddenly caused him to be thrown on his head from a wagon. He was in a half stupor for two or three days, and it has since been learned that his mind was not entirely clear for several months. In seeking the source of the disease that caused his retirement and resulted in his death, the physicians attached much weight to this accident, and to the sunstroke received in his childhood. His continual field service for twenty years, involving many



privations, hardships and exposures, was alone sufficient to break down the strongest constitution. But when we consider the extraordinary amount of bodily and mental labor accomplished by him, his nervous disposition, his incessant care and anxiety always to do his full duty, and the great strain upon a most conscientious mind, prolonged for many years, of responsibility of large and important commands in dangerous service, we can understand how latent weakness of the brain tissues, caused by past injury, was almost certain to be developed; such is the explanation of his malady.

He lies buried in the beautiful cemetery at West Point. His remains were followed to the grave by a large concourse of friends and relatives. Interred with the honors of war, his last resting place is beside the graves of BUFORD, SYKES, KILPATRICK, and other distinguished officers of the army.

Braver than a lion, yet sensitive and gentle as a woman—uncompromising, determined and just, yet kind, generous, and deeply sympathetic with humanity in every walk of life—imperious, impetuous and dashing, yet modest, diffident and simple—he was chivalrous, warm, loyal and pure, without fear and without reproach, with a great mind and a great soul, a grand soldier, a refined gentleman, and an exalted type of that noblest work of God, an honest man. The example of such a life can never be lost in death.



## MILITARY POLICY AND INSTITUTIONS.

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BY LIEUTENANT JOSEPH T. DICKMAN, THIRD CAVALRY.

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MAN is a selfish and destructive animal. His natural propensities are kept within bounds by civilization and laws resulting from ages of experience. The soldier, in addition thereto, is controlled by discipline which seeks to inculcate in time of peace those habits of obedience which enable his officers in time of war to preserve order and protect the persons and property of non-combatants. But when men find themselves in regions inhabited only by savages, or when they are carried away by religious frenzy or fanaticism, or when the bonds of discipline—provided any existed at the beginning—have in the course of a war become so loose as to cause practically no restraint, then the inherited passions of mankind are only too prone to resume their sway in full vigor.

Nations are but aggregations of individuals, and as long as human nature remains unchanged we must expect to see masses of men impelled by the same motives that now control the conduct of individuals.

Fortunately the desires of an irresponsible majority are not always heeded. The government can in many cases avert war; and in republics, by the time the will of the people is expressed through an election, or an assembly of the representatives, the whole situation may have changed. In nations having the seat of government in a city of such preponderating size, wealth and influence as to control the affairs of the country, a united and aggressive public opinion may indeed compel a declaration of war.

On the other hand, wars now demand such tremendous sacrifices in blood and treasure that no government, not even a powerful monarchy, will be likely to engage in such a conflict for unimportant reasons, such as personal hatred or desire for conquest. There is a vast difference between the bands of mercenaries of the time of **FREDERICK THE GREAT** and the "Nation in Arms" of to-day.

The more autocratic a government is, the more power it will have to avert war. It is said of the late Emperor of Russia that he was the conservator of the peace of Europe. However, the prospects of universal peace, or even of frequent cases of arbitration between the strong and the weak, may be considered as remote.

The law, for the good of the whole, deprives the individual of the right to personally redress his grievances, real or fancied; yet there remain many cases in which he would incur but little, if any, risk of penalty for destroying his fellow-being. As soon as two individuals have a serious dispute they unconsciously adopt a policy towards each other; not seldom they consider it good policy to arm themselves, in violation of law.

In fact, the fear that physical inequality may have been fully compensated for by superiority of armament and skill in the use of weapons, has often inspired a wholesome restraint—perhaps more so than fear of the penalties of the law. And in communities where the law is not fully established, all men find it a safe policy to go armed.

Nations have no law restraining them in the matter of armament and preparation for a conflict, but are guided solely by questions of expediency and considerations of expense. Accordingly, all nations have more or less of an army, with all that the term implies, and all have a military policy. Owing to difference of circumstances, these vary greatly in their scope. In most cases the policy is simply self-defense—the preservation of integrity of territory. Some may be influenced by the spirit of revenge and the prospect of ultimate recovery of lost provinces; or, it may be the policy of a nation to acquire suitable territory whenever possible, as an aid in controlling the oceans through a powerful navy. We also know of a nation which considers that its manifest destiny is to secure a port open all the year, and of another which strives to be in such a state of preparation as to be able to concentrate its army at once, on any of its frontiers. The United States has a territory so vast, and is so much isolated from other powerful nations, that armed conflict seems a remote contingency. Its invariable system has been to avoid entangling alliances. Its military policy—if its course of action deserves the dignity of this term—therefore places reliance on troops raised as the emergency may require, and keeps a standing army only of sufficient size to serve as a model, to keep alive military traditions and to furnish some educated officers.

But for the necessity of a force to fight savage tribes of Indians and to support the general government in its powers of internal

police, the standing army would, in the long intervals of peace, have been considerably smaller, or perhaps have ceased to exist entirely, as has been more than once proposed.

A military policy may be defined as a system or scheme of management of the military resources of a country with reference to a possible conflict with the forces of an enemy.

The general term "military policy," in its widest acceptation, embraces all preparations made and considerations entertained to meet the contingency of war, except those relating to diplomacy and strategy.

In this class JOMINI places "the passions of the nation or nations to be fought; their immediate means and their reserves; their financial resources; the attachment they bear to their government and their institutions; the character of their executive; the character and military abilities of the commanders of their armies; the influence of cabinet councils and councils of war at the capital upon the operations; the system of war in favor with their staff; the established force of the state and its armament; the military geography and statistics of states that may be invaded; and finally the resources and obstacles of every kind to be met with; all of which are included neither in diplomacy nor in strategy."

The government should neglect nothing in obtaining a knowledge of these details, for it is indispensable to take them into consideration in the preparation of plans.

The term may be also applied to a consideration of our own military system and institutions, a thorough knowledge of which should of course precede study of foreign institutions. They will depend more or less upon:

- 1st. Our geographical position with regard to possible or probable belligerents.

- 2d. Our form of government and the genius of our political institutions.

*Military Statistics and Geography.*—By military statistics we understand the most thorough knowledge possible concerning the elements of power and resources of other nations as well as our own.

Military geography comprises the geographical and strategical description and consideration of the possible theaters of war, with all the obstacles, natural or artificial, to be encountered, and the examination of the prominent decisive points.

A large part of the information obtained is of a secret character and is made known to very few persons; the same may be

said of the plans based thereon. Other matters, such as descriptions of the enemy's uniform and equipment, and maps of the theater of operations, are published for the use of the whole army before, or just after, the outbreak of hostilities.

Nothing could indicate more clearly the importance attached to these subjects than the fact that certain sections of the general staffs of all important armies are charged with the duty of collecting, arranging, and discussing information under the two heads just named.

The general staff of the German army, which has served as a model for all the others, is organized as follows:

(a) A central office or cabinet of the chief of the general staff. Attached to this office there is a chancery and an administrative commission.

(b) Four sections of the general staff in charge of information from various countries, including Germany itself, as follows:

*Division No. 1.*—Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Russia, Austria-Hungary, Roumania, Servia, Bulgaria, Montenegro, Greece, The Ottoman Empire and Russian Asia.

*Division No. 2.*—Germany.

*Division No. 3.*—Great Britain, France, Italy, Holland, Belgium, Switzerland, Spain, Portugal, America and Asia. (Russian possessions excepted.)

*Division No. 4.*—Fortifications and defensive works in Germany and throughout the world.

To these four sections there are attached:

1. A special bureau called "the bureau of information" whose duty it is to collect data concerning the organization of foreign armies (the press, literature and other sources) and to communicate them to the sections concerned.

2. A railway division, to which belong:

(a) Six military railway commissioners.

(b) The line commissions, at present eighteen in number, as follows: Fourteen for Prussia, one for Saxony, one for Würtemberg, two for Bavaria.

3. An historical section, with library and archives.

4. A section of statistics and geography.

5. A general map department embracing certain bureaus such as accounts, trigonometry, topography, cartography and a depository of maps.

There is also a general supervisory board on geographical work

which is composed of delegates from the different ministries of the realm, and which is presided over by chief of staff of the army.

The mission of this committee is to give a general direction to the preparation and publication of plans and topographical maps conforming to the interests of the general public administrative departments, and at the same time to determine the manner in which the other departments are to assist in the execution of works to be undertaken or continued.

The number of officers in the general staff varies slightly; last year it was 191, on duty as follows:

General staff at Berlin .....	59
Military attachés in foreign countries .....	8
Bavarian staff .....	9
Staffs of army corps .....	61
Staffs of divisions .....	45
Staffs in fortresses .....	9
Total .....	191

The amount of reciprocal misinformation existing between enemies has in the past often been remarkable. The Schwarzwald, or Black Forest, which is the designation in general terms of a large portion of the Grand Duchy of Baden, was from its name and traditions supposed to be a wild and difficult country as late as 1796; and Bohemia at a later period was supposed to be a mass of mountains. In each case the reports were far from the truth.

Some of our elder officers could probably give long accounts of the mistaken ideas of the people of different sections of the country with reference to each other, thirty-five years ago. In the "Rebellion Records" complaints may be found about the lack of accurate maps, and the fact that alleged maps, on account of their errors, were worse than none.

It is doubtful whether in our service there ever has been sufficient interest taken in these matters, in spite of the requirements of army regulations. There still are sections of the United States of which there are no maps in existence sufficiently detailed to enable one to march by them. In southern Texas there have been at least four military posts and numerous camps of troops, as well as frequent scouting and field service, for nearly fifty years, all within a radius of 100 miles; yet a reliable map showing roads was not in existence three years ago, and but little improvement has been made since. Only a comparatively small portion of the United States has been mapped so as to show topographical features in detail.

At the beginning of this century topography was in its infancy; the close finds practically all Europe mapped (and the maps published) on a scale of  $\frac{1}{100,000}$  or larger.

OTHER CAUSES WHICH EXERCISE AN INFLUENCE UPON THE ISSUE OF  
A WAR.

The passions of a people form a powerful lever in war. They will generally support their government in a war, right or wrong; yet if they feel that the war is a just one, or if they are defending their firesides, that support will be enthusiastic and the heaviest sacrifices will be cheerfully made. On the other hand, an enemy's people driven to desperation will make the war a bitter, sanguinary and difficult one. It should therefore be the policy of the commander-in-chief and of the government to allay the fears and calm the feelings of the non-combatants of the enemy. They should, if possible, be made to understand that there will be nothing personal in the war unless they themselves make it so.

A general should do everything in his power to enhance the confidence and spirits of his army. The means must vary with the national character. A grandiloquent proclamation might have a fine effect on French or other soldiers of Latin race; but with cold-blooded and critical Teutons the effect would probably be different.

The intelligence and irreverence of the American volunteer would suggest extreme caution in this regard, lest what was intended to be sublime became the subject of ridicule in the camp. It is a question whether enthusiasm is to be preferred to steady, stubborn coolness. Presence of mind is a valuable quality in commanders of troops, and it may well be doubted whether frantic enthusiasm has a beneficial effect on the efficiency of small arms fire.

Respect and affection for the person of the general and confidence in his military ability form important elements of success; the latter quality is indispensable.

Superiority of skill will generally win, if the terms are fairly even. Poor generals sometimes stumble into a success, and a combination of trifling circumstances may defeat the most experienced, skillful and painstaking commander. The exception, however, only proves the rule, and the fortune of war will generally abide with him who provides the greatest number of chances of success. One of the earliest battles of our war furnishes a good example of how inefficiency of subordinate commanders, lack of discipline in the troops, combined with good fortune on the part of the adversary

may defeat an excellent plan. A general who expects to carry out a campaign for a country with a republican form of government and relying almost entirely on militia, needs a great deal of good luck at the beginning, for one defeat may cause him to be deposed from command. Those who are ignorant of the rudiments of the art of war can judge only by results.

Formerly the religious feeling was habitually invoked to assist in securing victory. On the eve of battle solemn services were held, and whole armies, even when they were principally robbers and cut-throat hirelings, offered up a prayer to the God of battles. While a religious fervor, coupled with morality and fortitude of character is not to be despised by any means, we hear less of these invocations since the saying of NAPOLEON that the Almighty is on the side of the strongest battalions.

The influence of a cabinet council, or committee on the conduct of the war, is generally injurious to the cause it is intended to benefit. It places the commander-in-chief in an awkward position; numerous persons may be found who are ready to share the credit of victory, but none who are willing to assume part of the responsibility for defeat. The evil ought, however, to correct itself. A general of sufficient character to be fit to command armies will have force enough to insist upon unhampered control, or none at all; and when the burden becomes unbearable he will simply resign his position of responsibility. A high sense of patriotism will impel men, who feel the importance of their influence upon the success of the cause, to rise superior to councils, committees, and the nagging of Congress itself, and to continue the performance of their whole duty to the best of their ability. The American Revolution would probably have collapsed without such a leader. We may search the history of all times in vain for a character whose patience equaled that of WASHINGTON.

All nations, whatever their degree of civilization, recognize to a greater or less extent the necessity of an armed force to protect themselves against external foes or domestic violence. Wars will occur as long as human passions exist; and the integrity of a nation will depend to a great extent upon its military policy and the character of its military institutions.

*Military Institutions.*—The principal feature in the military policy of a state is the nature of its army and attendant military institutions. JOMINI enumerates twelve essential conditions as concurring in making a perfect army.

1. A good system of recruiting.



There are two methods of raising an army—voluntary enlistment and compulsory levies. The former system was once the rule, but of all the great European powers only England retains it. It is fair to all; the soldier receives satisfactory wages for voluntary service, and the civilian helps to pay the taxes. The character of the men received under this system will depend on the wages paid and the inducements offered for advancement, or for employment under the government after a period of service; and, of course, on the rules and regulations of the recruiting service.

Compulsory service gives a large number of men, and some writers think they are of a better class; in our service it is believed that the recruits selected from applicants for enlistment are above the average, both mentally and physically.

Conscription bears hardest on the middle class of skilled industry and professional men; consequently some system is devised to shorten the term of service for men above the average in intelligence and material means. The relative cost of the two systems depends on the size of the army. For a small army, voluntary enlistment is probably the cheaper method; but when high wages are necessary, or when large forces are required, conscription is less expensive, and may have to be resorted to as a matter of necessity.

2. A good organization.

It goes without saying that all nations feeling the strain of the struggle for survival will adopt for their armies the best organization devised up to date; others, like the United States, may retain obsolete arrangements until a defeat emphasizes the lessons of the defeats of others.

3. A well organized system of national reserves.

By the treaty of Tilsit, signed July 9, 1807, between the Emperors ALEXANDER and NAPOLEON, Prussia was restricted to a standing army of 43,000 men. The object of course was to prevent this nation from again becoming a military power of the first magnitude. It was at this time that General SCHARNHORST devised the "*Krümpersystem*," or short term system, which, while complying with the letter of the treaty, furnished a large number of instructed soldiers. It consisted simply in discharging men as soon as they were considered instructed, and filling their places with recruits. This was the foundation of the present system of all the armies of Continental Europe.

By the terms of the law of November 9, 1867, modified by that of February 11, 1888, and of August 3, 1893, military service is obligatory for every German between seventeen and forty-five years

of age. In principal there is no kind of complete exemption from this service.

In the ordinary course the young Germans are called up in the year during which they complete twenty years of age.

The class is designated by the number of the year of the call. The number of young men registered in the different countries of the empire as arriving at their twenty-first year is about 475,000 per annum, out of a total population of forty-nine and one-half millions; but, about 45,000 have disappeared, principally through emigration. This reduces the annual contingent to 430,000.

Of this number about two-thirds are put back for another year or two because their constitution is not yet sufficiently developed to enable the inspectors to pass definitely on their physical aptitude. These are of course replaced by those who have been turned back in previous years so that the number 430,000 is composed of young men of twenty, twenty-one and twenty-two years of age.

Of this number only 32,000 are rejected as being unsuitable for any employment whatever; 13,000 are excused from active service in time of peace for family reasons (only support of widows or aged parents); 46,000 are reserved for the navy; 16,000 enter the ranks in a different way (one year volunteers and others); and 13,000 are excluded for moral reasons.

The 363,000 remaining are classified in the order of physical fitness, and from these they take, beginning at the top of the list, the number fixed for the annual contingent, increased by the *Nach-Ersatz* (subsequent supply). In 1893 the number incorporated in the active army was 229,000 for the contingent and 12,000 for the *Nach-Ersatz*, total 241,000, which is the number calculated by the Ministry of War as necessary to keep up the authorized total of the army.

These recruits enter the army the same year they are called; for the cavalry early in October, and for the other services about the 15th of that month.

The remaining 122,000 who were found fit for the service but not incorporated in the active army are placed in the *Ersatz Reserve* (recruiting reserve) the operation of which will be explained further on.

The cavalry and light artillery serve three years with the colors, the other arms only two.

After this service all enter the reserve, where they remain five and one-half years and then enter the landwehr (first levy).

The cavalry and light artillery have three years in the first levy

of the landwehr, and the other arms five. After ten and one-half and twelve and one-half years respectively the men pass into the second levy of the landwehr, and there they remain until the 31st of March of the year in which they complete thirty-nine years of age. For the remaining six years they are in the second levy of the landsturm.

As to the *Nach-Ersatz* previously mentioned, the law permits the taking of five to six per cent. in excess of the contingent, for the purpose of supplying losses. The recruits begin in October and drill through the winter; on account of sickness, desertion, death, punishment and other causes, there are certain losses by the time spring opens. The *Nach-Ersatz* having been drilled at the same time in the depot battalions these losses are easily repaired, and on the 1st of April all the regiments are full to the legal limit.

After leaving the active army the German soldier is still liable to certain periods of drill and exercises, which are established by law. While in the reserve he may be recalled twice, for periods not to exceed eight weeks each. During his stay in the landwehr (first levy) he can likewise be called out twice, but only for periods of two weeks. In practice both these classes serve only thirteen days at a time, which makes the total service after leaving the active army fifty-two days.

Now, out of the 363,000, after taking the contingent of 229,000 and the *Nach-Ersatz* of 12,000, there remained 122,000 men fit for service. Part of this reserve undergoes training during three periods of twenty weeks in all. They stay in this class twelve years and six months and may be called to replace losses in war. After twelve years and six months the instructed men pass into the second levy of the landwehr; the others go into the first levy of the landsturm, which also comprises all young men between seventeen and twenty years of age.

After thirty-nine and up to forty five years of age all Germans belong to the second levy of the landsturm. During this period no military service of any kind is required in time of peace.

In calculating the number of men remaining in the different classes, four per cent. is deducted for the first year, and three per cent. for each of the succeeding years.

The system of recruiting now in force will ultimately give Germany about 8,000,000 men fit for military service; and from now on they count upon more than 3,000,000 instructed soldiers, as shown in the following summary:

## ACTIVE ARMY:

Officers and functionaries .....	29,089
Non-commissioned officers and classes of 1891, 1892 and 1893 .....	569,754

## RESERVE:

Five classes 1887-91.....	782,036
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## LANDWEHR, first levy:

Five classes, 1882-86.....	662,927
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## LANDWEHR, second levy:

Six classes, 1876-81 .....	656,214
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## LANDSTURM:

Six classes .....	530,000
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## RECRUITING RESERVE:

Twelve calls of 15,000.....	180,000
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Total .....	3,410,020
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Taking out the one year volunteers, about 9,000 per annum, we have left in round numbers 3,330,000 men, more or less instructed and ready for military service. In time of peace all except the standing army are considered as on furlough (*Beurlaubtenstand*).

4. Good instruction in drill and internal duties as well as those of a campaign.

At the present time the duties of campaign are considered all-important; drill and internal duties are valuable in developing the physique and cultivating discipline, and are thus preparatory to the full instruction of the modern soldier fit for war. The final instruction is given in field exercises and maneuvers simulating as nearly as practicable the actual conditions of a campaign.

5. A strict but not humiliating discipline, and a spirit of subordination and punctuality based on conviction rather than on the formalities of the service.

This will vary greatly with the character of the people and the form of government. Under a monarchy the people grow up with inherited respect for the government and its officials, whereas, in true republics there is less formality, less dignity among the officers of the state, and the sovereign voter is accustomed to a certain amount of familiarity with those depending upon him for tenure of office. The superior intelligence of the independent volunteer will more than counterbalance these slight disadvantages; with a proper system there is no trouble in convincing thinking men that a reasonable discipline is not only necessary for the success of the army as a whole, but essential to the welfare of the individual.

6. A well digested system of rewards suitable to excite emulation.

JOMINI says that three-fourths of the promotion in each grade

should be by seniority, and the other fourth for zeal and merit. In the German army promotion except into the staff is practically all by roster, although they have no law on the subject and the Emperor reserves the privilege of making promotions arbitrarily. This is seldom done, the principal exception being among members of the royal family.

The main objection to promotion for merit lies in favoritism and political influence, which would probably make it unsuitable under our form of government in time of peace.

It is astonishing what an amount of medals, ribbons, orders, brevets, decorations, etc., a body of officials, be they civil or military, can accept without bringing ridicule on the system, as long as these devices continue to mean something. Handled with tact they constitute a powerful influence in raising the spirit of armies. The most valuable rewards are those given immediately after the action, in the presence of the witnesses, on the battlefield itself. This was one of NAPOLEON's favorite methods. The celebration of anniversaries of victory over a foreign foe also helps to maintain military ardor. On the occasion of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the battle of Mars-la-Tour (August 16, 1870) the same regiments were assembled; the French troops were represented by other regiments and the formation of both cavalry forces was reproduced. Again the squadrons advanced to the charge and the spectators were furnished a vivid picture of the bloody battle of twenty-five years ago. After the mimic war, the aged general, VON BARBY, still vigorous and with a perfect seat, though retired long ago, reviewed the troops and received once more the salute of the standards. At the banquet in the evening the brigade commander read a telegram from the Emperor, dated on board the imperial yacht *Hohenzollern*, thanking and congratulating the troops and conferring upon their former commander the title of general of cavalry. The martial spirit does not die out very rapidly in a nation where they do things in this style.

8. The special arms of engineering and artillery to be well instructed.

Unless the artillery can hold its own against that of the enemy the army operates at a serious disadvantage.

9. An armament superior if possible to that of the enemy, both as to offensive and defensive arms.

Any serious defect or inferiority in armament is likely to have a bad effect on the morale of troops; it forms an excuse not only for defeat but also for neglect in the performance of duty. The soldier

is apt to believe that he is heavily handicapped and that the struggle is a hopeless one. He is thus defeated before he goes into action.

10. A general staff capable of applying the elements of the science of war, and having an organization calculated to advance the theoretical and practical instruction of its officers.

In the German army the staffs of commanding generals are formed of officers of different categories:

1. Staff officers proper, called in Germany *Generalstabsoffiziere*, or officers of the general staff.

2. Officers of the *Adjutantur*, or adjutants.

3. Orderly officers, or aids-de-camp.

The duties of these officers are clearly defined by the regulations.

1. For general staff officers: All that relates to marches, cantonments, stations and distribution of troops; drills and maneuvers of troops; military bridges; artillery and engineering; armament and defense of fortresses; topography and military reconnaissances of all kinds; and movements and operations of troops in campaign.

2. For adjutants: Orders; garrison duties; reports; personnel of the corps of officers and of the troops; recruiting, reserves, landwehr, landsturm; furloughs, discharges, pensions, etc.

3. The orderly officers are at the disposition of the generals, and even of the staff, and are employed in conveying orders and for special missions and duties of all kinds.

Other affairs such as military justice, administration, and those relating to the health of the army, are in charge of special departments, each with a chief under the immediate authority of the commanding general.

The officers of the general staff are divided as follows: Prussia, 149; Saxony, 11; Bavaria, 24; Wurtemberg, 7.

As a rule the German staff officers are graduates of the war schools at Berlin or Munich.

Admission to the school at Berlin follows after an examination, which is open to officers of all the arms after at least three years' service as an officer.

The annual admission is about one hundred, nearly all lieutenants. The course is three years, after which all return to their corps. There is neither examination nor classification of any kind; but from the notes made by instructors during the course the director of the school makes a minute report upon the aptitude, work, etc., of each officer. All these reports are sent to the chief of staff of the



army, who, after examining the papers, selects a certain number for a term of duty with the general staff. This is for about two years, several months of which are with a branch of the service different from that of the student.

This latter period determines the career of these officers. Those who perform satisfactorily the test work given them are classed with the staff and become captains as vacancies occur. They take the uniform of the staff and are attached to a division, a corps, or to the general staff. The others are sent back, generally to a different regiment.

From the other graduates of the war school officers of the *Adjutantur* are ordinarily selected in the same way; non-graduates may also be selected for this duty. These officers still belong to their regiments; they are simply detached and do not change their uniforms. There are about four hundred in this class.

The aids-de-camp are selected like ours, only there are not so many of them, relatively. In all about eight hundred officers are on staff duty.

The officers of the general staff may be detailed for duty with troops or elsewhere according to the orders of the Emperor.

A large part of the staff duties of the army are performed by line officers, who, when they return to their regiments, carry back with them the experience acquired in the staff; at the same time the staff remains in touch with the line.

10. A good system for the commissariat, hospitals and general administration.

11. A good system of assignment to command and of directing the principal operations of war.

12. Exciting and keeping alive the military spirit of the people.

To the twelve conditions as stated by JOMINI several minor ones might now be added, such as: 1, A good system of clothing and equipment; 2, Railroad troops and organization of railroad transport; 3, Signal corps and aeronauts.

Railroads and magnetic telegraph lines were not known in NAPOLEON's time, and aeronautics had not been well developed. Other improvements are forging to the front, and will be adopted as soon as their utility is fully established.

In conclusion, a good military policy will look carefully after the discipline of the army and the military spirit of the people, as well as after what Sir WALTER RALEIGH called the sinews of war, namely, men, munition and money.



## THE MILITARY GEOGRAPHY OF MEXICO.

BY LIEUTENANT A. L. MILLS, FIRST CAVALRY.

MEXICO extends from the United States to Central America, and from the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea to the Pacific Ocean. In extreme limits it embraces about thirty degrees of longitude and eighteen degrees of latitude. Its superficial area is about 744,000 square miles, equal to about two and three-fourths times that of the State of Texas. The length of the northern frontier line is about 1,900 miles, of which 1,000 miles is formed by the Rio Grande River; that of the eastern coast line is about 1,600 miles. The Pacific coast line, including that of the Gulf of California, is about 4,500 miles in length; the southern boundary is about 500 miles.

Mexico's greatest length is about 2,000 miles; her greatest breadth is about 750 miles. At the Isthmus of Tehuantepec her width is only 140 miles. Geographically, Mexico, lying between two great oceans, is highly favored.

### TOPOGRAPHY.

The Cordillera of the Andes, as the mountains of Mexico are called, enter Mexican territory from Gautemala, and, to about latitude  $18^{\circ}$  extend east and west, almost midway between the two oceans. From this line the mountains follow, in a general way, both the eastern and western coasts. Between these branch chains lies a great central table-land, called the Plateau of Anahuac, embracing nearly three-fifths of the entire area of Mexico. The highest portion of the plateau is in the vicinity of the City of Mexico, south and east, where it culminates in four volcanic peaks, ranging in height from 15,271 to 17,720 feet. From this locality, where the general elevation is more than 7,600 feet, the plateau has a general inclination toward the northwest, gradually subsiding until the

United States is reached. Low mountain ranges divide the great plateau into smaller ones, the general but gradual northerly tilt being shown by the altitudes of Mexico City, Durango, Chihuahua and Paso del Norte, on the frontier, which are respectively 7,600, 6,630, 4,600 and 3,800 feet. There is no point of the great plateau from which mountains may not be seen in clear weather; they are all the same in appearance—abrupt, bleak and without vegetation. No great valleys traverse the plateau, nor are there many small ones. By avoiding the mountains, according to authority, “there is a good natural carriage road from Santa Fe, N. M., to the City of Mexico, a distance of 1,400 miles, with only slight variations from the level.” Between Saltillo and San Luis Potosi, a distance of 240 miles, the plateau is a treeless region, containing but little water, and is practically a desert; the greater part of the remainder is a habitable region, largely under cultivation. In 1883, Captain Dorst, Fourth Cavalry, made a horseback journey through Mexico; he gives the following general description of the plateau: “Some fifty or sixty miles from Laredo, Texas, traveling by rail to Monterey, a long, flat-topped hill is seen some miles to the right, extending in the distance nearly parallel to the road. After traveling fifteen or twenty miles further, this hill is higher and broken, its top has become serrated and jagged, and it finally merges into a range of mountains. Other mountains then appear to the left, and all increase in height towards Monterey. From thence southward to every place visited on the Mexican plateau, mountains were always in sight, either near or distant, and generally in every direction. Saltillo is regarded as located at a point on the northern edge of the Mexican table land. Starting from it and proceeding southward, the traveler at once enters a chain of mountains extending in an easterly and westerly direction and more than forty miles in breadth. After passing through it he comes upon a broad and almost desert plain, flanked by distant mountains, which produces scarcely anything besides a few stunted bushes and cacti, is sparsely populated, wholly uncultivated, poorly watered, and extends without change one hundred miles further to the south. He then meets a few towns, some evidences of cultivation, and near Charcas—a town more than two hundred miles from Saltillo—the first stream of running water. The plain has become more or less hilly and broken, and both population and cultivation increase perceptibly as he nears San Luis Potosi. The country to the west of that city, however, as far as Zacatecas, is barren and almost uninhabited. Further south lie more fertile, though partly sterile plains and valleys, cultivated by

irrigation to as great an extent as the water supply will permit, and separated from each other by intervening mountains. This alternation of plains and valleys with mountains extends southward to the City of Mexico, and eastward from thence to the edge of the plateau. Except where the soil is tilled, nearly all this great expanse of country is bare, and the whole is almost treeless and but scantily supplied with water. \* \* \* As far south as the State of Guanajuato the mountains are bleak, dry, and desolate in appearance; but there, and farther south, a partial covering of bushes, stunted live oak, or occasionally pine, is not unusual." Scarcity of water and fuel will be the greatest obstacles to military operations on the great plateau, as they have been to the development of its resources.

The mountains of the western coast, the Sierra Madre of the Pacific, are continuous, extending from Oajaca to Arizona, at a mean elevation of over 10,000 feet. The mountains of the eastern coast, the Sierra Madres of Nuevo Leon and Tamaulipas, have a mean elevation of about 6,000 feet; they gradually subside toward the north, and finally merge into the great plains of the Rio Grande River. The eastern range slopes abruptly to the sea, while the ranges of the western and southern coasts fall through a series of well marked terraces to the Pacific.

Between the foot of each of the great mountain chains bounding the plateau and the sea, lies a low, flat country, called the Tierras Calientes, or Hot Lands. Along the western coast these lands form a strip from thirty to seventy miles in width. They are much more extensive along the eastern coast, where they include the greater part of the States of Tamaulipas, Vera Cruz, Tabasco and Yucatan.

The territory of Lower California, comprising the peninsula of that name, has an area of 61,544 square miles. It is about 750 miles long and from 30 to 150 miles broad. The peninsula is traversed throughout its length by a continuation of the Sierra Nevada Mountains of California, which range from 1,000 to 5,000 feet high, and are bare of verdure. The soil of the peninsula is wonderfully fertile where there is water, but the greater part of it, being subject to excessive droughts, is but thinly settled. It is credited with a population of less than 30,000. Separated from Mexico proper by the great Gulf of California and the Colorado River, and its resources being comparatively small, the importance of Lower California in war between the United States and Mexico would be confined probably to some point on its coast being taken as a secondary base in operations against the ports on the west coast of the main

country; the original base being some point on the coast of California, probably San Diego, or on the Colorado River below Yuma, Arizona.

#### HARBORS.

The seaboard of Mexico is little varied either by deep inlets, bold headlands, broad estuaries, or large islands. On the west side is the Gulf of California, the open Bay of Tehautepec, and the smaller inlets of Acapulca and San Blas; the two last named are two of the finest harbors in the world, and almost the only safe ones in Mexico. The coast of the Gulf of Mexico is low, flat and sandy, and is without one good harbor. Those of Progreso, Campeachey, Tabasco, Vera Cruz, Tuxpan and Tampico, (the last three being of the greatest strategic importance) are mere open roadsteads, affording little or no protection from the "northers," which frequently blow, with great violence, along this coast. Vessels lying in these harbors are liable to be wrecked during these storms and often are compelled to put to sea to avoid their dangers. The best anchorage on this coast appears to be at Anton Lizardo, south of Vera Cruz, where the fleet conveying General Scott's army assembled before disembarking the troops to attack that city. The harbors on the Caribbean Sea are excellent, but owing to their distance from what must necessarily be the main objective in the event of war they have but little strategic value.

#### RIVERS AND LAKES.

Mexico is imperfectly watered. Its rivers as a rule are small and unimportant, and owing to the peculiar topography of the country, but a small number are navigable, and then but for a short distance. On the north the Rio Grande is navigable for large vessels but a few miles above its port, Matamoras. The Panuca, 290 miles long, and the Coatzacoalcus, 112 miles, are the principal rivers of the eastern coast; the former is navigable for small vessels for over 100 miles, and the latter, were it not for a bar at its mouth, might be navigated for a considerable distance by large vessels. The Grijalva, or Tabasco River, rises in Guatemala, flows through the two States of Chiapas and Tabasco, and empties into the Gulf of Mexico through two mouths; it is navigable for small vessels for about one-half its course. The longest rivers of the Pacific Coast are the Santiago, 540 miles long, and the Balzas, 420 miles; both of these rivers rise in the State of Mexico, the former entering the sea at the small but good port of Zacatula, and the latter at San Blas. Neither are navigable

on account of rapids; nor are any of the other rivers flowing into the Gulf of California, except the Colorado, which is open to the largest vessels from its mouth to the frontier of the United States.

Mexico has fifty-nine lakes. Most of them are shallow lagoons, the remains of what were once large basins of water. Like the rivers, they are all small and of little value for the purpose of commerce or communication. The most considerable one is Lake Chapalla, in the State of Jalisco, which is about seventy miles in length and from ten to twenty in width. The Santiago River flows through this lake. The valley of Mexico, about forty-two miles long by thirty wide, contains six lakes, which were originally one large lagoon. Their total area is about fifty-eight square miles. The largest is Lake Texcoco, directly east of the city. It, and the three lakes to the north, are salt, while the two remaining ones, about ten miles southeast of the city, are fresh. Many of the so-called lakes along the Gulf Coast, such as the Laguna Madre, Laguna de Terminos, etc., are really arms from the sea.

Upon the whole, Mexico is poorly supplied with water, and, upon the great plateau, the supply has been steadily decreasing since the Spanish Conquest.

#### CLIMATE.

Intersected about midway by the Tropic of Cancer, and stretching across seventeen parallels of latitude, Mexico necessarily enjoys a great diversity of climate. The four seasons are more or less distinctly marked in the northern portion, but in the central and southern portions there are but two seasons—summer, or the rainy season, which lasts from May to October, and winter, or the dry season, comprising the remainder of the year. The heaviest rains fall in August and September. With reference to temperature, Mexico, in common with all the countries of Spanish America, is divided into three great terraces: The coast regions, or *tierras calientes* (hot lands); the mountain slopes, or *terras templadas* (temperate lands); and the elevated plateaus, or *tierras frias* (cold lands).

The Hot Lands include the region along each coast lying between the sea and an elevation of 2,500 feet. In these lands the usual temperature ranges from 70° to 85° F.; but near the sea level, consequently at all seaports, the summer temperature frequently rises higher than 100 degrees; during the winter months the average temperature is only a few degrees lower than in the summer.

The Temperate Lands lie between 2,500 and 5,000 feet above the

sea, and here the ordinary daily temperature ranges between 65° and 70° F. throughout the year.

The Cold Regions include the portions of the surface higher than 5,000, and this division embraces more than three-fourths the area of Mexico. The extremes of 45° and 80° F. are seldom exceeded below 8,000 feet altitude. The climate is cold as compared with that of the coast country; but not as compared with that of any portion of the United States, except portions of Florida and the Gulf Coast.

The healthfulness of the different regions of Mexico depends upon their climate, the most healthy being those enjoying a dry climate, whether hot, temperate or cold, and the most unhealthy being those in which humidity prevails. The climate of the Temperate Lands is healthful and pleasant, and that of the Cold Regions is salubrious below the elevation of 8,000 feet; but the climate of the Hot Lands is one of the worst and most unhealthful on the face of the earth. Yellow fever and black vomit are the great scourges of the coast regions. They usually set in at Vera Cruz about the middle of May and last until November. At Campeachy, Tampico and Acapulco the season often passes without a single case, but no such respite is ever enjoyed by Vera Cruz, Merida, or any of the coast towns of Yucatan, at all of which the mortality is generally great. Mexico has, therefore, every variety of climate, from tropical heat to cold, but it should be noted that the climate of any particular place will depend far more on its elevation than on its latitude.

#### FOOD PRODUCTS.

The soil of Mexico is for the most part extremely fertile. The comparatively few exceptions are nearly all attributable to insufficient irrigation, due to lack of water. In the Hot Lands the entire surface, excepting certain small areas of sand, is covered with a very luxuriant vegetation. Oranges, bananas, rice, hemp, and all kinds of tropical plants are found in abundance. In the Temperate Lands coffee, sugar, cotton, tobacco, and other plants, are cultivated. In the Cold Regions wheat, corn, barley, and other products of temperate latitudes, are found. The maguey, whose fruit is edible and which supplies the famous "pulque," the national beverage of Mexicans, is, however, the principal object of cultivation. Wheat is cultivated with some success in portions of all but five of the Mexican States, but corn, frijoles, or brown beans, and chile colorado, constitute the subsistence of nine-tenths of the population, and are exten-



sively produced in every State. On the plateau north of the twentieth parallel crops depend upon irrigation; south of this, the rain fall is often sufficient, but cannot always be depended upon.

Two crops of either corn or wheat are grown on the same ground every year in the various parts of Mexico, and in the States of Vera Cruz and Tabasco on the Gulf Coast, Mexico on the plateau, and in Jalisco, Guerrero and Oaxaca on the Pacific Coast, three crops of corn are cultivated on the same ground in a single year. The yield per acre per annum is considerably greater than in the United States. All this is done with the simplest farming implements.

The following items will afford an idea of the annual Mexican food production:

Corn .....	200,000,000 bushels.
Wheat .....	12,000,000 bushels.
Barley .....	10,000,000 bushels.
Potatoes .....	4,000,000 bushels.
Frijoles.....	508,000,000 pounds.
Sugar .....	158,000,000 pounds.
Rice.....	33,000,000 pounds.
Coffee .....	17,500,000 pounds.

The annual value of the food crops of Mexico is estimated at \$60,000,000, and of all agricultural productions at \$110,000,000. A large portion of the area under cultivation gives indifferent results, but the remainder is equal in fertility to any country in the world. Mexico has been described as composed of regions of great fertility, separated by mountain ranges, or by tracts of very unproductive country, which, in many cases, are simply deserts. The portions of the country not suitable for agricultural purposes are, in general, more or less suitable for grazing, and support large numbers of horses, cattle, sheep and goats. The rivers and lakes abound in excellent fish, as do also the waters of the coasts. Mexico is also rich in precious metals, which are extensively mined.

#### GOVERNMENT.

Mexico is a federative republic, consisting of twenty-seven States, a Federal District and two Territories, each of which has a right to manage its own local affairs, while the whole are bound together in one body politic by fundamental and constitutional laws. The powers of the Federal Government are divided into three branches, the legislative, executive and judicial. The legislative power is vested in a Congress consisting of a House of Representatives and a Senate, and the executive in a President. Representatives and

Senators are elected by the suffrage of all respectable male adults, and hold office for two years. The President is elected by electors popularly chosen, as in our own country and holds office for four years. The administration is carried on under the direction of the President and a Cabinet of seven secretaries.

Each separate State has its own internal constitution, government and laws, with its governor and legislature popularly elected.

#### DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION.

In 1892 the estimated population of Mexico was 11,885,607, of which nineteen per cent. are of pure, or nearly pure, white race, forty-three per cent. of mixed race, and thirty-eight per cent. of Indian race. The great mass of the people are extremely poor and densely ignorant, the natural result of their treatment by the Spanish conquerors and their successors; but under the enlightened policy pursued by the government of the republic, a great change is in progress, and education is now compulsory. The Indian population has been very little affected by nearly four centuries of contact with the white race. They are to-day very similiar to their Aztec forefathers in manners, customs and mode of life. They follow the same pursuits and use exactly the same implements as did the Aztecs.

Nearly the whole of the Mexican population live in cities, towns or villages. Detached houses are rarely seen; travelers report riding from town to town, in the most populated districts, without observing a house. Except in the Hot Lands the houses are usually built of adobe, and are very strong for defense, and almost impossible to set on fire.

The chief cities are the capital, Mexico, with a population of about 326,000; Guadalajara, 95,000; Puebla, 78,000; San Luis Potosi, 62,000; Guanajuato, 52,000; Leon, 47,000; Monterey, 41,000; Aguas Calientes, 32,000; Merida, 32,000; Vera Cruz, 29,000 (about four-fifths of the exchanges of Mexico pass through this port); Colima, 25,000; Pachuca, 25,000; Jalapa, 18,000.

For convenience in considering the military geography of Mexico, the States of the republic are divided into three groups. The northern groups comprising the States of Sonora, Chihuahua, Coahuila, Nuevo Leon, Tamaulipas, Sinaloa, Durango, and the Territory of Lower California; the southeastern group comprising Yucatan, Campeachey, Tabasco, and Chiapas; and the central group comprising all the remaining States and the Federal District.

Of these groups, the northern, containing more than half the area of Mexico, contains less than one-ninth the population; while the central group, containing less than one-third the total area, contains more than four-fifths of the population. This central region must therefore be regarded as "the heart of the country," not only in geographical position, but also in population; it is also in wealth, productions, manufactures, in fact, in everything but the grazing and mining interests; its boundaries, approximately, are two east and west lines, the one drawn through San Luis Potosi on the north and the other through Orizaba on the south.

#### COMMUNICATIONS.

Mexico is lacking in good roads. From the City of Mexico roads radiate to the different cities of the central plateau, but from this plateau, communication with the coast, with a few exceptions, is limited to bridle paths. There is a carriage road from Saltillo to Monterey and Matamoras; from San Luis Potosi, to Tula and Tampico; and from the City of Mexico to Vera Cruz, Tehautepec, Acapulco and San Blas; but the Sierra Madre Mountains of the Pacific are crossed by no road from Guadalajara to Arizona. Travel from the State of Sonora to the capital must be by sea to one of the Pacific ports, or by way of El Paso in the United States. The roads of the central plateau, poor under the most favorable conditions of weather, are quagmires during the rainy season; those leading to the coast are steep, rough and always difficult to travel. The government has of late years been engaged in improving its highways, but much yet remains to be accomplished.

In railroad communications the country is much better off. It is now pretty well intersected by railways, and their construction is being pushed forward rapidly. In a short time Mexico will possess a system of railroads that will not only develop her great natural wealth, but will greatly increase her power of defense. At present her railway mileage is over 7,000 miles.

The principal lines are: The Mexican Central, from El Paso, Texas, to the City of Mexico, 1,225 miles, with branches; Irapuato to Guadalajara, 160 miles, and under construction to San Blas; Aguas Calientes to Tampico, 415 miles.

The Mexican International, from Eagle Pass, Texas, to Torreon Junction, 383 miles, where it connects with the Mexican Central. Its branches are: Torreon to Durango, 157 miles; Trevino to Tampico, 387 miles.

The Mexican National (narrow gauge), from Laredo, Texas, to Mexico City, 840 miles. Branches: Mexico to El Salto, 19 miles: Acambaro to Patzeuaro, 96 miles. (This branch is being constructed to Manzanillo, 440 miles); Matamoras to San Miguel, 75 miles.

The Mexican Railroad, from Vera Cruz to Mexico, 263 miles, with a branch to Puebla, 29 miles.

The Mexican Inter-Oceanic (narrow gauge), from Vera Cruz to Mexico, with branches from Mexico to Jojulta, 122 miles, and from Puebla to Chialta, 64 miles. This last branch is being continued to Acapulco, 200 miles.

The Mexican Southern, from Puebla through Oaxaca, is now in operation to Tehauntepec.

The Tehauntepec Railroad, from Coatzacoalcos to Tehauntepec, 140 miles.

The Sinaloa & Durango Railroad, from Altata to Culiacan, 60 miles, is to be continued to Durango.

The Sonora Railroad, from Nogales, Arizona, to Guymas, 265 miles.

The Eagle Pass and Laredo lines are connected by cross lines from Sabinas to Lampaxos, and from Jaral to Saltillo.

A glance at the direction of these roads will show how greatly Mexico is favored by them, with the advantage of interior lines for her forces.

Still more developed is the telegraph system of Mexico, which is now extended to all the State capitals and principal cities, and is connected with the systems of the United States. In 1893, there were 37,800 miles of telegraph lines in operation.

#### MILITARY STRENGTH.

The total land fighting strength of Mexico in 1893 was reported to be 131,523 infantry, 25,790 dragoons, and 3,650 artillery. As every Mexican capable of bearing arms is liable for military service from his twentieth to fiftieth year, there would be a general reserve of over one-half million men to draw on in case of necessity.

Her naval strength consists of one 7-knot gunboat, two despatch vessels, two unarmored gun vessels, one transport, one steel training ship, five first-class torpedo boats and one police steamer. The fleet is manned by eighty-four officers and 416 men. In 1890 the mercantile marine, of vessels over 100 tons, comprised sixteen steamers and sixteen sailing vessels. Her shipping also includes many smaller vessels engaged in the coasting trade.

The forces immediately available in case of war are about 2,000 officers and 36,000 men, as follows:

1. The regular army: Twenty-nine battalions of infantry, thirteen regiments of dragoons, four battalions of artillery, engineers, etc. Total, 1,700 officers and 30,000 men.
2. The Rural Guards and Gendarmes, mounted, 3,000 men.
3. The local troops of the several States, about 3,000 men.

The regular troops are well armed and equipped, the artillery being provided with steel breech-loading guns of modern pattern. They do not lack field experience and have shown high efficiency in Indian warfare. Remarkable marching qualities, combined with ease of subsistence, are ascribed to the infantry, while the "Rurals," as a mounted body, is said to be without a superior in the world. It is to be regretted that no information has been received as yet of Mexico's partial mobilization of her forces for war, which recently seemed imminent with Guatemala. Such would be of interest now as indicating her readiness for war, and on which to base an opinion of the efficiency of her general staff.

Railroads constitute Mexico's best means of transportation, and pack animals the next; wagon transportation is undeveloped, due to the nature of the country and the kind of service her regular forces have been called upon to perform.

Mexico has no permanent fortifications of modern design. Works exist at the Capital, Puebla, Vera Cruz, Perote, Acapulco and Mazatlan, but they and the guns manning them are obsolete. An excellent military school, modeled largely after West Point, is maintained near Chapultepec. The country also has in operation a national armory for the manufacture of small arms, and works for the production of powder.

#### FINANCES.

The fiscal value of property in Mexico in 1892 is given as \$497,-865,195, the fiscal value being taken as one-third less than the actual value. The total debt of the country, June 30, 1892, was \$174,449,510. The exports of the country, in 1892-93, amounted to \$87,509,221. The budget estimates of the government for the year ending June 30, 1895, were as follows: Revenue, \$43,074,053; expenditures, \$43,054,371; of the latter, \$10,402,866 were for the army and navy.

## MILITARY CHARACTER.

Captain SHUNK, Eighth United States Cavalry, in an article on the "Military Geography of Mexico" (freely used in the preparation of this lecture), describes the military character of the Mexican as follows:

"Readers familiar with Mexican history, knowing that Mexican armies have been defeated repeatedly by greatly inferior forces of Spaniards, Americans and Frenchmen, will be inclined probably to regard the Mexican soldier as inferior to the soldiers of other civilized countries, and there is much in history to justify such an opinion. However, before accepting this conclusion as final, several facts should be taken into consideration, among them the following:

"1. In the encounters referred to, the Mexican troops were invariably poorly instructed, poorly armed, and destitute of good officers in the lower grades; disadvantages that could not be equalized by the efforts of a few able men in high command. In future wars, this state of affairs will no longer obtain in their regular forces, nor to so great an extent as formerly in any part of their forces.

"2. Their want of good communications and the general poverty of the country have been such that their resources could not be made available on a threatened line in any reasonable time. This condition has almost completely disappeared.

"3. The Mexican soldier has also been accustomed to handle and use firearms from childhood, and he often displays the recklessness and prowess that we are familiar with among our native Indians. In physical bravery and contempt for danger, he will probably be found equal to any soldier he may be called upon to meet. Instances show that Mexican troops, bravely and skillfully led, fight well; poorly led, they are easily stampeded.

"4. The true point of inferiority of the Mexican soldier lies in his dense ignorance; but compulsory education is correcting this evil, and will in time eradicate it.

"5. The marching power of Mexican troops has been commented upon by many officers who have visited the country; and if it has been correctly reported, it far exceeds that of all other countries. It is asserted that Mexican infantry, in small bodies of 2,000 or 3,000 men, has repeatedly marched about fifty miles a day for several consecutive days. While this can scarcely admit of belief, it cannot be doubted that Mexican troops are accustomed to march with greater rapidity than is customary in any other country."

From the foregoing it appears that our neighbor on our southern frontier is not unprepared for war. Her condition is prosperous; her finances are good; her resources in soldiers and supplies are large. Nature with mountains, deserts and climate, has made her strong in defense, and her communications, giving all the advan-



tages of interior lines, increase this strength. Finally it is apparent, with a determined defense, her conquest by an enemy from without must prove to be a great undertaking.

## POSSIBLE LINES OF OPERATIONS.

In the event of war between the United States and Mexico, our country will naturally assume the offensive; if not at first, then shortly after the breaking out of hostilities, and will carry the war into Mexican territory. To prosecute the war to a successful conclusion, it is evident, from what has already been pointed out, that our forces must conquer the great central plateau of Mexico from San Luis Potosi, on the north, to Orizaba, on the south. Our first objective there would be the capital city. Examining the map, we find a number of routes to it. We might base ourselves on the Rio Grande River, and assisted by the railroads, invade Mexico by way of El Paso, Eagle Pass, or Laredo; or, having control of the sea, we might establish ourselves at one of the Gulf or Caribbean ports, or at a Pacific port south of Guymas, and move thence towards the capital. Considering these several routes, reflection will show that the great distance of the Pacific ports from our resources and the lack of roads to the capital, puts these lines out of the question when compared with nearer routes; and that similar reasons—distance from the objective and the character and climate of the intervening country—throw out all sea ports south and east of Vera Cruz. Taking up the other routes, the following table gives the lengths of the remaining lines:

El Paso to Mexico City .....	1,225 miles.
Eagle Pass, via Torreon, to Mexico City .....	1,091 "
Laredo to Mexico City .....	840 "
Tampico, via San Luis Potosi to Mexico City .....	637 "
Vera Cruz, via the Mexican R. R., to Mexico City .....	263 "
Laredo to San Luis Potosi .....	478 "
Tampico to San Luis Potosi .....	275 "

These figures are significant. Controlling the sea as we would in the case considered, they show Vera Cruz to be the available point on the Gulf Coast nearest the capital, 374 miles nearer than Tampico, and 577 miles nearer than Laredo, the point on the Rio Grande closest to the objective. The shortest line, to fight for, if a possible and an effective one, is plainly the best. In the past, Vera Cruz has been an effective point of invasion as attested by the fact that the greatest successful invasions of Mexico have been based on

it—in 1519, by CORTEZ; in 1847, by General SCOTT; and in 1863, by the French. CORTEZ followed the route Vera Cruz, Jalapa, Tlascala, Mexico; General SCOTT, Vera Cruz, Jalapa, Perote, Puebla, Rio Frio, Mexico; the French, Vera Cruz, Orizaba, Esperanza, Puebla, Rio Frio, Mexico. We are warranted in assuming that these lines are still practicable, for, although the armament of armies has been vastly improved since they have been tried, and railroads now follow the routes, yet, as our studies show to be true, the relative advantage of improvements, to the defense and offense, remains about the same.

The absence of suitable roads to the plateau must confine any effective invasion of Mexico, at the present time, by the Gulf Coast, to a base at Vera Cruz or Tampico. A writer in the *CAVALRY JOURNAL* of June, 1892, advocated the latter point as a better base than Vera Cruz, but its few advantages do not offset one great disadvantage. The Mexican Central Railroad runs directly from Tampico to the plateau at San Luis Potosi, distant 275 miles. This line is equally as long as the lines from Vera Cruz, and evidence is wanting that it would be any less difficult to force. The advantages of the port are that it is some 200 miles nearer by sea to the United States than Vera Cruz; that we could count on securing early in the war the control of the railroad from it to Monterey and Laredo, thus giving, in addition to the sea route, an all rail route from our country; and, lastly, the Rio Panuco River, being navigable for small vessels for over 100 miles, and following closely the line of the railroad, would afford greatly increased means of advancing. These advantages are apparent, but the controlling objection to the port as a base is that the point of the plateau we would gain by it would find our army, not at the gates of the capital and chief city of Mexico, but over 300 miles north of it, with a further advance of 140 miles to the west, to capture the City of Aguas Calientes, before we could turn towards it. The great effort that would be necessary to move our army from San Luis Potosi to the capital will be shown later, in discussing invasion from the Rio Grande frontier.

Returning to the Vera Cruz line, two railroads, the Inter-Oceanic (narrow gauge) and the Mexican (standard gauge), paralleling the respective routes of General SCOTT and the French, are now in operation from Vera Cruz to the City of Mexico; they cross each other at San Marcos, 150 miles from Vera Cruz, but for the greater part of the way are separated by lofty and impassable mountains. An old carriage road follows the course of each railroad about one-half the way to the capital. One or both of these railroads must

be the line of advance; the possession of either to San Marcos would give control probably of the other back to Vera Cruz, but possession would be obtained only by overcoming great obstacles and at the cost, certainly, of desperate fighting. Both roads abound in strong defensive positions; both ascend tremendous grades, cross deep *cáñoñs*, traverse brinks of precipices and pass through tunnels; they will be easy for the enemy to destroy and difficult for us to repair, but in the light of past experience they ought not to prove insurmountable obstacles.

A short description of the course of the Mexican Railroad will be sufficient to give some conception of the obstacles that must be overcome in gaining the central plateau. Leaving Vera Cruz, the road crosses a strip of the Hot Lands, a plain thirty miles wide, to the Soledad River, where the ascent to Orizaba, eighty-two miles from Vera Cruz, begins. Orizaba is 4,000 feet above the sea, and in attaining this height the road ascends a tremendous grade and crosses the Barranca de Matlac on an iron bridge 350 feet long and ninety feet high. A few miles beyond Orizaba the road runs in the Barranca del Infernillo, with numerous bridges, tunnels and steep grades, thence to the plains of La Joya, crossing which the road rises an additional 3,600 feet in a short distance and attains the plateau, at an altitude of 7,900 feet, at Esperanza, 111 miles from Vera Cruz. The road then follows, for ninety miles, a broad and generally level plain to Apam, fifty-eight miles from Mexico City, where it passes through a narrow gap into a flat valley, generally five to six miles wide, which it traverses past the northwestern shore of Lake Tezcoco to the capital.

With the difficult Sierra Madre Mountains in rear and with insufficient communications for the prompt withdrawal of a large body of troops, it is not likely that Mexico would seriously oppose invasion in the State of Vera Cruz. Her first great efforts would be met in the defense of the mountain chain. If these efforts should prove futile we must then expect to meet the Mexicans in large force on the plateau in the vicinity of Puebla, which, from its position, would be a strategic point which we would have to take. Victory there will open the way to the capital, and to the objective of the campaign—the destruction of the main army of the enemy. Preliminary, however, to any sustained operations to gain the central plateau, a large depot and entrenched camp must be established across the Hot Lands, at a sufficient elevation above the sea to afford the army security from sickness.

No time should be lost in doing so; the army as soon as de-

barked should be pushed forward rapidly to the point selected. On the line of the Mexican Railroad, Orizaba would be such a point; or, the vicinity of Jalapa, if the advance be by the Inter-Oceanic road.

With Vera Cruz as the point of invasion, our operations on the northern frontier and the Pacific Coast should be limited to diversions, having for their object the capture of important points and the detaching of bodies of troops from the enemy's main army to defend them. The seaport of Tehuantepec at present, and when the railroads now being constructed are completed, Acapulco, Manzanillo, San Blas and Mazatlan, are all especially important points and must be blockaded, and occupied if possible.

Let us now consider the northern frontier. Without entering into a discussion of the War of 1845-7, it may be safely asserted that the expeditions of General TAYLOR and Wool proved that a decisive invasion of Mexico from the Rio Grande frontier was not then practicable, due to the great distance to traverse, the want of necessary supplies in the country, the lack of sufficient wood and water, and the impossibility of protecting long lines of supply from guerilla warfare in which Mexicans are adepts. General TAYLOR advanced with the greatest difficulty to Saltillo although successful in every battle. Urged by the War Department to push on to San Luis Potosi, he objected to doing so, and recommended that Saltillo be held only as a defensive line and all remaining troops be thrown into the column operating from Vera Cruz. Ambition, alone, would have spurred General TAYLOR on had success been probable. The Saltillo desert was in front of him, and its ruinous effects on SANTA ANNA's army, which crossed it to meet him and be defeated at Buena Vista, was known to him. Railroads did not then exist in Mexico. To-day they do, and from our knowledge of the use that may be made of them in war, it is believed the lines running from our frontier now make a decisive campaign from the Rio Grande practicable. But when we consider what such a campaign will require in men and efforts, it is not likely our government would undertake it, unless Mexico should have an ally denying us control of the sea, or making uncertain our ability to establish ourselves at a suitable point on the Gulf Coast. The probable course of such a campaign and the efforts necessary for its successful prosecution are well set forth by Captain SHUNK, in his article already referred to, as follows :

"The choice of a line of operation would be from among the railroads leading into Mexico from the Rio Grande. The first effort

of the main army would probably consist in a movement upon Monterey and Saltillo. Eagle Pass or Laredo would be the starting point. A choice would, no doubt, be largely influenced by topographical considerations. The Laredo route is more direct; but the Eagle Pass route favors an attack in a more effective direction, and would probably be preferred at first, for this reason, and because it is a standard guage road, while the Laredo road is a narrow guage, and especially because points thereon, such as Trevino and Jaral, must be occupied to protect the flank while moving upon Monterey and Saltillo.

"Selecting the Eagle Pass route, the army would probably advance to Jaral. Holding that place by means of a detachment, it could then advance from Trevino upon Monterey and then upon Saltillo. The Mexicans observing these movements, would probably evacuate the country from the Rio Grande to Monterey; and, concentrating all their available forces, would either fight a battle in defense of Monterey or Saltillo, or would retire without much fighting, beyond the desert, using both the railroad line to Tampico and that to San Luis Potosi for the purpose. It is plain that Mexico could not better serve our interests than by putting forth her whole strength in this region; just as the Russians in 1812 might have served NAPOLEON by fighting him on the Vistula, instead of which they preferred to retire among their deserts. But the probability is that the Mexicans would evacuate this region without severe fighting, destroying the railroads and the water tanks in the Saltillo desert. In any event it must be occupied, and an entrenched camp would probably be formed at Monterey or Saltillo, which would be occupied by a strong force to guard against an attack from Tampico and to give security to a further advance. The strategic value of this locality would be very considerable.

"It would next be necessary to establish the army in the fertile and populous districts of the Great Central Plateau. The point to be ultimately secured is San Luis Potosi, as being the first important point south of the desert, on our direct line, by which line it is 240 miles from Saltillo. In the entire distance, water in sufficient quantities for a force of some size, is found only in artificial tanks, easily destroyed by the retreating enemy. If the railroad could supply with water, as well as other necessities, a force large enough to attack San Luis Potosi with a reasonable prospect of success, the attempt should, of course, be made to advance directly. But, as this is out of the question, the army must pass to that point either by following the railroad lines to the east of the desert, or by following those to the west of it.

"The distances are as follows:

From Monterey to Tampico.....	321	miles
From Tampico to San Luis Potosi.....	275	"
Total via Tampico.....	596	"

From Trevino to Torreon.....	160 miles.
From Torreon to Aguas Calientes.....	342 "
From Aguas Calientes to San Luis Potosi.....	140 "
Total via Torreon.....	642 "

"The Tampico line is somewhat shorter; but the Torreon line passes through a less barren country and is entirely secure from the enterprises of an allied army that might land at Tampico and interrupt the communications, should the attempt be made by the eastern line to reach San Luis Potosi.

"By whichever line the attempt be made, the whole strength of Mexico will certainly be encountered. Her railroads furnish ample means for concentrating all her forces at any point between Tampico and Agua Calientes, or between the latter place and Torreon. This is her time to beat back the invading army, if she can do this at all; and the greatest battle of a war begun under such conditions might be expected before the Americans would be allowed to get possession of their objective, San Luis Potosi.

"The distance from Eagle Pass to Torreon is 383 miles; to Zacatecas, 651 miles; thus the Americans, guarding a line 600 or 700 miles in length, would need vastly superior forces in order to put equal numbers in line of battle. Torreon Junction is a point of much strategical importance and, when captured, an entrenched camp would, no doubt, be established there. Detachments would occupy Chihuahua and Durango, and the resources of the country would be secured, while Mexico would be cut off from her north-western States—about one-fourth of her area.

"Under the supposed conditions, it has not been supposed that Mexico would fight a pitched battle north of Zacatecas, because guerrillas operating on the American communications, would compel them to detach so many men that their superiority of numbers would rapidly disappear. But, it has been assumed, that the great battle would be fought in defense of Aguas Calientes, because, while that point was in their possession, the Americans would not dare to attempt to march on San Luis Potosi. If the Mexicans win the battle, the American campaign is checked until reinforcements enable them to resume it. If the Americans win, they establish themselves at San Luis Potosi, thus shortening their line of communications about 250 miles, form an entrenched camp, repair the railroad in their rear, and are now prepared to move upon the capital from their new temporary base, meanwhile guarding a line 475 miles in length—a line about as long as SHERMAN'S line from Louisville to Atlanta. But the capital is still 365 miles distant.

"The Mexican National Railroad is a narrow guage road, while the other lines are of standard guage. The above change of base would be greatly facilitated if the two lines were of the same guage, and this change could be made in a few days as we know by experience. (The P. Ft. W. & C. R. R. was changed in a single day from narrow to ordinary guage, and every regular train ran on time as usual).



"With the principal army thus established at San Luis Potosi, (or perhaps at Aguas Calientes), the war, so far as decisive results are concerned, has really only begun. It has progressed only so far as a European War has done when one army has crossed the frontier and has gained the first action; the army has only reached a position from which a vital part may possibly be struck.

"The next operation would probably have in view the capture of Celaya Junction which would effectually isolate the capital from the north and west. But when the army finally arrived before the capital, there would be behind it a line of communications 840 miles in length. This would have to be guarded against the efforts of a hostile population, greatly addicted to guerrilla warfare. The city itself would be defended by an army behind powerful works, and an ally could land troops at Vera Cruz and send them by rail to their assistance.

"To give an idea of the force necessary to guard such a line, 840 miles in length, let us compare the supposed situation with the very similar one on a much smaller scale of SHERMAN before Atlanta. 'On the 31st of August, 1864, SHERMAN had at the front about 72,000 men, and in his rear about 68,000. (These numbers represent combatants only. He had besides, in his rear, an army of civilian employees engaged in running his trains and keeping the track in repair). His main line, Louisville, Nashville, Stevenson, Chattanooga, the Chattahoochee Bridge, Red Oak, was about 480 miles. \* \* \* It is worthy of note that the portion of the line north of Chattanooga was held by about 533 men per étape (distance of fifteen miles), while that from Chattanooga to Red Oak required a force per étape of 3,500 men.'

"When we consider the force necessary to conduct an operation such as the above, and estimate the strength that would necessarily be employed in guarding the line of communications, enforcing requisitions, checking partisan operations, besieging or garrisoning important places such as Monterey, Saltillo, Torreon Junction, Aguas Calientes, San Luis Potosi, Celaya and many others, quelling uprisings, the difficulties of supply so far from the base, etc., then we begin to appreciate the magnitude of such an undertaking in case we did not control the sea.

"In fact, if Mexico, in the case supposed, should make a respectable resistance, according to the number of her population and the advantages of her topography, the conquest of the country by the overland line of operations (and without the use of the sea) would constitute a task of immense magnitude. And, even with control of the sea, another Mexican war will bear only a faint resemblance to the War of 1846-7, so far as the scale of the operations is concerned."

In that war, Mexico was poor, her people were not united and her government was threatened with revolutions during its progress. To-day Mexico is prosperous, her people are fairly united,

and her government is strong. The United States employed forces in the last invasion aggregating about 100,000 armed men—26,690 regular troops, 56,926 volunteers, and the balance in the navy and supply departments. In another war, these numbers will be but a fraction of the force that will be necessary to bring Mexico to terms.





## THE FORT DONELSON CAMPAIGN.

BY LIEUTENANT JOHN M. STOTSENBURG, SIXTH CAVALRY.

### MILITARY SITUATION AT OPENING OF CAMPAIGN.

THE Civil War had been going on since April, 1861. The main strategical ideas of the North had been to surround the Confederacy by a blockade, to cut it in twain by opening and holding the Mississippi, and to capture its capital. Nothing of consequence had been accomplished in the development of these plans. The policy of the Confederacy was to remain on the defensive. It was considered of the utmost political and military importance for the Confederates to maintain a foothold in Kentucky. Nashville was also considered an important point to hold on account of intense Rebel sentiment and sympathy there.

On January 19th, General THOMAS had defeated ZOLLICOFFER at Mill Springs and caused the Confederates to retreat, but THOMAS was unable to follow up his victory on account of bad roads and lack of transportation. Numerous feints and diversions were made all along the Confederate front, and although General JOHNSTON knew that he was going to be attacked soon, he could not determine whether the blow would come from BUELL or HALLECK, so his forces were divided, about 14,000 being left at Bowling Green in observation of BUELL and about 16,000 sent to Donelson.

Brigadier-General GRANT commanded the District of Cairo. A considerable fleet of gunboats and river ironclads was at Cairo under command of Flag Officer A. H. FOOTE, U. S. Navy.

During the latter part of this month, General GRANT, after consultation with Flag Officer FOOTE, suggested to General HALLECK the feasibility of taking Forts Henry and Donelson by the cooperation of the navy with his command. Reconnaissance had been made between the 15th and 25th both by land and water, and as report had been received that General BEAUREGARD had left the

vicinity of Richmond with reinforcements for JOHNSTON's army, the suggestion was considered timely and practicable, and the movement was ordered February 2d.

The composition of the Union army was as follows:

BRIGADIER-GENERAL U. S. GRANT, COMMANDING.

Organization.	Commanders.	Approximate Strength.	Guns.
First Division...	Brig. General John A. McClernand...	8,000	24
Second Division.	Brig. General Chas. F. Smith.....	7,000	18
Total.....		15,000	42

Of this command there was one regiment and three companies of volunteer cavalry and one company of regular cavalry.

The composition of the naval expedition was:

Gunboats and Ironclads.	Armaments.			
St. Louis.....	4 rifled 42-pounders..	7 32-pounders.	2 8-in. guns...	1 Buckhorn mortar.
Carondelet....	4 rifled 42-pounders..	6 32-pounders.	3 8-in. guns...	
Louisville....	4 rifled 42-pounders..	6 32-pounders.	3 8-in. guns...	1 12-pdr. boat howitzer.
Pittsburg.....	4 rifled 42-pounders..	6 32-pounders.	6 8 in. guns...	
Tyler.....	.....	2 32-pounders.	6 8-in. guns...	
Conestoga.....	.....	4 32-pounders.	.....	

General GRANT's army received reinforcements before the attack, and at the time of the surrender his reinforcements amounted to about 27,000. This does not include NELSON's division from BUELL's army, that arrived the day of the surrender.

General ALBERT SIDNEY JOHNSTON's biographer gives the garrison at Fort Donelson as 17,000 men, but does not include in this estimate about 1,800 men sent there from Columbus by General POLK.

This force was divided approximately as follows: \*

BRIGADIER-GENERAL JOHN B. FLOYD, COMMANDING.

Garrisons of Forts Henry and Donelson.....	5,000
Floyd and Buckner's command.....	8,000
Pillow's command from Clarksville.....	2,000
Clark's command from Hopkinsville.....	2,000
Total.....	17,000

FORREST's regiment of cavalry and six batteries of light artillery formed part of this command.

\* The "Life of General Albert Sidney Johnston," by WILLIAM PRESTON JOHNSTON.



GRANT's estimate of the enemy's forces at Fort Donelson was 21,000.

Forts Henry and Donelson had been located by Confederate engineer officers, constructed and garrisoned. Fort Henry covered an advance by the Tennessee and Donelson by the Cumberland Rivers. Both streams were navigable to a considerable distance above, especially at this season of the year. Fort Henry, which was close to the right bank of the river, consisted of an enclosed work and an entrenched camp, with an armament of ten 32-pounders, two 42-pounders, two 12-pounders, one 24-pounder rifled cannon and one 10-inch Columbiad.

The garrison, commanded by Brigadier-General TILGHMAN, consisted of two brigades, one light battery, with a total of about 2,800 men. On the opposite side of the river the Confederates had started Fort Heiman, which commanded Henry, but could not be reached at that season with artillery on account of bad roads.

Fort Donelson, situated on the left bank of the Cumberland River, ten miles below the town of Dover, was about 100 feet above low water mark. On the water side its armament consisted of two batteries of heavy guns. The lower or water battery contained nine and the upper battery three guns. There were five guns also in the fort bearing on the river. That these batteries were much better situated than those at Fort Henry was demonstrated by their execution on the Union gunboats, and this without the loss of a man. The trace of the main work was 2,000 feet, and enclosed about 100 acres. On the land side its entrenchments extended to the hills two miles to the westward.

Practically there were two deep wet ditches, Hickman Creek northwest and Indian Creek southeast of the fort, due to the back-water in the creeks. These did not interfere much with the movements of the Union army, however, but Hickman Creek gave them an advantage, as their transport could unload in it under cover.

#### FRONTS OF THE ARMIES.

During January, 1862, just previous to the opening of this campaign, the Union and Confederate armies of the Middle West confronted each other; the former occupying the line of the Ohio from Cairo, Ill., through Louisville, Ky., to Cincinnati. General HALLECK and General D. C. BUELL commanded the Union forces on this line. Both at this time were under command of General McCLELLAN at Washington, D. C. They were independent of each other, but were supposed to cooperate.

The Confederates occupied a line generally parallel to the Ohio and covering all the probable lines of operation of the Union army. It extended from Columbus, Ky., which was strongly fortified with 140 guns and garrisoned by about 5,000 men, through Bowling Green to Mill Springs, Ky. The latter was an entrenched camp covering the gaps in the Cumberland Mountains through which ran the railroad connecting Richmond with Nashville and Memphis, Tenn., and through which gaps came much of the Confederate supplies from Alabama and Georgia.

The Confederate headquarters were at Bowling Green, Ky., and General ALBERT SIDNEY JOHNSTON was in command of the whole of their forces on this line.

#### BASES OF OPERATION AND LINES OF COMMUNICATION.

During this entire campaign the Union army was based primarily on St. Louis and Louisville, its secondary base was the Ohio River. Its lines of communication were the Tennessee, Cumberland and Ohio Rivers.

Its lines of operation were: To Fort Henry, the Ohio and Tennessee Rivers; to Donelson, the Ohio and Tennessee Rivers and the wagon roads from Henry to Donelson.

The Confederates were based on Nashville and Memphis and surrounding districts primarily, but had secondary bases at Bowling Green, Mill Springs and Columbus where large quantities of stores were collected. Their lines of operation and communication were, besides the Mississippi, Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers, the Memphis & Ohio and Louisville & Nashville Railroads and connections, and the wagon roads of the country.

#### SUCCESSIVE STEPS OF THE MILITARY OPERATIONS.

February 2d the expedition left Cairo, and arrived on the afternoon of the 4th.

February 5th the expedition landed the army about three miles below Fort Henry, from which point it was to proceed the next day overland and coöperate with Flag Officer Foote in the attack. But as the landing had to be made out of range of the guns of the fort, the army found itself below a swollen creek in a difficult country, and roads and bridges had to be made, so by starting at 11 o'clock, the time agreed upon, it was unable to coöperate with the navy.

The gunboats began the attack at noon and after about one

hour and a half bombardment, the seventy men who were left behind to serve the guns surrendered to the navy, and General GRANT's command moved up and occupied the forts. Fort Heiman was occupied by a portion of General C. F. SMITH's division.

February 6th to 11th was employed by the Union army at Fort Henry in reconnaissance towards Fort Donelson, which was twelve miles distant, though the entrenchments extending out about two and one-half miles from each fort reduced the actual distance to seven miles between outworks.

The reconnaissance developed the following facts as to country, roads, etc. The terrain between these two places according to the official report of the engineer officer was very rolling, thickly covered with timber and sparsely populated. Two good roads were found, one direct, the other known as the Wynn Ferry Road bearing southeast some distance at first, then runs essentially parallel to the first, distance about fourteen miles. These roads were found unobstructed. The bottoms were bad, but the high ground was good for the season.

On the afternoon of the 11th, the artillery and a portion of the infantry were moved back two miles over the worst part of the road to the high ground.

February 12th the Union army left Fort Henry. General McCLEARNAND's division took the southern road and went into position on the right of the Union line, extending beyond Dover. General C. F. SMITH's division took the northern or direct road and went into position on the Union left and enveloped the enemy's position on the north. The divisions came together about two and one-half miles west of Donelson and moved forward to the investment in line of battle. As the line appeared weak, General GRANT sent for General LEW WALLACE's command, which had been left at Fort Henry.

February 6th Colonel HEIMAN and about 2,800 men arrived at Donelson from Fort Henry, reinforcing garrison already there.

February 7th Brigadier-General BUSHROD R. JOHNSON arrived with his brigade and took command.

The 8th and 9th were employed in strengthening earthworks and receiving stores.

February 9th General GIDEON J. PILLOW arrived with 2,000 men and assumed command, and General B. R. JOHNSON was assigned to command of left wing.

February 11th Brigadier-General SIMON B. BUCKNER arrived with a portion of his division, was assigned to command the right

wing and took command of the fort on the 12th during temporary absence of General PILLOW, who had gone to Cumberland City to meet General FLOYD, probably to consult him about disobeying the orders of General JOHNSTON to occupy Donelson.

On the night of the 12th General FLOYD arrived with part of his division, and he assumed command.

At this time the command of Fort Donelson consisted of twenty-eight regiments of infantry, one regiment (FORREST'S) cavalry, some detached cavalry amounting to about half a regiment, and six batteries of light artillery, and for defense were divided into a right and left wing.

The armament of heavy batteries on the river side need not be taken into consideration as far as the army was concerned, although they did such heavy execution on the navy.

February 13th nothing was done on either side except skirmishing brought on by the Union army making changes in their position and further reconnaissance; and an assaulting column of four Illinois regiments was severely repulsed.

On the afternoon of the 13th, the gunboat arrived below the fort with the reinforcements sent by water. A detachment was sent from Fort Henry to disable the Memphis and Ohio railroad bridge at Danville.

February 14th the Union army was inactive except slight changes of position and closing in of the investing lines. About 3 o'clock P. M., the gunboats opened a heavy bombardment on the Rebel river batteries, and made an attempt to run by the fort; this was unsuccessful, and the gunboats had to draw off.

General GRANT concluded to invest Fort Donelson and await repair of gunboats.

At noon on the 14th, General FLOYD held a council of war, composed of his general officers, and it was decided unanimously to make a heavy attack on the Union right at once and open up their communications with Nashville by way of Charlotte. Preparations were made for this movement that afternoon, but were stopped by General FLOYD on General PILLOW'S advice, the latter claiming that it was too late in the day to attempt the movement.

On the night of the 14th another council of general officers and regimental commanders came to the same conclusion. All that night the Confederates massed their army on its left. PILLOW was to be in command of the leading troops, BUCKNER was to attack the right center, and if they were successful he was to cover the movement by taking position in advance of the Rebel works on the Wynn

Ferry Road and cover the retreat of the army and then form the rear guard.

February 15th the Confederates attacked at dawn. They were entirely successful in this attack, and by 9 o'clock had practically accomplished all that the Confederate leaders anticipated. They drove McCLEARNAND's division back and the road to Nashville was uncovered. GRANT had been called to a consultation with Flag Officer FOOTE and did not know what was taking place on his right. On his return he reinforced the right with General LEW WALLACE's division, and ordered General C. F. SMITH's division to make an attack on left as a diversion.

In the meantime PILLOW had jumped to the conclusion that the whole Union army was on the run, and withdrew BUCKNER's division from its position and prepared to make a general movement with his whole army, with the intention of pushing the enemy back upon the river. This move was fatal. McCLEARNAND's division, reinforced by WALLACE regained its lost ground, drove the enemy back and occupied his works. C. F. SMITH's division was as successful on the left, and the Confederate army, defeated and broken up, was caught in a trap.

During the night General FLOYD, with a part of his command, secured the two transports remaining at Dover and slipped away. General PILLOW and staff crossed the Cumberland in a skiff and made their escape. Colonel N. P. FORREST got away with his cavalry on the overflowed river road. And General SIMON B. BUCKNER was left to surrender the command, which he did at daylight the next morning.

There is but little question that during the night many more could have stolen through the Union lines if they had been so disposed, as the weather had turned bitterly cold, the troops were tired, and outpost duty was indifferently performed.

#### RESULTS.

The fall of Fort Henry opened up the Tennessee River to Florence, Alabama, cut off POLK from JOHNSTON, and caused the evacuation of Bowling Green by HARDIE, which General JOHNSTON ordered on the 14th, or as soon as he learned that General GRANT was going to invest Fort Donelson.

Besides the loss of an army, its stores and materials of war, General JOHNSTON realized that after the fall of Donelson, that Nashville could not be held with the forces then available, and that place was

abandoned and occupied by the advance guard of BUELL's army on February 23d.

Columbus, Kentucky, which the Confederates called the Gibraltar of the Confederacy, was turned, and thus had to be evacuated, and Island No. 10 was occupied by the Confederates. Kentucky was thus entirely abandoned to the Union army, and the line of Confederate defense was located in Middle Tennessee. The Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers were thrown open to the North, and formed valuable auxiliary lines of communication in the subsequent operations of the Federal army.

General GRANT, in his "Memoirs," states that the results might have been greater than these if there had been one general with force of character and a strong will in command of all the territory west of the Alleghanies. He thought, and he certainly had good grounds upon which to base his opinion, that the whole Southwest was open to the Union armies, and that they could have marched to Chattanooga, Corinth, Memphis and Vicksburg. Volunteering was going on rapidly in the North, and all that was needed was rapid concentration and a forward movement.

To these material results were added some moral results none the less important. The Confederates, since their success at Bull Run, had freely circulated the opinion that it took ten Union men to whip one Rebel, and that their generals were greatly superior to those of the North. This notion was completely knocked out of their heads at Donelson. It stimulated recruiting in the North, cut off a great deal of territory where the South had received more or less assistance and encouragement and recruits. In fact, just at this time the South was disheartened and sore, and realized that it had undertaken too much.

#### COMMENTS.

This was on the part of the Federal authorities one of the most timely movements of the war, for just at this time the army everywhere and the navy in the Western waters was inactive, and at this particular season of the year the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers were open to large crafts, and unprecedented floods favored the co-operation of the navy. The forts were both incomplete, not fully occupied and armed, and time was needed to strengthen them. But above all BEAUREGARD, with fifteen regiments, was on his way from the Army of Virginia to join JOHNSTON; in fact he started the same day this expedition did.



As a skillful turning movement\* it was the best strategical maneuver on the part of the Federals during the early part of the war. Columbus was considered impregnable and the Mississippi was closed to direct attack, yet this campaign with small loss opened it up as far as Island No. 10, and as General GRANT says, it should have opened it up to Memphis. This was not the fault of the campaign but of the system of handling the war at that time.

The Union commander had one base, the Ohio River, and two lines of communications and one line of operations, via the Tennessee River and the overland route to Donelson. These lines of communication were safe from attack and needed no guard other than the navy. The two rivers lying so close together, a change of the line of communication from one to the other could be effected without danger. They possessed all the advantages of river lines to a high degree, especially at this time, as the wet season improved them, while it had the reverse effect on the country roads. In fact it closed the river road from Donelson, which at the normal stage of the water would have furnished not only FORREST's cavalry, but the whole Confederate army a safe line of retreat.

General GRANT, perhaps, lost nothing by the delay at Fort Henry, because, as the campaign turned out, just so many more were caught in the trap. However, had the enterprise ended in disaster he would have been open to severe criticism for allowing so large a force to collect at Donelson, and the works to be enlarged and strengthened, while he was inactive at Fort Henry. The delay was made to allow the gunboats time to repair and make the circuit of the river, and for reinforcements to arrive. The movement from Henry to Donelson was well executed and skillful. The subsequent delays were due undoubtedly to the friction of the new machinery, as the army was on its maiden campaign and everything was untried.

The student of military art, with nothing to guide him but the history of the campaign and maps of the terrain, has grounds for criticising the dispositions of the Union army in the investment of Donelson, as well as its inactivity for six days. There seems to have been too great an extension of the lines. It strikes the student that the ground might have been better occupied by massing most of the forces from the junction of the roads to Fort Henry on the

\*Although the Fort Donelson campaign has been called by American historians a turning movement, it is in fact a good illustration of a strategical penetration, and one made at the proper moment, viz: before the assemblage of the hostile armies. This was made all the more possible and advantageous in its results on account of the faulty reentrant position of Forts Henry and Donelson in the Confederate lines.

south to the river, as this would have cut off the Confederates more effectually, and would have prevented even their partial success Saturday morning. There was only one way for them to get out of Donelson, and there seems to have been no good reason why their disposition should not have been anticipated. A Confederate attack on any other point than where it was made would have been absurd. And that the Union army was not properly disposed, was proved by the subsequent change from left to right, which had to be made under fire of the enemy.

The Confederate leaders made the first great mistake in fighting for Nashville at Fort Donelson. They also had a mistaken idea of the value of fortifications and entrenched positions, thinking them as valuable as armies in the field. JOHNSTON appreciated the mistake and tried to remedy it afterward by fighting the battle of Shiloh. Forts Donelson, Henry and Heiman were merely useful to close the two rivers. They should have been armed and occupied with this object primarily in view. The Union army would then have had to make detachments to guard or invest them.

General JOHNSTON's second mistake was in dividing his army in holding two points and leaving 14,000 to watch BUELL. This was too large a detachment to leave in observation and too small to fight BUELL's army alone. He here violated what VON DER GOLTZ calls "the second general principle of modern war, namely, to have, if possible, all the forces assembled at the hour of decisive action."

General JOHNSTON's not going to Donelson himself and sending his troops in dribblets and under incompetent general officers, was not among the least of the Confederate blunders. B. R. JOHNSON, PILLOW and FLOYD succeeded one another so quickly in the command that no definite or harmonious plans could be made to meet the impending attack; and when a plan of action had been decided upon, it was not followed when everything pointed to success.

The Confederate depots of supplies were too far to the front, and too much exposed to BUELL's army; they bound the Confederates to them and General JOHNSTON thought they were too valuable to lose without a severe struggle, but he lost anyway when he abandoned them in the evacuation of Nashville.

While General GRANT was lying inactive at Fort Henry, the Confederates had three courses open to them. They might have gone out of their works and attacked the Union army while it was inactive at Fort Henry and only 15,000 strong; or they might have abandoned Fort Donelson, concentrated with HARDIE's command and defeated GRANT in the open field; or they could hold Donelson.

This latter course General JOHNSTON decided to follow, though he did not expect his subordinates to lose his army. He did not appreciate the trap that his army had entered as he telegraphed to FLOYD as follows: "Do not lose the fortress if it can be helped, but do not lose the army anyhow."

The wagon roads from Fort Henry to Donelson might have been obstructed and contested and time gained for the Confederates, but



Fort Donelson.

this would have done no good ultimately unless they received reinforcements.


General BEAUREGARD points out that a strong position and one on the line of defense from Columbus to Bowling Green, about thirty miles above Donelson, where the rivers are only three miles apart, could have been prepared and both rivers closed by a much smaller force. Had this position been assumed, the Confederates' defensive line at this point would have been very strong. The Tennessee River and Cumberland would have been more secure

than the Mississippi, the position being so confined that a detachment was as good as an army.

The Confederates seem to have acted on the supposition that a fortress and entrenched camp were the same thing and required the same method of treatment.

Fort Donelson was a fortress pure and simple, and yet they occupied it with an army as an entrenched camp. After they sought it, as a place of refuge, reinforcements should have been sent forwarded to relieve it. This they had the rail and steamboat facilities to do and they had six days to make the movement in. Their failure to do this cost the Confederacy the loss of their army in Donelson at least. An army can get into one alone, but it needs another one to get it out.

That the Confederates might have occupied Fort Donelson with the garrison from Fort Henry and the troops from Columbus, concentrated their army of thirty thousand against GRANT's twenty-five thousand or less and then turned and defeated BUELL's army either at the crossing of the Big Barren or Cumberland Rivers may now be regarded as one of their lost opportunities of the war.







## SCOUTING WITH MACKENZIE.

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BY MAJOR W. A. THOMPSON, SECOND CAVALRY.

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THE Llano Estacado, or Staked Plains of Texas, consist of a plateau twenty-five hundred to three thousand feet in altitude, three hundred and fifty miles or more north and south, two hundred and fifty or more east and west. To the eye perfectly level, but it is undulating, with long imperceptible rolls, that run north and south. A treeless plain covered with a carpet of very nutritious grasses. The greater portion of this great plateau is dotted thickly with depressions in shape of a wash bowl, that vary in size from one hundred yards to half a mile in diameter. During the rainy season, July and August, these basins are filled to overflowing with water, which percolates through the sand and limestone which underlies the whole plateau, breaking out and flowing upon the surface at the heads of the many cañons that indent the whole eastern side of these plains, forming beautiful limpid brooks, that are the headwaters of the Texas rivers.

This whole section of Texas was for ages the home and general rendezvous of that portion of the Comanche tribe of Indians known as the Twa-ha-das. The Staked Plains had numerous and very large herds of antelope, and as Twa-ha-da is the Comanche name for antelope, it was known as the Twa-ha-da country and the Indians as Twa-ha-das. These Twa-ha-da Indians are a bright, quick-witted race, brave, venturesome, bold and dashing fighters, splendid horsemen, and not cruel to their prisoners. They had been for years raiding Texas, New Mexico and Old Mexico, stealing horses and cattle, fighting and killing the frontier settlers. The United States forces as well as the Texas Rangers had for a long time been fighting these Twa-ha-das, but with meager results, simply because the custom had been to follow these raiding parties to within fifty miles or less of the edge of the Staked Plains and then return.

In 1870, General MACKENZIE was transferred and assigned to the command of the Fourth U. S. Cavalry. For some time previous to this transfer he was colonel of the Fortieth U. S. Infantry, and owing to his superior soldierly qualifications, great talent and untiring energy, both in the field and garrison, he left that regiment with a reputation as first-class soldiers, and surpassed by no regiment in our army. The most important question in the Department of Texas, was how to subdue and rid Texas of these bold Twa-ha-da raiders. The department commander, General AUGUR, selected General MACKENZIE to accomplish it, and authorized him to adopt such plans as he might see fit. At that time, 1870, the Staked Plains, as a whole, was an unknown country to the whites. MACKENZIE's plan of operations was very simple, and it was to take a force strong enough into the enemy's country and attack him wherever he could be found.

The campaigns of 1870-71 were mainly for exploration, for, as he expected, the Twa-ha-das would keep out of his reach and only stampede his horses at night whenever they could, and which they did do, with the loss to his command of eighty horses and several pack mules during 1870.

In 1872, with six troops of the Fourth Cavalry, having become acquainted with the topography of the northern portion of the plains, he made a night march that placed his command in a section of country which enabled him to discover and surprise a large camp of Twa-ha-das on McClellan's Creek near its confluence with the North Fork of the Red River, Texas. The Indians saw the command three or four miles off, as it was passing over a ridge. But dust enveloped the column so that they thought it was only a party of their own people driving a herd of buffalo towards camp for slaughter, as they were drying meat and making pemmican for their winter supplies. The command was thus enabled to reach within half a mile of the camp before the Indians discovered the true state of affairs.

The charge was made in echelon, troops in columns of fours. The General rode by the side of the commanding officer of "A" Troop, which was the base troop. When the troop was near the center of the camp and parallel with a small ridge thickly covered with high grass, about ten or fifteen yards off, about seventy-five Indians raised in line and gave the troop a volley, but fortunately, and what will be the case nine times out of ten, with very little damage, as the volley was high. Like all close Indian fighting it then became general and more or less individual. The fight com-

menced on the 29th of September about 4 P. M. and by 5 o'clock the battle was over. It was one of the most satisfactory victories over Indians the General ever had, for it was complete.

He burned up all their winter supplies and at least one hundred fine wigwams, captured two hundred squaws and children, about 3,000 horses, and killed fifty-two warriors; all this with the loss only of four or five men slightly wounded. It was the most terrible blow these Twa-ha-das had ever received. In making his official report of this engagement, General MACKENZIE reported seventeen dead warriors, as only that number was found and counted. The Twa-ha-da chiefs, after they had surrendered and were living at Fort Sill, Indian Territory, in talking over their fights, and this one on the 29th of September in particular, said that they lost fifty-two warriors.

The commanding officer of "A" Troop cut off and enclosed about eighty warriors in a crescent-shaped ravine, through which ran a good sized brook. About the center was a deep pool some twenty-five or thirty feet long and eight or ten feet wide. When the troop was deployed the flanks commanded the exit of both the lower and upper portion of this ravine. The fighting was close and desperate; the Indians charged the line twice, but were driven back with great slaughter. As fast as the Indians were killed their bodies were thrown into this deep pool, from the fact that almost all Indians have a perfect horror and dread of being scalped after death, as they do not want to appear in the "Happy Hunting Grounds" scalpless. This particular portion of the fight can best be pictured by imagining a troop of men in line on a stage firing into a crowded theater pit.

Until 1874 the General had carried on his campaigns against these Twa-ha-das during the spring, summer and fall months. With the exception of his 1872 fight he had not by any means subdued them or stopped the raiding. In 1874 he decided upon a winter's campaign and made his preparations accordingly. Fort Griffin, Texas, was his base. On the 12th of September he left there with six troops of the Fourth Cavalry and thirty Indians as scouts, and established his sub-base of supplies in Cañon Blanco. On the 27th of September, after a night's march of some thirty miles, from Tule Cañon, he discovered and surprised a number of large camps of Cheyenne Indians in Palo Duro Cañon. A running fight took place, in which three Indians were killed. All the wigwams and supplies in the several camps, were burned and 1,800 head of horses were captured. A few days afterwards he moved north and west of Palo Duro Cañon, and while scouting that section of the Plains, his scouts

captured a party of Mexicans from New Mexico, who had three or four ox teams loaded with supplies and ammunition that they intended to trade to the Twa-ha-das. The wagons were burned up and the command had plenty of beef for some days. Among this party of Mexicans it was discovered that two of them had been raised from children among these Twa-ha-das, and they agreed to pilot the General, for releasing the others, to where the Twa-ha-das had their winter camp.

The command returned to Cañon Blanco and after resting and fitting out for the winter's work left there on the 3d of November, moving southwest into the center of the Plains. It had been the custom for these Twa-ha-das to break up in small bands and establish their winter camps where water flowed. On the 5th of November his scouts discovered and surprised a party of these Indians, with a herd of twenty-eight horses, killing two of them and capturing twenty-seven horses. This party proved to be a raiding party that had just returned from the settlements with the stolen horses. As no white men had ever before been in that portion of the Plains an attack from that quarter was least expected. Night marches were of frequent occurrence, and, a few days after the above noted affair, he surprised a camp of Twa-ha-das, killing three warriors, capturing sixteen squaws and 155 war horses. The General was constantly on the move, from water to water, and while not being able to reach within shooting distance of any more bands of Twa-ha-das he forced them to flee from their camps with the loss of their winter supplies, and this caused a great deal of suffering. The weather was very trying, a day or so of lovely June-like weather followed with cold rains, sleet and snow. His command was clothed, and lived, so far as rations were concerned, with the most Spartan-like simplicity.

This method of scouting was continued for over two months, and when the horses were about worn out, the clothing about thread-bare, and the food all gone, the command returned to Fort Griffin in the latter part of February, 1875, where it was broken up and the troops returned to their different posts. As this was the first time the Twa-ha-das had ever been disturbed and routed out of their winter homes, and the first time the whites had ever explored and become acquainted with that portion of the Plains, the moral effect, as well as the damage inflicted, was more than any kind of a human creature could stand. So the chiefs collected their scattered bands, numbering 1,500, marched to Fort Sill and surren-

dered to the Indian Agent in March, 1875. Ever since this occurrence the people of Texas have enjoyed the blessings of peace.

A study of General MACKENZIE's Indian campaigns will show that the results were the perfect and complete subjugation of the Indians, and the frontier people ever afterwards enjoyed a permanent peace and security. Such has been the fact since he left Texas with his regiment, both in 1875 and in 1879, when he put an end forever to Mexican cattle stealing, and established law and order along our side of the Rio Grande River. His winter's campaign, after a hard, close and desperate fight against the Northern Cheyennes, 1876-77, ended in their complete and lasting subjugation. His expedition against the Ute Indians was a successful one, and while it partook more of diplomacy, it added much to his credit and reputation, for, by his skill, decision and wonderful energy he subdued them completely without the loss of a life. The people of Colorado have him to thank for the peace and security they have enjoyed ever since.

General MACKENZIE endeared himself to all who ever had the honor to serve under his command. He possessed many noble traits of character. He had the faculty of imparting to all under him a high sense of duty, and by his own example educated his officers and men to a high state of discipline and efficiency. He was a man of very deep and intense feeling, of a high-strung and nervous temperament, and those who did not understand him fully, gave him the credit of bordering upon the martinet; but all who did understand his character, knew him to be a man of such a noble heart and of such courage that it was impossible for him to possess a particle of such a spirit.

## REMINISCENCES.

BY MAJOR JAMES M. BELL, FIRST CAVALRY.

AS personal experiences will enter largely into the make up of this paper, I will necessarily lay myself open to the charge of egotism, but I desire to disclaim at the start any such motive, and present my recollections in the hope that they may recall to the older readers of the JOURNAL similar scenes, and convey to the minds of the younger officers an idea of what the cavalry service was on the Plains thirty years ago, under conditions that can never exist again.

The time was when the favorite weapon of the cavalryman was the sword; when the campaign, the scout, the affray, the chase, the long dreary march through blinding sands and scorching sun, over barren wastes of sage brush, cactus and mesquite, taught him fortitude; constantly in danger of a shot from a lurking savage foe, often without food or water, caring little where night overtook him, deprived of all the refining influences and comforts of home, shut off from the pleasures and benefits of civilized life, disregarding considerations of personal comforts, constantly carrying his life in his hands, always on the alert, cemented to his comrades in arms by a friendship that can only be formed in the school of privation and danger, with "*semper paratus*" for his motto, the bold sabreur of early days was the beau ideal of a soldier. Lucky was he, if, in the midst of his active life, he gained a few months rest during the winter. Field service was the rule, garrison life the exception. But all these have passed away, and have, under the enervating times of peace, been replaced by lyceums, essay writing, schools and books. From the present trend of military affairs we are forced to the conclusion that the sword is no longer the weapon of success, but that the pen has opened up the royal road to military honor and preferment. Our biblical friend, Job, was evidently in error



when he wished to punish his enemies by having them write books, or else conditions have mightily changed since then.

During the time of which I speak but few officers were married; now bachelors are the exception, and it is not much wonder that the old Irish captain, when reflecting upon the changed conditions of things, exclaimed: "I have little use for the modern second lieutenant; he reports for duty with a bride on his arm and an application for a school detail in his hand."

Like many young men, who passed through the exciting scenes of the Civil War in the volunteer service, I returned to my home in a condition of unrest, and with a feeling of doubt as to the future. My life plans had been broken up; the prospect of settling down to study, or devoting myself to business was distasteful to me, resulting finally in my acceptance of a commission as second lieutenant in the Seventh Cavalry. Having passed my examination, I joined my regiment, then being organized at Fort Riley, Kansas, in December, 1866. A number of the troops had already been organized and sent to the more remote posts of Harker, Hays, Wallace, Dodge, Lyon and Morgan. The Kansas Pacific, now the Union Pacific Railroad, had been completed as far as Junction City, and most of the grading had been done as far west as Fort Harker. The overland stage lines to Denver, Colorado, and Santa Fe, New Mexico, were protected by two lines of posts, one on the Smoky Hill River, the other on the Arkansas River. These posts, seven in number, were all of a temporary character, rudely constructed of cottonwood logs and rough lumber, and at some of them, particularly Fort Dodge, the officers and men lived in dugouts, with dirt coverings and no floors except what the earth furnished. The comforts now enjoyed by the troops were not dreamed of in those days. Temporary bunks with pole or board slats, supplied with a straw tick, empty boxes, cross sections of cottonwood logs, and empty barrels with the sides cut out and stuffed with hay, made up the sum total of barrack room furniture; tallow dips supplied the illumination; the clothing was poor in quality and often deficient in quantity; the rations were meagre, and as a rule, much deteriorated from lack of proper storage facilities; the Subsistence Department did not furnish the delicacies, such as canned vegetables, fruits and meats that it now supplies, and the few articles of this kind that could be procured were gotten through the post trader at the most exorbitant prices—prices almost prohibitive to the enlisted men.

The personnel of the army at that time also differed very much from what it is now, and was by no means satisfactory from the

standpoint of discipline. All the officers and a majority of the men had served during the war, many of the latter on the Confederate side. These, upon returning to their homes after the surrender had found all their earthly possessions swept away, and nothing was left for them but to seek new fields for their energies. Many from the Union side were induced to enter the service from love of adventure, or the hope of advancement. They were a fearless, yet restless and turbulent lot of fellows, and yielded reluctantly to the discipline imposed upon them by their new environments. Chafing under this new restraint, and rendered dissatisfied by the many hardships they were called upon to endure, desertions became alarmingly prevalent.

The vast undeveloped empire lying between Fort Riley, Denver, the Platte River and Red River, was completely dominated by the powerful tribes of Cheyennes, Arapahoes, Kiowas and Lipans. Their subsistence was furnished by the innumerable herds of buffaloes that roamed over these Plains. Across the home and hunting grounds of these Indians passed annually hundreds of trains laden with provisions and other necessities of life for the hardy pioneer of the mineral regions of the Rocky Mountains and the Pacific Coast, as well as emigrant trains, carrying the families and earthly possessions of men seeking homes in the far, unknown West. How many of them failed to reach their destination was sadly manifested by the numerous neglected graves scattered along the dreary overland highways, lured to their death by the deceptive mirage, or ambushed by bloodthirsty and relentless savages. These Indians for some time had been restless and had threatened hostilities, due to the rapid advancement of white settlements and the building of railroads across their favorite hunting grounds. To hold them in check, and to afford protection to the settlements and the builders of the roads, was the purpose of sending the newly organized cavalry regiments into this region. A suspicious circumstance connected with the Indians was their urgent demands upon the government for arms and ammunition. They had not then discarded the bow and arrow as a weapon of war, and improved fire-arms could not be so readily procured as in later years. Every concession on the part of the government was regarded by them as an evidence of fear, and only served to make them more arrogant and aggressive. Such was the situation when, about March 12, 1867, I was ordered to proceed to Fort Wallace with a detachment of recruits for my troop, "I," Brevet Colonel KEOGH, captain. My first march was to Chapman Creek. Shortly after dark I made an in-

spection of my camp and found to my astonishment that about half my men had taken their revolvers and gone away, and, as I supposed, deserted. I spent a sleepless night in consequence. Fortunately the horses were all present. I anticipated having to continue my march the next day with half my command, but to my surprise the missing men were all present at reveille. They had returned on foot to Junction City to have a night of it, and had walked in all about twenty-five miles. We reached Harker, and proceeded thence to old Fort Hays, located eighteen miles southeast of where the new post of that name was built that year. Here we began to receive rumors of Indians, and it became necessary to exercise the greatest vigilance. My command consisted of twenty-five men, and all, like myself, totally inexperienced in Indian warfare. On the evening of the first day out from Fort Hays, and just as we were going into camp, a small herd of buffaloes was seen grazing on the south side of the Smoky Hill River, and seemed, to my inexperienced eye, to be about a mile away. After giving orders for the night, I crossed the river and started for my maiden buffalo hunt. I fully expected to be on them in a little while, but after riding for half an hour at a good gait, they seemed as far away as at the start. I quickened my pace and in another twenty minutes I had reached a point close enough to make the run. I singled out a young bull, and, after firing several shots at him, brought him to bay, but, unfortunately for me, my horse was so frightened that he lost his head and resisted all the argument I could present with my spurs. I saw by the flashing, angry eyes of the buffalo that he would be upon me in a few seconds, but the horse could not be moved from where he was, apparently rooted to the ground. I saw with dread the charge of the furious beast, and, with all my strength, managed to turn the horse so that he would receive the shock from the rear. The blow was so great that the horse was tossed for several feet and, suddenly realizing the danger of his position, made off at full speed. I was thrown out of the saddle by the shock and found myself sitting on the horse's rump, holding on to the cantle. While the horse was running I managed to regain my seat and get him under control. The shots I had given the bull proved fatal, and when I returned to the scene of the exciting conflict he was dead. In the excitement of the chase I had lost all record of distance and direction, and it was not till 9 o'clock at night that I caught sight of the fire the men had lighted to guide me back to camp. The next day's march brought us into countless herds of these shaggy beasts, grazing in the valley of the Smoky Hill River, and covering the plain north

and south of the river as far as the eye could reach. For three consecutive days and for a distance of seventy-five miles we marched through these herds. The river at this point was very shallow and sluggish, and we camped each night on or near its banks, drinking the water that was a mixture of alkali and filth.

One night my tents were pitched with their backs on the edge of a steep bank devoid of trees or brush. The common tent used for cooking and storage of my rations was only a few feet from the wall tent in which I slept. I arose in the morning expecting to find my breakfast in course of preparation, when I was informed by the cook that all the rations had disappeared. As we had been treated to a vigorous serenade by the wolves during the night, I at once charged the theft to them, but I soon realized the propriety of the man's suggestion that the wolves would not carry off the sacks containing the flour, sugar and coffee. Upon making an examination of the premises I found numerous moccasin tracks in the sand on the river bank. The Indians had stealthily crept up under the bank during the night, raised the back of the tent and stolen everything I had to eat, within a few feet of where I slept. I did not pitch my tents so near the bank again.

I arrived at Fort Wallace early in April and served there till the following November. The garrison was made up of Troop "I," Seventh Cavalry, Brevet Colonel KEOGH, captain, commanding troop and post; Company "E," Third Infantry, Lieutenant JOSEPH HALL, now captain, commanding, and Company "D," Thirty-seventh Infantry, Lieutenant D. MORTIMER LEE, now retired, commanding. Lieutenant BEECHER, who was killed with General FORSYTH the following summer, was on duty at the post. WILLIAM COMSTOCK, who was also killed by Indians the following year, was the scout and interpreter, and one of the most valuable men I have ever known in that capacity. Shortly after my arrival, Company "D," Thirty-Seventh Infantry, was ordered to New Mexico. The construction of a permanent post had been begun, the work being done mostly by the labor of troops. The material used was a very soft magnesian limestone, found in that vicinity; the only tools necessary were cross-cut saws and jack planes. The dust formed by shaping the stones made an excellent cement for laying the walls.

On account of the threatening attitude of the Indians an expedition was prepared at Fort Riley under command of General HANCOCK, Department Commander, and left that post on March 27, 1867, its destination being a large camp of Cheyennes, located on Pawnee Fork, not far from Fort Larned. The purpose of the ex-

pedition was, if possible, to compel the Indians to go upon their reservation and observe treaty stipulations, or fight them if they refused. A point three miles from the camp was reached on April 14th, a council was held that afternoon with the chief men, and an agreement made for a general council the following day. The Indians, as usual, were full of promises; but General HANCOCK found, much to his surprise the next morning, that the Indians had fled precipitately during the night, leaving their lodges and entire camp outfit on the grounds. Everything was at once destroyed, and CUSTER was ordered to follow the fleeing Indians with all the mounted force—eight troops of the Seventh Cavalry. Here began the war of 1867, 1868 and 1869. The Indians fled in a north-westerly direction towards the Platte River, and in crossing the Smoky Hill Stage Line, destroyed a number of stations, killed the keepers and stole the horses. These relay stations were situated from ten to fifteen miles apart; two relays of horses were kept at each and two men were employed to take care of and guard them. Early in June a band of Cheyennes, numbering about 300 bucks, and known as the Dog Soldiers, under the leadership of ROMAN NOSE, a bold and intrepid warrior, made a persistent and successful effort to destroy this line. Troop "F," Seventh Cavalry, had been detached from CUSTER's command to act as escort to trains and stages between Russell Springs and Chalk Bluffs, and on June 8th had an engagement with this band at the latter place. The Indians were so active and persistent, however, that nearly all the stations were destroyed, horses stolen and keepers killed for a distance of 150 miles east and west of Wallace, so that it became necessary for a time to haul the stages over this part of the route with government mules. Two coaches were run together, one carrying the passengers and mail, the other an escort of soldiers. About June 15th an attack was made upon one of these parties near Big Timbers, twenty miles west of Wallace, resulting in the death of two passengers and two of the escort. General HANCOCK about this time decided to make a personal inspection of the situation, and reached Wallace about June 20th, on his way to Denver, taking with him as escort Colonel KEOGH and forty men of his troop, leaving a garrison of about sixty men. ROMAN NOSE was not long in discovering the depleted condition of the garrison, and on the morning of the 22d he paid his respects to the post in a decidedly vigorous manner with his band of 300 warriors. They first attacked the stone train, on its morning trip to the quarries, three miles east of the post, killed several of the drivers and captured a number of mules.

They then made a determined assault upon the garrison, but were finally repulsed with considerable loss, and driven to a ridge about a mile north of the post. The small cavalry force, about twenty-five men, supported by what infantry could be safely spared from the post, pursued them and drove them still further north, the troops occupying the ridge previously held by the Indians. There was temporarily at post a detachment of a sergeant and six men of the Thirty-eighth Infantry (colored). While the fight was in progress I saw this detachment coming from the direction of the garrison in a wagon as fast as the mules could carry them and, upon their arrival, I directed them to deploy on the right of the skirmish line, where they immediately went into action. In a few minutes I observed that one of these men had separated himself from the others by a considerable distance, exposing himself to a heavy fire from the Indians, but before I could order him back to his proper place I saw him fall and throw his legs about in an agonizing manner. I thought of course he was killed, and when the Indians finally withdrew beyond the range of our guns and the men were assembled, I directed the sergeant to take his wagon and bring in the dead dorky, but just then, to my surprise, I saw the fellow get up and walk leisurely towards us, with his gun on his shoulder. As he came up I said, "Are you not shot?" He replied with a grin that absorbed his whole countenance, "No sah, Mr. Lieutenant, I's all right." I replied, "Why I saw you fall and throw your legs and arms in the air, and thought you had been killed; what in the devil do you mean by doing such a thing?" To which he replied, "Golly, Mr. Lieutenant, I jist did dat to fool 'em; I tot dey would tink I was shot, and when dey come to get my scalp I'd git one ob dairs." While it was a foolhardy and dangerous piece of strategy, I could not help admiring the fellow's nerve.

On the 26th of June a surveying party of the Kansas Pacific Railroad, under the direction of General W. W. WRIGHT, arrived at the post, running a line to the Pacific Coast. They were escorted by Troop "G," Seventh Cavalry, Brevet Colonel BARNITZ, retired for wounds received in the battle of the Washita the following year, commanding. On the following morning, the 27th, ROMAN NOSE again paid us a visit; the attack was made just at dawn of day, and in a more vigorous and determined manner than the previous one, but he was driven off after a severe conflict, in which six men were killed and as many more wounded. The Indians also lost heavily. The day following, ten miles north of Wallace, they attempted to capture a train escorted by Troop "A," Seventh Cavalry, carrying



supplies to CUSTER's command, but were again repulsed with some loss.

CUSTER, having failed to find the Cheyennes who had fled from Pawnee Fork, went to Fort Sedgwick, on the Platte River, for supplies, and, after resting a day or two, started across country to Wallace. When about midway, he discovered an Indian trail leading westward, which he followed. The day after his departure from Sedgwick, General SHERMAN arrived at that post, and wishing to communicate with CUSTER, sent Lieutenant KIDDER, of the Second Cavalry, with thirteen men and Indian Scout RED JACKET, to carry his dispatches. To avoid being seen, the detachment marched at night, and for this reason failed to discover the sharp turn made by CUSTER's trail to the westward, and while searching for the lost trail by daylight, was discovered by a band of Indians under the leadership of PAWNEE KILLER. After a desperate struggle the entire party was killed, RED JACKET being the last to fall. In this fight the Indians lost more than man for man. The dead and horribly mutilated bodies were found a day or two later by CUSTER's command on his way to Wallace.

Early in July a battalion of the Fifth Infantry reached Wallace on its way from New Mexico, Brevet Brigadier-General BANKHEAD, commanding. It had not been in camp but a day or two when the cholera made its appearance, a number of deaths resulting. The only woman with the command was the wife of General BANKHEAD, who fell a victim to the disease. A few days later General CUSTER arrived, and had no sooner made his camp than the terrible scourge broke out in his command. The men, much reduced by hard marches and improper food, rapidly yielded to its fatal influences. While CUSTER's command was scouting the country north of Wallace, there was so much dissatisfaction on account of the wretched quality of the rations that the men began to desert in squads, taking their horses and arms with them. The evil was so threatening that the severest measures had to be resorted to. At one of the camps a squad of men left, mounted and armed, in broad daylight. Lieutenants COOK and CUSTER were sent in pursuit with a detachment of men. The deserters were overtaken some distance from camp, a fight ensued, the horses and arms were brought back, but the men were never seen thereafter. A wholesome check was put upon desertion in that command. CUSTER was severely censured for administering such summary punishment, but I think he was justified by the circumstances.

A striking example of the wholesale desertions of that period

occurred at Fort Morgan, on the South Platte, in January, 1867. The post was garrisoned by Troop "L," Seventh Cavalry, Brevet Colonel MICHAEL SHERIDAN, now of the Adjutant-General's Department, captain. Shortly after tattoo one evening the first sergeant entered the barracks and ordered the troop to prepare at once for field service. Forty men of the troop were quietly formed and marched out of the post without the knowledge of Colonel SHERIDAN, who was the only officer present. The detachment continued its march as an organization to within a few miles of Pueblo, when the first sergeant coolly informed the men that they were deserters, and that every man must look out for himself. I was at Fort Riley at this time, from which place Lieutenant ABELL, who had been assigned to SHERIDAN's troop, was ordered to conduct a detachment of forty recruits to Fort Morgan, to replace the deserters. He was ordered to proceed across the country to Fort McPherson and thence up the Platte River to Morgan. A few days out from Riley he was overtaken by a terrific snow storm, which stampeded and demoralized his command so completely that he had only one man left when he arrived at McPherson, and he was only saved by being so badly frozen that he could not desert. This solitary remnant of the command was placed in the hospital, and ABELL reported to his post with nothing but his personal effects and the descriptive lists of his detachment.

Early in July General HANCOCK returned to Wallace from his trip westward, and directed that an effort be made to reestablish the stage line. That part of the line west of the post fell to my lot. Pond Creek Station, three miles west of Wallace, had not been burned. Upon my arrival there with my detachment I found the place deserted, the horses and men nowhere to be found. Search was made, and the dead bodies of the two keepers were found in a Buffalo wallow about a mile north of the station. The horses had been driven off while out grazing; the men had gone to search for them and had been surrounded and killed by the Indians. They had made a hard struggle for their lives, as was shown by the pile of empty shells, but they were too far from the fort for the firing to be heard; the assistance the poor fellows so anxiously looked and hoped for never came, and the Indians added two more to their long list of victims of that fatal summer. I was directed to place at each station a guard of a non-commissioned officer and three men, and to provide them with means of defense. For this purpose circular pits were dug in the ground about ten feet in diameter, just deep enough so that a man standing in them could comfortably aim

over the top. Around the edge of this pit was built a heavy wall of sod, pierced at intervals with loopholes. Across this was laid a frame of logs and brush, on top of which was placed a heavy covering of earth. These little underground forts were connected with the buildings by a subterranean passage, and were supplied with a barrel of water, ten days' rations, and a supply of ammunition, to serve in case of siege, or the destruction of the building by fire. After completing this duty I sent my transportation and escort back to Wallace, and went on to Denver for a few days. Upon the day of our arrival the Indians attacked a large ox train thirty miles east of the town, and had only abandoned their efforts to capture it a short while before our arrival at that point. As the driver and I were the only occupants of the stage, we congratulated ourselves on our narrow escape. The people of Denver, including the stage officials, were badly stampeded, and it was with difficulty that I persuaded them to send out a stage to take me back to my post. Passengers could not be induced to take the chances of the trip, so the driver, one man employed as mail guard, and myself, started on our journey, uncertain as to what the outcome would be. The country was full of Indians, and it would be an extraordinary piece of good luck if we succeeded in getting through without encountering them. Thus we three traveled for 140 miles, when to my delight, I found three men of my troop at one of the stations, who had been sent out as guard to a west bound coach. At the next station I found one of the guards sick with fever. I placed him on a bed spread for him on the top of the coach. The day was perfect and we congratulated ourselves that so far we were all right. We reached Cheyenne Wells a short while before noon, and stopped to get dinner and rest our tired team. The buildings here had not been burned, although several attempts to do so had been made. The wife of the station keeper had been with him through the trying experience of the summer and, being anxious to get out of the country, begged me to let her go with us. I told her she could go if she was willing to take the chances, which she decided to do. All went well till we reached a point midway between Cheyenne Wells and the next station, Big Timbers. At this point the trail crossed a dry fork of the Smoky Hill River. The animals were tired, and while they were slowly dragging the stage through the deep sand of the creek bed, we were startled by a heavy volley fired into us by a band of twenty-five Indians, concealed under a steep bank seventy-five yards away. The stage was riddled with bullets, the glass lamps at the driver's feet were broken into a hundred

pieces, and it was as if by a miracle that any of the party escaped instant death. A number of the shots passed through the top of the stage, scattering the splinters about the woman and me. The three men of my troop were sitting on the top of the stage where the sick man was lying. We seized our Spencer rifles and returned a rapid fire. As we reached the opposite bank of the creek I called to the men to jump to the ground and, seizing the woman, forced her to the floor of the stage, telling her not to move, knowing that if the Indians saw her they would have an additional motive in capturing the stage, and also that the heavy frame work would be a protection to her. I hastily opened the door to get out and while doing so the sick man swung himself from the top of the stage, down through the opening of the door, and as he did so said, "I am killed," and began to deliver to me his dying message to his mother; but there was no time even to listen to such a sad message, for the lives of the entire party were trembling in the balance. We had now reached ground high enough to see that our fire had been effective, and observed the Indians placing the bodies of two dead warriors on their ponies. Those of their party not thus occupied had left their place of concealment and were rapidly riding around our flanks to cut off our line of march. The country was much broken and traversed by ravines. In these they concealed themselves and opened fire upon us as we approached. Fortunately a third Indian was killed who had ventured too close to our trail, but, nevertheless, they kept up the fight for two hours over a distance of more than five miles. Several of our animals were badly wounded, but were fortunately able to keep going till we reached Big Timbers. When the attack was made, seeing how greatly we were outnumbered, none of us entertained the slightest hope that we could by any possibility escape, and we made up our minds to sell our lives as dearly as possible. It was the only time in my life that I experienced the feeling of absolute hopelessness, and I trust I may never be called upon to undergo it again. When we had descended from the high rolling ground into the valley of Big Timbers, and about a thousand yards from the station, the Indians gave up the fight, and watched us from a bluff on which they had assembled. I never in my life was so glad to reach any place as that station.

When we stopped I went to the stage, opened the door, and told the woman that she could now get out. She arose from her prone position and, as she stepped from the stage, remarked, "But I have not seen the Indians yet." I pointed to where they had assembled and told her to gratify her commendable curiosity. She

did not seem to be in the least disturbed or excited by the trying experiences through which she had just passed, and related to me in her impressive manner the trials she had been subjected to in the coach for the two hours she had been lying on the floor. The wounded man had laid down on the back seat and in a few minutes was dead. Every time the stage struck a depression on the trail the dead body would roll of the seat on top of the crouching woman, and it required all her strength to force it back upon the seat. While she was having this ghastly experience she could hear the firing going on outside, not knowing what moment the stage would be captured, subjecting her to a fate worse than death. I listened to her recital with perfect amazement. She showed not the slightest evidence of nervousness or trepidation, and when she had finished her story, I exclaimed: "By Jove, you are a rare specimen; you certainly deserve a chromo."

We proceeded on our journey to Wallace, a distance of twenty-eight miles, without further molestation, the rough and dangerous parts being traversed on foot. This was truly an eventful summer for the troops serving at Wallace. Not a pound of fresh beef was supplied by the Subsistence Department; the rations on hand had been sent there for the use of the volunteer troops in 1865 and were not fit for human food. Buffaloes were to be found within fifteen or twenty miles of the post, but being unsafe to send out small hunting parties, it was rarely that sufficient men could be spared for a force large enough to make it safe, so we usually were without fresh meat of any kind, and were very much in the condition of the troops of the old German captain, who, complaining of the manner in which his troops had subsisted during a long tour of field service, remarked: "My men they don't had any fresh beef for six weeks exceptin' tree ducks." We did occasionally get a stray duck from the pond near the post. For three months no man's life was safe a half mile from the garrison, and during that time we were practically in a state of siege. At the time of my arrival, in April, no graves had been dug in the grounds set aside for the post cemetery, and at my departure, in November of the same year, sixty mounds marked the final resting place of the victims of cholera and Indians, divided about equally between the two. I was not sorry when in November an order came appointing me quartermaster of my regiment, headquarters Fort Leavenworth, and I sang with light heart:

"Oh, Smoky Hill, my Smoky Hill,  
The day has come when we must part,  
And candor bids me freely own,  
How few regrets oppress my heart."

## SHALL NOT OUR LEGAL ORGANIZATION BE RESTORED?

### 1.

IN November, 1897, the Judge Advocate General of the army rendered the following opinion: "By Section 1102, Revised Statutes, Congress has prescribed the organization of the cavalry regiments. To skeletonize some of these troops, which, as I understand it, would be to discontinue them for a time, would be practically to change the organization, and it is, in my opinion, open to serious doubt whether the executive has the power."

Let us consider the laws which established the organization of the army, referred to in this opinion.

In Section 1094 Revised Statutes of the United States it is enacted that the regular army shall consist of five regiments of artillery, ten regiments of cavalry and twenty-five regiments of infantry.

Sections 1090, 1102 and 1106 Revised Statutes, state that each regiment of artillery shall consist of twelve batteries, each regiment of cavalry of twelve troops, and each infantry regiment of ten companies.

By Section 1103 the law requires that each of these troops of cavalry "shall consist of one captain, one first lieutenant, one second lieutenant, one first sergeant, one quartermaster-sergeant, five sergeants, four corporals, two trumpeters, two farriers, one saddler, one wagoner, and such number of privates, not exceeding seventy-eight, as the President may direct.

Similar provisions establishing the enlisted strength of each battery of artillery, and of each company of infantry may be found in Sections 1100, 1101 and 1107 Revised Statutes.

These provisions are still in force. It is clear, then, that the opinion of the Judge Advocate General, rendered with the diffidence of one who regrets to be obliged to censure the action of a former superior officer, expresses between the lines this truth, that no one who has



a fair knowledge of law or of the English language can characterize the action taken in 1890, in skeletonizing fifty companies of infantry and twenty troops of cavalry, as anything but *illegal*.

## II.

The procedure directed by General Orders 79 and 120 of 1890 was, therefore, not justified by law. Was it justified by policy?

The laws organizing our army as it now stands, were made in 1870, at the close of our greatest war, when the country was full of military talent educated in the school of experience. These laws may thus be said to embody the military policy of the United States, as determined upon by that talent. Our great generals, GRANT, SHERMAN, SHERIDAN, HALLECK, MEADE, THOMAS, HANCOCK, some of the greatest soldiers of this century, were then still living. Their influence in public affairs, and especially on military legislation, was great. Congress was filled with gallant officers, men who had held high commands. These men were guided in their acts not by a makeshift policy, but by what was thought to be the best plan for the future military defense of the country. While the size of our army was necessarily limited by considerations of economy, its organization was founded on wise and statesmanlike principles.

The principal features of the plan were as follows:

1. To instruct, by actual service with troops, as many officers as possible.
2. To maintain a large staff, to be ready to assist in the organization and supplying of our volunteers in case of war.
3. With an army small in numbers, to maintain as many organizations (regiments, companies, etc.) as possible, these organizations to be kept at the minimum strength compatible with fair efficiency, but to be filled up to double or triple strength in case of hostilities.
4. To maintain a large proportionate force of cavalry and artillery.

In pursuance of this plan, while but 30,000 men were provided for in appropriation bills, the number of companies of artillery, cavalry, infantry and engineers established by the laws I mention was fixed at 435. The maximum strength of any company was fixed, for the artillery at 147 men; cavalry, 99 men; infantry, 119 men, and engineers, 150 men. What the minimum strength is, is not so apparent; it would seem to be the total of the sergeants, corporals, musicians and artisans, added to the smallest number of privates consistent with the existence of the company as an organized body of soldiers.



These laws thus provided an expansive military organization, suitable for war or peace. The maximum strength of the artillery as contemplated, was in officers and men, 9,190; of the infantry, 30,825; of the cavalry, 12,410, and of the whole army, 55,618.

It is also manifest that the law permitted the expansion of certain corps at the expense of the others, as, for instance, the filling up of the companies of cavalry while companies of infantry were reduced in strength, or *vice versa*, as the necessities of Indian warfare or other contingencies might require. But that to enlarge others, certain companies could be altogether abolished as organized bodies, was, I think, never claimed by any legal authorities.

When, as in 1879, the total enlisted strength of the army was reduced to 25,000 men, it became difficult to provide all the companies in the army with a force of men sufficient to maintain their full effectiveness. Twenty-five thousand men divided among 435 companies, gives fifty-six men to a company. But companies engaged in active service in the Indian country had to be kept full, and this, on the other hand, made it necessary to reduce companies not thus engaged to a depleted strength. Nevertheless, it did not occur to our authorities to abolish or "skeletonize" companies until our greatest emergencies in connection with Indian warfare had long ceased. While our whole army was commonly called a "skeleton" army, we were not yet familiar with the term "skeletonize," which in 1890 came to mean "abolish," "destroy," "wipe out."

Our skeleton companies of those days were not without the strong frame work, the backbone, of living entities. They contained the sergeants, the corporals, the trumpeters, the artificers, and enough experienced men to quickly leaven a mass of recruits, no matter how large, that might in emergency be forced into the company. With the machinery of administration running smoothly and easily, the army might, in case of war, be quickly and easily raised (with the authority of Congress) to the full maximum strength contemplated by law; since these new recruits, who in the volunteers learn only at length after many mistakes and by many hard knocks and much hardship, in the regular army have no such difficulties. Such things as guard duty, the care of arms, pitching tents, making themselves as comfortable as possible, and a thousand other details which volunteer troops find a difficult problem, would be acquired at once and easily, there being always an old soldier at hand to show the recruit how. Accordingly, his drill would be much more promptly advanced than would be the case in the volunteers.

These great advantages were gained by the retention of the

small company. A further advantage gained was connected with the instruction of our officers. Our policy must needs be that in order to bring our volunteer armies into effective shape as quickly as possible, we must educate and keep on hand a large number of trained instructors and officers. (A similar necessity of expansion makes England keep on her lists over 200,000 trained officers.) The proportion of officers in our army was therefore made large. While the companies are small there are plenty of them, in order to afford experience in command, administration, drill, etc., to as many officers as possible. The importance of this instruction cannot be overestimated. The commanding of large bodies of men differs only in degree from the commanding of small bodies. Regiments are but larger companies. The reduction in the number of companies made the chances of a subaltern obtaining or exercising command much more remote. By the abolition of twenty troops of cavalry and fifty companies of infantry in 1890—the equivalent of seven regiments—our lieutenants are made to seem wholly as file-closers and largely deprived of the experience heretofore had in commanding companies, an experience which would be of priceless value to them when as volunteer officers they shall command battalions or regiments.

I think we may, therefore, safely conclude that the skeletonizing of our companies was opposed to the measures for the instruction of our officers and the expansion of our regular army in time of war, and thus, in these respects, subverted the policy of the law of 1870. A skeletonized company is a company that does not exist. In the haste of mobilization for war it is likely to be lost sight of, or if not, its rehabilitation can not be accomplished without great and serious difficulties. Skeletonization, therefore, defeats expansion to war strength.

### III.

Let us consider the few arguments brought forward in defense of this measure.

1. That the abolishing of seventy companies of cavalry and infantry gave an opportunity to fill up the foot batteries of artillery to a more effective strength.

This was quite true. Further, this increase of strength, to a certain extent, relieved Congress of the necessity of providing for the artillery a new organization.

2. It added to the effectiveness of the infantry company by

making it possible to maintain those companies not skeletonized at a more effective strength than formerly.

This was true in part. The effectiveness of the infantry company depended largely on the post commander. With good administration the former company of fifty men was efficient. With bad administration the company of sixty men was inefficient.

3. That the regulation provided a more modern organization for the infantry. The infantry regiment consisted of ten companies; the orders of 1890 cut it down to eight companies. As a regiment of eight companies is divisible into two modern battalions of four companies each, and one of ten companies is not, ergo: eight companies will accomplish more than ten companies. It is pardonable to dissent from this view. And it has to be pointed out that the same order cut the cavalry regiments down from twelve troops to ten troops, thus *destroying* the three battalion organization they had formerly enjoyed.

4. That a larger number of officers being at that time detached from their companies, the abolition of some of the companies would result in the remaining companies being more fully officered. This result did not follow. But in these later years active field service being more rare, and by consolidation the number of garrisoned posts diminished, a less number of officers is needed, and a larger number of officers became available for detached service, and were thus utilized. Further, it may be said that the absenteeism of officers (when they are not absent improperly) resulted formerly in affording an opportunity to exercise command to young officers who are perfectly capable, but have waited vainly for promotion. But with our surplus of officers this does not now occur.

5. Greater economy and care of administration was expected. It is not believed that this has been accomplished in any considerable degree. The measure has lessened the number of non-commissioned officers in the army by some 650, but the small amount of extra pay thus saved is not to be compared with the advantage of affording to so many men a practical military instruction, which often goes far towards fitting them for the duties of an officer of volunteers in case of war.

6. By this measure the number of enlisted men in the cavalry was reduced. The strength of the infantry remained about the same, while the artillery was largely increased. By some this was justified on the ground that the proportion of cavalry in our army is too large.

There are some who even favor a further reduction of the cav-

alry regiments from ten troops to eight troops, arguing that in this way we may assimilate European regiments, which each contain four squadrons, each squadron being composed of two troops or companies.

#### IV.

Taking the last point first, it is difficult to understand why on this continent we should copy accurately the European regimental organization of cavalry. Our cavalry is, and always will be, required here and there in small bodies. A glance at the distribution of our troops shows that while the infantry is maintained in comparatively large bodies, it rarely occurs that more than four troops of cavalry are found at one station together. In many cases we find isolated troops at posts. Over one-third of our domain is, and always will be, sparsely inhabited. Whether the Indians give trouble or not, the necessity for preserving order, protecting the mails, policing the government reservations and national parks, and patrolling the frontiers, will always give work for our troops, which, owing to the vast distances and remoteness from railroads, can only be properly performed by cavalry. Troops, not squadrons, are units which can best be utilized for this duty. A large part of our cavalry must necessarily always be employed in this service. To make our smallest unit the squadron of two troops, will entail needless expense, or else a lack of efficiency.

This, during peace. But in war, also, our organization is not without its merits. It is true that a line of twelve troops, of 100 men each, would make a somewhat unwieldy regiment for one man to maneuver mounted. But if, in war, regiments of four squadrons, each of two troops, are a *sine qua non*, then our 120 troops of cavalry may easily be converted into fifteen regiments\* of the desired size, and this merely by the promotion to a higher grade of five lieutenant-colonels, five majors, five captains, five first lieutenants and fifteen second lieutenants. And for any foreign war in which we may become involved, it surely will not be said (after the ball has opened) that fifteen regiments of cavalry are too many.

But, with our single rank formation, four of our troops in line occupy the same front as four double rank European squadrons. Our squadron, then (which consists of four troops, commanded by a major), is equivalent, as a drill or maneuver unit, to the European regiment. An American squadron, in fact, in point of handiness,

\*  $15 \times 8 = 120$ .

maneuvering power and ability to dismount and deploy on foot, is preferable as a combat unit to the European regiment, being inferior in its strength of officers and men only.

## V.

Regarding the contention that the number of our cavalry is disproportionately large, it may be well to quote the words of one of our deepest thinkers and best soldiers, who in 1877 wrote:\*

"Keeping in mind the fact that the 60,000 to 80,000 cavalry maintained from the beginning to the end of the Rebellion, did not become really efficient till the battle of Beverly Ford, in 1863, after it had been trained for nearly two years; \* \* \* we ought, from our own experience, to follow the example of European nations, and as far as practicable maintain our future cavalry either on a war footing or else on a basis capable of such expansion as to meet quickly the demands of war."

These words are to-day even more true than when written. To reduce our cavalry would be to strike a deadly blow at what is the pride and may be the salvation of our army. Glibed at in 1862, our cavalry, as the war progressed, each day more fully justified the wisdom of those who believed in it and maintained it, until finally, in the closing year of the war, when at last it was allowed to *act*, in the Shenandoah Valley, at Five Forks, in the campaign ending at Appomattox, in the Selma expedition, and throughout the West, it covered itself with glory, that even the most prejudiced could not but agree that it was, in every sense of the word, indispensable to our final success. It was SHERIDAN's troopers who threw the iron net around LEE's exhausted footmen, that ended the war. And we all know what SHERIDAN himself, one of the greatest of modern generals, said, as he gazed on a European battlefield, as to what would be the effect there of a sufficient force of American cavalry handled according to American methods.

Since the War of the Rebellion the cavalry has for many years engaged in a struggle in the West, not as dangerous but as full of hardships, often, as our war in the South. In subjugating the Indians, nine-tenths of the real work was done by the cavalry. This experience has resulted in methods which are superior in many respects to those of any other mounted troops in the world. It is believed that we may truly claim that in equipment, methods of supplying a marching column by pack transportation, knowledge of

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\*"Armies of Asia and Europe," by Major-General EMERY UPTON, U. S. A.

scouting, the care and preservation of horses on the march, the handling of isolated commands, and the knowledge as to when or when not to fight dismounted, we are ahead of any European cavalry. We are free from the superstition that it degrades a cavalry soldier to fight on foot. Our troops when on foot ask no odds from any infantry, or when mounted from any cavalry.

It is the fact that our cavalry is not ashamed to assume the rôle of mounted infantry, when by doing so it may win success, that makes our cavalry so valuable. A military writer has truly said that a force of 20,000 men which can march twenty-one miles a day is equal in fighting power to 30,000 men who can march but fourteen miles a day. If anything, this is understated. Our volunteer infantry is deficient in marching power, and the range of modern firearms and the extent of battle lines is such that the great distances which have to be traversed in making flank attacks or in pursuing effectively a defeated army will surely call in the future for the employment of mounted troops.

But it is only the ignorant who decries cavalry. It is true that the precision of range and volume of fire has increased, and that over an open plain, cavalry, except at night or in a fog, cannot charge unshaken infantry. But battlefields are never open plains. As for fighting infantry, the functions of cavalry as a force are three. First, to fight cavalry mounted. Second, to fight foot troops. Third and last, and that seldom, to fight foot troops mounted. Nearly all military writers agree that in future wars fighting armies will be preceded by immense masses of cavalry, whose duties are to mask and conceal the movements of their own infantry, while they strive to discover, harass and thwart the movements of the opposing infantry. To succeed in this calls for a preponderance of mounted troops. During the Franco-Prussian War of 1870 the German cavalry accomplished this result so thoroughly, owing to the faulty manner in which the French cavalry was handled that the Prussians were at all times kept informed of the movements of their adversaries, while the French on the other hand were at all times in the dark as to the position of the Germans. To this fact is attributed the overwhelming success of the Germans.

In Europe where the keenest intellects of the nations are devoted to the solution of military problems this lesson has not been without its fruits, and thus we see in the armies of Russia, Austria, Germany and France, immense forces of cavalry kept up as part of the regular establishment, Germany and France each maintaining 65,000 cavalry, and other nations in proportion. On her western



frontier alone Russia keeps constantly arrayed menacing Austria and Germany 45,000 cavalry, ready at the first note of war to swarm like a stampede over the borders, inundating the hostile country with fast moving squadrons, tearing up the railways, cutting the telegraph wires, and preventing the assembling of the enemy's forces, while behind this unpuncturable screen of firebrand and pillage, will move slowly forward in hundreds of thousands, the dark masses of the Czar's infantry and artillery.

Russia since 1894 has made a large increase in her cavalry, which now in all has a war strength of 175,000 men, and this increase neighboring powers have hastened to meet. England, in her comparatively small army, maintains a cavalry force of 20,000 men; but this by no means represents her mounted strength, for in the numerous regiments trained as "mounted infantry," she has a force which (while she is unconscious of it) is destined to perform the same duties as her cavalry, the only difference being that war once commenced, some time will elapse before it is discovered that a cavalry soldier must be prepared to fight on foot as well as on horseback. It is evident, then, that the tendency in those countries where the art of war is most deeply studied and where mistakes in military policy are most dangerous to national existence, is to increase rather than to diminish the cavalry force.

Returning again to the proper policy of the United States as regards cavalry, we find that the late war proved that the employment of large bodies of cavalry trained to act when necessary as mounted infantry is particularly suited to our terrain, our resources and our adaptabilities. Horses are more numerous than in almost any other country, and they are cheap. In large sections of our domain railroads are far apart, good roads are scarce, and distances great. On our northern and southern frontiers we find nations with whom we are liable to come into conflict, and in each case we find that the early employment of large bodies of cavalry would be attended with unusual advantages. At the beginning of a campaign great raids into the enemy's territory to break up his communications and disturb his mobilization are found to be an important preliminary. Such was the policy developed by us in 1861-5, and such is the line of action recommended to us by our best military advisers in case of a war with either Mexico or Canada.

In many respects our position as regards an extended use of cavalry is the same as Russia's, and we have every reason to expect the same advantages. As for the excessive cost of cavalry, that is a bug-bear which deserves to be exploded. Instead of cavalry cost-



ing two or three times as much as infantry, the actual cost of our cavalry horses probably averages little over \$100 per year, a sum which is less than one-third the cost of the infantry soldier. Thus, if, as according to the military writer I have quoted, the value of infantry depends on marching ability, our cavalry, considered as "mounted" infantry, are an economy to the government. Since readiness for war often prevents it, a respectable force of cavalry always mobilized and ready for invasion may go far toward securing peace on our borders.

As for duty in times of peace, the scattered condition of our cavalry in the West shows, as has been said, how much it is needed there. But further, in case of riot or disorder in large cities, no force can be employed more advantageously than cavalry. In European capitals it is the cavalry that the mobs erect their barricades against—their object is not so much to stop bullets, as to obstruct the free passage of a force which they fear far more than infantry. The isolated cavalry command can march unchecked in the midst of a riot in which the same number of infantry would be lost. While in order to repel a riot, infantry has no resource but to kill, cavalry is able to preserve order and clear the streets without bloodshed.

Infantry can be extemporized—cavalry cannot. Besides our regular infantry, we rely for defense on the National Guard, practically all infantry. We also, as far as infantry is concerned, hope to utilize masses of volunteers, hastily trained. But no volunteer cavalry can be made fairly efficient without a long course of training. At the outbreak of any war, for cavalry we must depend on our regular regiments. Spare them.

The above facts would seem to indicate that the proportion of cavalry in the army is not greater than it should be, and did not justify the reduction of 1890.

## VI.

When we consider the injury that has been done the cavalry, and the service at large, by the skeletonizing of 1890, it is difficult to understand how, to-day, it can have any apologists. When it occurred, the blow was sudden and wholly unexpected. It received little comment. Its expediency and propriety could not then become the subject of public discussion by those best qualified to judge of it, viz: the officers of the army, for the reason that when first announced it had become an accomplished fact. Moreover, its far-

reaching consequences were not fully understood. Now, that its legality has been denied by the highest authority, it is right and proper to set forth fully its pernicious results as revealed by time.

In each regiment of cavalry two troops, and in each regiment of infantry two companies, were skeletonized in 1890—a total of twenty troops and fifty companies—an equivalent of two regiments of cavalry and five regiments of infantry. The men were transferred to other organizations, the property was turned in to the supply departments, the books were sent to Washington. The officers were borne on the army register as belonging to the skeletonized troops; in reality, they were transferred to other troops. No nucleus remained—no skeleton that could be clothed with flesh; the troops and companies ceased to exist.

This suddenly wiped out of existence many organizations with famous records. In our cavalry it is the troop that is the fighting unit, and the same is true more or less of the infantry company. Many of these troops and companies had existed continuously since the original formation of their regiments. They had taken part in many battles and skirmishes, sometimes, as in Indian fighting, detached and unsupported; their history was the possession and pride of the men who served in them, and their traditions were a precious aid to their discipline and efficiency. The abolition of these organizations destroyed the results of the labor of years of their captains, and dispersed comrades who were endeared to each other by profound ties. The troop was a living thing, with a life, a character, a conscience—it was killed ruthlessly, uselessly.

By this act 210 officers were displaced. These officers are borne on the Army Register as belonging to certain troops and companies when in fact these troops and companies have ceased to exist. The officers are, as a matter of fact, supernumerary; in the administration of the army they are superfluous; made so by the non-existence of their commands. This has resulted in the necessity of sending a largely increased number of officers to duty with schools and colleges, or similar details. When on such details they have little or no opportunity to improve their military efficiency, and on the other hand, owing to the very elementary nature of the military instructions which must be given to those they are sent to teach, (more befitting a corporal's ambition than an officer's) their usefulness is greatly limited. Their services are rarely needed for more than three or four hours per week. Such officers do not earn their pay, and however much they regret this, their sense of soldierly responsibility is dulled. This large number of supernumerary and

partly idle officers attracts the attention of those who are anxious to cut lower the expenses of the government and leads to assaults upon the army. A reduction of our commissioned strength may result, and thus the function of the army as a school of instruction for war be greatly curtailed.

Another harmful result which has come from this measure is in the matter of harmony. In no army in the world is there less discussion and criticism of rule. It is unique in this respect. But when law and regulation are opposed to each other, which should the soldier respect? Is there impropriety in discussing the regulation when it is plainly opposed to the law? The spirit of our institutions, which rests ever on the law as a basis, is too deeply implanted in the hearts of our rank and file to allow them to approve of such an extraordinary contradiction. There has been, accordingly, much discussion, and this discussion has been hurtful to the coördination that should exist in a military body.

## VII.

The last resort, in case the laws of the United States are defied, is the army. Back of the law, stand the courts; back of the courts, stands the army. There was a time (in 1861) when men in authority in the government knowing this, and wishing to overthrow the law, tried in every way to cripple the army. What has happened may happen again. If such precedents as these are allowed, how easy to accomplish this baneful result!

Law, policy, propriety, justice, demand that the legal organization of the army be restored.

## REPRINTS AND TRANSLATIONS.

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### THE QUESTION OF THE CAVALRY HORSE.

Should the state encourage the breeding of the cavalry horse? Has it the means?

Such is the double question which, raised some months ago by various persons in the hippological and political world, discussed in public, has finally been brought before the Parliament.

Breeders, keepers of studs, sportsmen, deputies, each has had his turn in the debate, but no one has said the last word. The evil has been diagnosed, its reality has been in turn denied and affirmed, but the remedy has not been formulated.

So there would seem to be still some utility before public attention, always so mobile, is diverted from this subject, in bringing into the discussion a few arguments, and especially in seeking to deduce some practical conclusions.

#### *Improvement of the Type.*

Improvement of the type of the cavalry horse is at the present time necessary in order to put our cavalry of the first line upon the level demanded by its mission, and permit it to struggle with equal chances against the cavalry of foreign nations.

#### *Increase in Production.*

Increase in the production of saddle horses is equally essential if there are to be found, when requisition for horses is made, the resources that mobilization will require for our cavalry of the second line.

Being desirous of abbreviating this study, we shall look at the question solely from the point of view of the first line. Besides, on the day when French breeding can see an object in the production of the cavalry horse because this production has become remunerative instead of being onerous, the number of saddle horses will be augmented quite naturally, and the resources of mobilization largely increased. Let us hasten to add that all the measures that the state

can take, transitory though they may be, to improve the mount of our second line, will constitute a useful work for the national defense.

*Is it Necessary to Improve the Type?*

Why is it needful to improve the type of the cavalry horse? Such as he is, does he not answer our needs? Has not the cavalry long been content with him?

*Opinion of the Optimists.*

It is in this manner that the adversaries of all change, of all encouragement, express themselves; and many, it must be said, among the most serious minds adopt this too optimistic view.

French breeding, according to them, gives everything that can be desired. The cavalry horses exist; we have only to look for them and pay the price they are worth; upon this single point of the increase of the purchase price we shall all be able to agree in asking of the state some sacrifices. Those who claim otherwise are soreheads who are simply seeking a pretext for debasing the stock; there are, perhaps, behind them some officers who would like to see the remount department lay its hand on the management of the studs. The latter possesses in its half bred trotting stallions, the stock needed for making very satisfactory saddle horses; it has, however, other interests to consider than those of the national defense. Everybody must live, and the breeder lives only by raising horses for commerce—driving horses. These are saddle horses like any others—when they have saddles on their backs. Perhaps they do not gallop very fast, but is that necessary? In the field, say some old generals who have seen service, you always march at the walk; one may charge once by chance, and in order to renew the legendary exploits of REICHSHOFFEN's cuirassiers there is no need whatever of hippodrome charges; it is sufficient to have brave and determined cavalrymen, like those our army is now proud to possess.

*Contrary Sentiment of Cavalry Officers.*

Those are the arguments brought against the innovators who think that everything is not perfect, and that there is reason for trying to get out of the rut.

Well, we think we voice the sentiment of the great majority of cavalry officers when we cry aloud: "No, our cavalry is not mounted as its rôle in modern war demands!"

*The Half Bred Galloper Does Not at Present Exist.*

The half bred galloping horse the remount department does not find, or finds too rarely, because it exists only exceptionally; and this for the reason that its breeding is not remunerative under present conditions. The breeder must be led to produce him. To modify these conditions by means of well considered inducements to thus set horse production in the direction of the needs

of the cavalry, this is the duty of the state. The whole question of the cavalry horse lies within these few lines. It remains for us to prove the truth of our assertions, and to show afterwards that some, at least, of the means that may be employed to attain the desired end are more simple and less onerous than is generally imagined.

*The Cavalry Horse Must Gallop.*

To-day, more than ever, the cavalry horse must gallop and gallop rapidly.

*The German Gallop.*

The Germans have adopted the lengthened gallop of 560 meters to the minute, while with us the gallop of 440 meters constitutes a maximum gait painfully reached, with difficulty maintained; so much so that at the command "charge," the acceleration is hardly perceptible. This very long gallop, as understood by the Germans, should be familiar, not only to a few horses in each squadron, as is now the case, but to all our horses without exception; and this for two reasons: The first is that all cavalymen may be called upon to use it at any moment; the second (and perhaps the more important) is that for horses capable of giving, when called upon, this more than average speed, the ordinary gallop is only a promenade, instead of being, as happens with heavy and common animals, a cause of exhaustion and ruin.

*Utility of the Gallop in the Various Rôles of Cavalry.*

If we pass in review the different rôles that cavalry may have to play, whether it is a question of individual duties or mass action, everywhere and always we shall find *speed* constituting an indispensable element.

*Rôle of the Officers.*

Is there need to speak of the special obligations that rest upon the officers? It is only with very fast horses that they will be able in reconnaissances to attempt bold strokes, to slip between the hostile columns, and defy pursuit from the patrols.

MARBOT relates that in the campaigns in Spain and Portugal the English profited greatly from this manner of operating on the part of their cavalry officers, who, mounted on thoroughbreds, came up and got information from under the very nose of the outposts, and disappeared like arrows at the first sign of pursuit. In a few strides they were out of reach.

Let us take a commonplace example. In the division maneuvers the commanding general and the brigadiers have each behind them officers detached by the regiments and charged with transmitting the orders. Suppose the division commander wishes to order any movement whatever, a change of front or anything else; he gives the order to the officers beside him, detached by each brigade. The latter gallop towards their brigade commander, who in their turn send the order to their colonels by the officers who follow



them. This transmission must be made instantly, and for this the officers must have horses endowed with great speed.

Let us remember also the staff officers who supply themselves with fresh horses from the cavalry corps; no one will deny that they must have very fast horses.

#### *Use of the Gallop by the Troop.*

It seems, however, that so far as the officers are concerned, the question is settled. For the troop the necessities are the same. The ordinary gallop, whatever one may say of it, is a normal gait; there are no maneuvers possible without making the largest use of it; the squadrons must be thoroughly broken to it. Now, if the horses have no blood, if they are not gallopers, they will not be able to bear long the labor of the gallop, especially when they are loaded; their riders will have to hold them up; strained tendons, falls will multiply. This is what happens to-day in too many regiments; and the result is that, through a legitimate fear of being cashiered, officers no longer dare execute the drill at a gallop, even moderately prolonged; as to the fast gallop, one is led to consider it a fantastic gait to be taken twice a year, when one is forced to do so, whereas the drill should be in that gait almost daily. But let us leave general theories and look at some particular cases.

#### *Individual Duties.*

The officers' reconnaissance has attained its end; it is necessary now to have information of the highest importance reach the general; a courier is sent toward him; he must get there. Gallop, my man! Kill your horse if necessary, but get there!

The division is marching to the fight; around it are buzzing the covering patrols. Suddenly one of them perceives the enemy; this information must be taken to the general at full speed in order to allow him to make his dispositions in due time.

A courier is bearing a dispatch; discovered by a hostile patrol, he sees the latter give him chase. If his horse has in his legs only the gallop of 440, while those who are pursuing him gallop at 560, at the end of only three minutes he will have lost 360 metres start; at the end of from five to six he will be taken.

From isolated cases let us pass to the squadrons; the principle will appear with the same obviousness.

#### *Rôle of the Cavalry in Ranks.*

There is a squadron which is the support of the horse artillery of its division; the latter receives an order to move rapidly and take position at 1,500 or 2,000 metres, and starts at the gallop. The squadron, which is on the outer flank, which must pass over an enveloping line and, moreover, gain ground in advance so as to assure the safety of the batteries, is going to make two or three kilometres at a very rapid gallop. A certain other squadron is charged with



going to occupy a bridge, pending the arrival of the infantry. There is urgency; it is necessary, at whatever cost, to bar the road of the enemy. There are two or three kilometres to cover as quickly as possible; on a few moments may depend the most important results. Many other analogous examples might be found.

*Rôle of the Cavalry in Action.*

Let us come to the combat. In the action of cavalry against cavalry, the second and third line will have to face unexpected attacks on the flanks; the effect will be produced only if due to the rapidity of the pace, formation is absolutely instantaneous. Conversely, every offensive movement of the second line in advance of the first will necessitate a march at the rapid gallop.

In action against artillery the foragers must melt away before the pieces, whatever the gait, or else they will succumb under the rapid fire of the machine guns.

Shall we charge yet against infantry? Many deny it. We cavalrymen believe so still, because there will always be critical moments in war when this glorious sacrifice will be asked of us; because there will always be circumstances of time, of place, of atmosphere, which will render a surprise possible; because, finally, if one admits that infantry, in spite of modern bullets, can still march to the assault, there is no reason why our horses, which move more quickly, should not still carry us to the charge. But this charge will have no chance of success unless it be conducted at a desperate pace. The faster we go, the fewer volleys we shall receive; at the same time the moral effect produced on the enemy will be augmented—it will be the *procella equestris*, the equestrian tempest, which overturns everything; otherwise, it will be only the “rush to death,” glorious, but useless.

*The Cavalry Horse Does not Really Exist, Except in the South.*

I think it has been sufficiently demonstrated that the cavalry horse must be a “galloping horse.” Does French breeding produce this horse? Yes, in the South; nowhere else. The South and the Southwest furnish the light cavalry excellent little horses; there one can improve the instrument, but it exists. In the other regions saddle horses are made only by accident. The Normans especially, in order to produce the prize winners of Vincennes or Neuilly-Levallois, sacrifice the type, the conformation, seeking only trotting speed. If, by chance, a breeder possesses a really handsome horse, outside of racing stock, ten to one it is a fancy coach horse.

If one wishes to convince himself of the reality of this assertion, he has only to examine with some attention the classes of saddle horses in the horse shows; in that reserved for small animals one finds remarkable subjects, and in great number; in the class of large horses, nothing; coach horses big enough to break the shafts, but not a saddle horse worthy the name, not a heavy-weight hunter.

This hunter, which is nothing but the ideal cavalry horse, must be sought in England or at the specialist dealers, BARTLETT, HENSMANN, etc., who make a business of importing. All the hunt clubs are provided with English or Irish horses.

The breeders work with a view to the trotter and the fancy coach horse. They are equipped for that and will not admit that those rôles are insufficient. However, it must be said, they serve in this their own pecuniary interests, since they find remunerative markets for only those two classes of horses. Perhaps it would be ungracious to think ill of them if, above private interests, above the interests of a province, they were unable to place the superior interests of the country, of the national defense.

#### *Present Conditions of Breeding in France.*

In what direction, under present conditions, must an intelligent breeder work in order to obtain from his half-bred colts the most profitable results? What is his objective, his ideal? His colt, after having won a few trotting races, or at least satisfied the trotting tests of CAEN or PIN, may be bought as a stallion by the management of the studs, who will consider, before everything, in fixing the price, the performances of the subject—his successes on the track.\*

If, through his less illustrious origin, through the aptitudes that he manifests, the colt does not seem to be able to aspire to so high a destiny, or if the studs refuse him, it is necessary for him to sell as a fancy coach horse. To be sure the breeder does not get the five, ten, or twenty thousand that the state would give him, but he can still hope that the trade will pay for his horse, if he has the appearance and gaits, two, three or four thousand francs.

If, finally, his colt has failed, he will say of him disdainfully, "that one will do for a troop horse," and he will present him to the remount department.

As to the thought of producing a good saddle horse, nearly thoroughbred, built for galloping and jumping, it will never even cross his mind. For no one would ask him for that type, and it would be necessary for it to cross the channel in order to come back with the English label; the amateurs who are able to buy high-priced saddle horses know so well that they are not to be had in France, that they do not think of seeking elsewhere than among our neighbors beyond the channel or their representatives in Paris. And we are in this respect so really tributary to England that our cavalry school at Saumur, having need, a few years ago, of horses capable of galloping and jumping smartly across country, was compelled, following the example of the similar schools of Belgium and Italy, to send its chief equerry to get them in the markets of England and Ireland.

So the ideal saddle horse exists in France only exceptionally.

\*The horse that wins a certain race at Vincennes is bought on the spot for cash at 25,000 francs, even though he may be as ugly as the horse of the Apocalypse.

It results from the conditions surrounding breeding, and from the object the producers set before themselves, that the ordinary saddle horse does not exist either. The one that the remount department purchases, for want of better, is anything whatever; if he is capable of galloping, so much the better; if he is made for hauling wagons, so much the worse; he will carry his cavalryman nevertheless, and will follow along as he can.

At present one can affirm that our cavalry of the line and of the reserve have in their ranks a large proportion (about a third of the effective strength) of carriage or wagon horses. It is permissible to wish, without having dreams too ambitious, that there should no longer be in our squadrons anything but saddle horses.

#### *Opinion of the Germans.*

To those who would accuse us of overdrawing the picture, we shall oppose the opinion of the German officers upon the value of our horses in 1870; if French breeding has made progress since that epoch, the increased needs of the cavalry in horses must rather have lowered than raised the general average, the purchasing boards being compelled, through necessity, to show themselves less fastidious.

We borrow from the history of a Prussian regiment which took part in the great cavalry engagement at Ville-sur-Yron on the 16th of August, 1870, the following quotation: "The French cavalrymen had a martial appearance, a bold presence, but they rode heavy, massive, awkward horses."

The report of the First Regiment of Dragoons of the Guard, published by the general staff, expresses itself thus:

"The horses taken from the French cavalry have, with respect to endurance and strength, answered the conditions of good service. But they were heavy in gait and less manageable than the horses of the Prussian remount department. They are in all respects very inferior. About the best of our captured horses were the little barbe stallions, which, however, are irregular in their gaits, often have bad feet, and are too little for our men."

#### *Remedies Proposed.*

As things now are, is it possible to find a remedy, with the means and resources at the disposal of the state?

Thus is stated the problem whose solution we have to seek.

Certainly, such a question is very complex, and we cannot pretend to analyze all the systems that are proposed so as to succeed in satisfying the legitimate claims of the cavalry, nor to put forth new theories on a subject already quite hackneyed.

We shall limit ourselves to developing a few ideas, those whose applications seem likely to give the most fruitful results, and which are the following:

1st. Necessity of parallel action, except from all feeling of rivalry or mistrust of the management of the studs and the remount service, taking for a principal objective "the cavalry horse."

2d. Possibility of giving to breeding a direction, a rational orientation, by accentuating the difference of purchase price between "saddle horses" and passable horses bought for lack of better.

3d. Creation and development of running races for half-bred horses, and optional substitution of the gallop test for the trot test for stallions presented to the management of the studs.

4th. Supply of all the light cavalry with horses from the South and distribution of the small horses from other regions among all the chasseur and hussar regiments, where they would fulfill a special rôle.

5th. Revision of the regulations on military races with the object of making them concur usefully in the breeding of the cavalry horse.

#### *Parallel Action of the Stud and Remount Departments.*

Without wishing, far from it, to manifest any hostility, any bias against the administration of the studs, we are obliged to declare that a part of its efforts, a part of the sacrifices it makes, are lost to the breeding of the cavalry horse.

We do not wish to criticise the trotter; he creates one of the branches of the horse industry in France, a source of wealth in certain provinces, and meets certain wants. But for the very reason that the trotting type is not what is sought for the cavalry horse, it should not be the object of the exclusive preoccupation of the stud department. Now, is not one warranted in believing that this is the case at present, when we see all the half-bred stallions subjected before their purchase by the state to a trotting test, without any account being taken of their aptitude for galloping?

Undoubtedly the department buys thoroughbred stallions also; but there again they do not seem to us to act for the best interests of the production of the cavalry horse; their purchases profit especially the breeders of thoroughbred horses. Would it not be better to increase the number of thoroughbred stallions (who are in reality the only efficacious agents of improvement) by selecting animals from a class less exalted, but irreproachable as to conformation, which would make good cross breeding stallions, rather than acquiring at great price a few exceptional subjects? Why contest with commerce, or rather with private industry, for which budget considerations do not limit the prices (sometimes of fantastic exaggeration), for the winners of grand prizes, in order to reserve them afterwards for thoroughbred mares of the first grade, who alone should be bred to them? Only the dealers in thoroughbreds, in race horses, profit by this; and these breeders who can find by paying dearer for their horses as good or better in the private studs, and who have hopes of selling their yearlings at 5,000, 10,000 and

15,000 francs, sometimes more, are they as interesting from the national point of view as the producers of cavalry horses? Is it quite necessary that the state should impose upon itself heavy sacrifices in order to obtain the get of "Berenger," "Bruce," or "Krakatoa"? Would not its money be better employed in multiplying the cross-breeding stallions?

If, finally, we look at the question of heavy draft stallions, is it not permissible to think that the action of the department might be more restricted. Could it not limit itself to stationing stallions of this class in certain deserted regions, while leaving in the breeding centers stands duly supervised and encouraged, so as to assure proper service?

This production of heavy draft horses, and in particular that of the Percherons and Boulogne horses, is interesting; but should we sacrifice to it the interests of the army?

#### *Means of Directing Breeding.*

How can the remount department indicate in a tangible manner to the breeders the road it desires to see them enter upon?

The process is simple; it is sufficient, without increasing the average purchase price, or by augmenting it only in the proportion allowed by the budget appropriation, to pay dearer for the good horses, those which are really saddle horses, and to give, on the contrary, a very inferior price for the merely passable animals that one is obliged to take for lack of better.

When the breeder realizes that he is paid for the fleet, blooded horse in proportion to the sacrifices made in producing him, and that in getting rid of his troop horses of inferior quality he scarcely pays expenses, he will try to have good breeding mares, choose for them stallions having blood, and improve his breeding processes.

In order to obtain this result it is necessary to give great elasticity to the purchase price, to raise the maximum for the different classes, and to appeal to the intelligent interest of the commanders of the remount depots.

It is by operating in this manner that the purchasing board of the Cavalry School can to-day procure good thoroughbred horses without exceeding the average price fixed for it.

#### *Direct Purchase by Officers in Open Market.*

On this same subject of the purchase price of horses, we may be permitted to insert a parenthesis. The present regulations allow every officer to buy in the market for his personal use a horse of from five to eight years of age (four to eight years if it is a thoroughbred) and sell it back to the remount commission of his corps. But under what conditions is this transfer effected? The commission can not surpass the maximum price fixed for the arm of service. The result is that the officer who has bought a very good

horse five or six years old, ready to enter service, and who wishes to cause the state to profit by it, sees himself paid the price of a colt three and a half years, which will cost from 1,000 to 1,500 francs for feed, care, etc., before it can be utilized. There is in this a flagrant anomaly; and what is the consequence? Simply that this complementary resource of the remount department, which should bring into the regiment many fine horses, is rendered almost useless. Only the fortunate officers who can take from their pockets several hundred francs in order to get a horse of their choice make this sacrifice, which it would be only rigorously just to spare them.

#### *Means of Modifying the Conditions of Breeding.*

We have tried to indicate in what direction the efforts of the stud and remount departments should be directed. But, it must be said, these efforts will remain sterile if we do not succeed in modifying the conditions of the horse industry and rendering it remunerative to the producer of saddle horses. Under this condition alone can the breeder be made to produce this horse, as he now produces the trotter and the high-class coach horse. Now, what is necessary in order that the breeder, breaking off from routine, shall decide to raise half-bred gallopers? He needs to be shown, alongside of the ordinary expedients by which he gains a livelihood, the possibility of winning a big prize that will enrich him. He must be given the hope, the day he possesses an animal of the first grade, of selling him at an exceptional price, that is to say, a price that is never attained except by the stallion or the race horse. That amounts to saying that we must give the half-bred galloper the entrée to our studs and race courses.

#### *Tests of Stallions at the Trot and Gallop.*

From this point of view a first reform is imperiously demanded. At present every half-bred horse presented at the studs as a stallion must undergo a trotting test and cover a certain number of kilometers in a minimum time fixed by the department; that is to say, the latter intends to buy, outside of thoroughbreds, only trotters. If it is desired to introduce into the national studs half-bred gallopers, hunters whose type corresponds to the real cavalry horse; if it is hoped in this way to offer breeders a remunerative market for their best stock, it is absolutely necessary that the test preceding purchase should be, according to the aptitudes of the animal presented and the choice of its owner, a trotting test or a galloping test. This reform has, moreover, recently been demanded in the Senate.

However, if one relies upon this method, the end will be but imperfectly attained. Purchases of stallions can be made only from a restricted number of animals, and the mares do not deserve less interest than the males.

#### *Running Races for Half-Bred Horses.*

Running races for half-breds will permit this gap to be filled up. The good race horse, whether he has won his laurels on the scales,



over obstacles, or by trotting, acquires a value that cannot be approached by the cavalry horse, be he a model of beauty and endowed with every quality. On the day when, at all the tracks, prizes are reserved for the half-breds, there will be created a new sport; with as much eagerness as they now try to get trotters, the breeders will try to produce horses galloping fast enough to take part in these trials, because their interest will be the same. Among the horses thus raised and brought out on the tracks, all will not possess sufficient speed to justify the hopes of their owners; the less favored will be put aside at the beginning and given over to high-class trade.

The horsemen, the dealers, will find in this class horses which, on account of their build and their aptitude as hunters, will easily compete with the English and Irish horses, which are at a premium to-day. A new market will, by this means, be opened to breeders, to those at least who are willing to run the risk of raising their stock and keeping it up to the age when trade takes it—four-and-a-half years. But there is every reason to think that many would prefer to profit by the advantages offered in the remount department by bringing in their three-and-a-half year old colts. The animals thus bought will be, for the cavalry, chargers worthy the name.

Finally, those of the colts which, while belonging to the same type, could not, on account of their conformation or their parts, pretend to become race horses or fill the stables of the rich, will quite naturally furnish the cavalry the bulk of its quota, and the regiments will receive, instead of defective coach horses, saddle horses more or less distinguished but built for galloping, spiritedly carrying their riders—the kind, in a word, for which the cavalry are sighing.

#### *Beginning of the Application of this Idea.*

This idea of running races for half-breds will, moreover, begin to be carried out this year. The Steeple Chase Society has offered, on eighteen tracks in the provinces, prizes for this class of horses. This is only a first step, but it is one of the duties of the government to encourage and second this initiative.

#### *Difficulties to be Overcome.*

It is not necessary to dissimulate the numerous difficulties that will be met, especially at the beginning. The code of rules for these races will have to be studied with the greatest care, so as to surround them with all the guarantees desirable. To enter into the details of these arrangements, notably the measures it will be necessary to take in order to limit the qualification of horses, would carry us too far. We shall restrict ourselves to answering briefly the principal objections of the adversaries of this institution.

#### *Scarcity of Competitors in the First Years.*

"The races for half-breds," they say, "will exist on the programmes; there will be nothing lacking but the horses! The fields

will be so restricted that the prizes will be at the mercy of a few specialists, and we shall give up very quickly a sport that will fall of itself."

Undoubtedly we must not delude ourselves. The first years will not be very encouraging; the fields will be meagre. But how could it be otherwise? We create these races to produce a type of horse; we cannot hope to immediately find this type matured. The results cannot be appreciated until a generation of half-bred gallopers has had time to develop. Until then we should have to possess ourselves with patience; but these trials will at once attract the attention of breeders and give the first impulse. It will be necessary, besides, to keep from multiplying them at first and trying to do too much. We must begin modestly and increase little by little the number and importance of the prizes, in proportion to the increase in strength of the competitors called to dispute for them.

#### *Danger of Lightening the Type too Much.*

Another serious argument is the following: "Will not the races lead to an exaggerated lightening in the type of the horses destined for the army? In seeking the qualities that give speed, shall we not lose sight of the necessity of having a powerful, stout animal?"

This danger exists, but it rests with the track regulations to ward it off by giving the qualification of "half-bred" only with full knowledge. The maximum degree of blood that is fixed will have to be such that after two or three generations it will be necessary to stop, for the moment, infusing pure blood into the race.

This process is employed in the south to determine the qualification or class of the Anglo-Arabians; so it is neither new nor complicated. The Anglo-Arabians cease to be considered as such when they have more than seventy-five per cent. pure English blood. For the half-breds there will be reason, believe us, to lower this maximum a little in order to remove still farther the thoroughbred type. It is to be considered, moreover, that if the too nearly thoroughbred horse loses its roughness, this only increases its endurance, and there is in this a sort of compensation.

#### *Dangers of Fraud.*

There remains to be met one last argument. "Half-bred races are a chimera! The competitors that present themselves under the name of half-bred, with some chances of success, will be disguised thoroughbreds; fraud will reign triumphant on the race tracks, false registry papers will be at a premium, and the aim will be missed." Such an apprehension is in no wise justified.

Have we not seen the Anglo-Arabian races succeed in the South in the last few years, so much so that last year they acquired citizenship in Paris and figured on the programmes of the *Maisons-Lafitte*. Are these Anglo-Arabians, therefore, disguised thoroughbreds? Assuredly not; otherwise public opinion would have caused

the suppression of races that had become fraudulent. Why, after that, assign to the half-breds the monopoly of fraud?

Let all necessary precautions be taken to prevent its occurrence, nothing more rational; but even when isolated cases appear in spite of everything, would that be a reason for condemning the institution? It is claimed that at the horse shows unscrupulous dealers bring in American horses with borrowed papers. No one, however, thinks of suppressing the horse show.

#### *Means of Fighting Fraud.*

The best means of combating fraud is to be pitiless towards the cheats. At the first attempt duly proven, let the guilty party be decisively ousted from the tracks and declared barred from selling a horse to the remount bureau. After an execution like this the rogues will reflect.

There will, nevertheless, be reason to regulate in a very precise way, the qualification of the horses. To the registry papers, which cause faith, new guarantees may be added; we could render the document more complete by requiring that it be provided with periodical signatures under the charge of the majors. It could be required that the horses race first in the region where they have been raised, where they can be known, before being taken elsewhere. These matters of detail need to be studied; they have an importance upon which it is good to insist.

#### *Budget Difficulties.*

The principle of running races for half-breds being adopted, the budget question must not be a bugbear. The prizes given by the state, modest and few in number at first, will not constitute a heavy charge upon our finances. However, the necessary funds must be found. Their source is quite well indicated.

#### *Means of Overcoming Them.*

Each year the state deducts from the results of the mutual pool a considerable sum, appropriated at present to the improvement of the remount studs. It is very presumptuous to ask that it divert a small part to encourage more directly the breeding of cavalry horses? One hundred thousand francs in prizes allowed by the department of agriculture, added to the eighteen prizes that the Steeple Chase Society gives already, would suffice to obtain this result. We may be allowed to ask if the tax-payers' money would not be more usefully employed in this manner than in buying a single stallion for 125,000 francs.

Moreover, why should not the local racing associations, if duly solicited, become the allies of the state in this praiseworthy enterprise? Why should they not leave on their programmes a little space for half-bred races? These would advantageously replace some of the hurdle races or steeple chases ordinarily contested by

two or three poor thoroughbreds, often geldings, fag ends of the suburban races. Interest in the spectacle would lose nothing by it, and breeding would gain a great deal.

In view of this happy initiative on the part of the state the great racing associations could not look with an evil eye upon the progress of this new sport, which could give them no umbrage. One day, perhaps, the association for half-breds, recognizing that no design were had upon its trotters, would consent to enlarge its programmes and give mixed meets in which the half-breds would alone pay the expenses, as trotters and as steeple-chasers. It would have thus a fine rôle to play and would attract to its special races a public that shows itself somewhat rebellious to the charms of trotting alone.

### *The Light Cavalry Remount.*

The greater part of our light cavalry is supplied with horses from the south or center. However, in seven regiments all or part of the quota still comes from the depots of Caen, Saint Lô, Angers, Fontenay, Paris, Suippes and Mâcon. There results for these corps an incontestable inferiority of supply which we have an interest in stopping. No one indeed dreams of denying the superiority of the southern horse as a light cavalry horse, and if the present state of things is maintained, it is in order to give a market for the product of the other districts in small horses.

Now, it is possible to reconcile the interests of the army and those of the breeders. To do this it must be decided that all the light cavalry shall be supplied principally with horses from the south; at the same time each regiment will be allotted a certain number of horses coming from other sections, which, being heavier, would answer special needs. Those which are of good enough stock would be sought by the rather heavy officers who find difficulty in procuring a mount in the horses from the south; the class reserved for superior officers of infantry and unassigned officers would receive a part of the lot; farriers, hospital men, telegraph operators, who carry some baggage on their horses, would also utilize a certain number. Finally the rest could advantageously replace, upon the heavy baggage and supply wagons, the horses from Tarbes and the like, which, if they are incomparable saddle horses, are in nowise suitable for heavy draft.

The remount bureau purchases annually about 400 horses in the departments of the north and west. By distributing this contingent among the thirty five regiments of chasseurs and hussars, the quota of each would comprise about a dozen animals; on the other hand the fact of sending twelve southern horses less into the twenty-eight regiments where this class forms the total of the present strength, would render disposable about 350 animals, which would assure the remount of the seven other regiments.

For a few years the regiments where the substitution took place would probably suffer a little from the lack of homogeneity. But this inconvenience would be largely compensated by the final result.

Besides, the experiment has already been made. In 1888 the Fifteenth Chasseurs, supplied up to that time with horses from Saint-Lô, began to receive horses from d'Aurillac; and the juxtaposition of these two elements gave rise to no serious complaints.

#### *Military Races.*

Nothing could be more natural than to make the military races serve as an encouragement to the breeding of cavalry horses; we may add, that nothing could be easier. The military authorities have it in their power to attain this important result without having to appeal to Parliament, without its costing the treasury a cent; it is sufficient to amend the regulation which has governed the "military" since 1892. This regulation admits thoroughbred horses to all the officers' races, and limits itself to imposing a weight handicap upon them. The result is, that to have a chance of winning a prize one must have a thoroughbred horse, for the half-bred horses taken from the ranks capable of figuring honorably upon their arrival are met with only exceptionally.

Officers desirous of entering are forced to buy thoroughbreds, which they sell back to the state at a loss of several hundred francs; that is to say, the wealthy officers, and those who act as if they were so, can alone take part in the military races. The others are discouraged and abstain. The "military" are at the mercy of a few specialists, who transport themselves with their "cracks" throughout France and distance the other contestants; whence those slender fields, reduced often to two or three starters.

There is nothing, even to the interdiction against giving a prize to the second horse, an interdiction whose cause escapes us but which the regulation prescribes, that does not contribute to aggravate the evil. As soon as there is a good horse in the race the others give up the struggle.

#### *Revision of the Regulations With a View to Encourage Breeding.*

The regulation of 1892 is, for many reasons, condemned by all the cavalry; the conditions of distance, of weight, that it exacts are recognized as defective. Its revision, awaited with impatience, would be welcomed with enthusiasm.

But from the special point of view with which we are concerned we ask only the introduction of the following provision:

In the races reserved for officers (outside of the "military" of the first and second series, whose conditions are to be modified, which perhaps could be united in a single series, but which must in any case remain open to thoroughbred horses) there is created a special series, reserved for cavalry horses coming from the remount depots, and not to those bought back from officers by the corps remount boards. Qualified as half-bred by their registry papers or recognized as *bona fide* such by a regimental remount board.

*Premiums to Breeders.*

In every race of this series there will be awarded a premium of 100 francs to the breeder of the winning horse.

No horse shall be able to win more than four prizes of this series.

The racing associations in the neighborhood of cavalry and artillery garrisons will be encouraged to cause a race of this series to appear on their programmes, and warned to deduct 100 francs, as a premium to the breeder, from the sum they appropriate to purchase the object of art destined for the winner. If in consequence of an understanding with the minister of agriculture, the latter could include in his budget the premiums to breeders, it would, of course, become useless to employ this means.

The day when this provision has been adopted and made operative it is not to be doubted that the military races, now in atrophy, will take new vigor; they will at least be open to all the young and active officers, to the great advantage of their instruction in horsemanship. On the other hand, the breeders, who, for an animal that has won his four series, will receive 400 francs, will see this sum added to the purchase price of the remount department; for a horse worth from 1,000 to 1,200 francs this will be an appreciable and appreciated supplement. So they will try to produce colts capable of bringing them such a windfall. Would not that be a very well understood encouragement?

An analogous measure could be adopted for the non-commissioned officers' races, reducing the premium to fifty francs.

*Conclusion.*

Although we have reached the end of this study, we have been unable to view on all sides the question of the cavalry horse.

In conjunction with the encouragements that we propose, the state will be able to assist to the extent allowed by the resources of the budget through all the means that competent men may suggest; modifications in the manner of conferring premiums on the colts, augmentation of the number of horses bought, on condition of returning some of them into circulation after their military training, still broader reforms, transfer of mares to the breeders, etc., etc. Each of these questions deserves to be the object of an attentive examination.

But the measures we have indicated present this advantage, that they can be applied immediately and at little expense.

At a period when the most decided good will is often paralyzed by the question of the budget—and also by the difficulty, from the parliamentary point of view, of reconciling general interests with local interests—perhaps an experiment of this kind would be well worth trying.—*Revue De Cavalerie. Translated from the French by Lieutenant Benjamin Alvord, Twentieth Infantry.*



## A CRUISING VISIT TO SOME GERMAN BATTLEFIELDS.

When I drew this picture on the wall, to which I must plead guilty, I was all alone in the room except my excellent friend Major *ABDY*, and I thought it was a very fine picture; but since coming back to it with so many eyes upon it I am a little afraid of it—it looks explosive—but it will have to do duty this evening to enable me to explain the scientific lecture I am about to embark upon. I simply wish to illustrate by this sketch what a necessary article is a canoe in exploring the countries of Europe for purposes of history. My canoe "*Caribee*," which I have here tried to picture, is fifteen feet long; it has a sleeping well seven feet long where one can sleep very comfortably by throwing down a coat or a blanket and wrapping up one's boots for a pillow; and there is a little tent which can be spread between the masts. I carry a spirit lamp and a few articles of stores which do not take up any more room than what goes into a soldier's knapsack. The front compartment is watertight, and the other one also, to within three and one-half feet of the stem and stern, and a little kindling wood is carried in the front compartment in case of having to camp of a wet evening. In the after locker I keep the bedding and all things of that sort in case of a capsized. The little sails here are purely auxiliary. The little fan centerboard of brass takes up no room when it is folded up and it drops perhaps quicker below the keel. The whole boat only weighs eighty pounds, so that it is easily carried on one man's back for short distances, the contents constituting a second load. This little boat has carried me and my maps in a great many countries of the old and new world, and always in the most successful way. A great advantage of that boat springs from the fact that in nearly every country of Europe there are a large number of officials, principally policemen, who make it a business to enquire what the stranger is doing, and it is an enormous convenience to have a little boat that slips along and leaves no trail. A little craft of that kind puzzles them in the beginning, and by the time they have solved the puzzle the boat has gone somewhere else and it is no more their business to enquire what it is. It is an exceedingly valuable boat in that respect. One does not camp until twilight comes on and then one always selects a little open spot above the village, not below it, and no one is notified, and the next morning you cook your coffee between your knees as you float away in the dawn of another day.

This peculiar trip that I am speaking of now was started from the head waters of the Elbe, which is really not the Elbe, but the Moldau. The Elbe runs through the heart of Germany from the top of Bohemia to Hamburg. I shipped the boat by rail from Flushing up to the head waters at Budweis. It is astonishing how little it costs to send a boat of that size half way across Europe. I think it was a matter of 10s. or 12s. The German railways have a very convenient and kind way of charging, only by weight and not by cubic contents as the railways do here, which makes an enormous difference. I found it at Budweis in good condition and I started down towards Prague.

Bohemia is to-day a battlefield of races; it is more insufferable than the most insufferable part of the Transvaal. If you speak to the Germans you are insulted by the Czechs. I have never met anybody who could talk Czech. I do not know what the effect of speaking Czech among the Germans would be, but I found after my first day's experience it was safer to begin with Dutch or English, or anything like that, and to work up very slowly and carefully to the German.

Prague was a place of great interest to me, because it was there that SCHARNHORST died. SCHARNHORST is, I suppose, now universally recognized as the author of the universal service in the army. He was the man who contributed, perhaps more than any other single man, to make Prussia capable of rising against NAPOLEON, uniting all her forces, civil and military, against an enemy who seemed at that time unconquerable. He was a simple, modest, scholarly man—one would have said a most unsoldierly-looking man. He was not a Prussian, and it may be interesting to recall that not a single one of the great men who made Prussia a military power was a Prussian; they were, every one of them, from non-Prussian countries. SCHARNHORST was a Hanoverian; GNEISENAU was an Austrian subject; BLUCHER was a Mecklenburger and saw his first service in the Swedish army; the great Prime Minister STEIN was from Nassau; and HARDENBERG, the Prime Minister who succeeded him, was a Hanoverian. But BLUCHER, and GNEISENAU, and SCHARNHORST, the three greatest generals of that time, were not one of them Prussians.

In Prague I went to see where SCHARNHORST had died, and I assumed that every boy in the streets would be as familiar with SCHARNHORST, who had saved Austria as well as Germany from NAPOLEON, as a boy here would be with WELLINGTON and NELSON, but I could find no one of the average class of men who had ever heard of SCHARNHORST, and it was only when I was, by my host, introduced to a professor at the Prague University, that my efforts were successful. He told me where SCHARNHORST had died in Prague, and I went to the house and climbed up stairs and rang the bell. A very stout lady came out, and I asked her to excuse my apparent presumption in calling upon her, but could she tell me if SCHARNHORST had died here. She told me rather surprisingly that there was no such lodger in the house, and that I had made a mistake. So I went down stairs, and my professor friend was waiting for me down stairs—he was actually afraid to come up; he was a German and the house was Czech. He told me he was quite sure it was the place and that I had rung at the right door. So that is as far as I got in trying to pay my respects to the memory of that great man in Prague.

That recalls to me a trip that I made in another direction. Perhaps I ought to say, first, that the scenery from the headwaters of the Moldau down to Prague is magnificently wild. The peasants there are equally wild, but not magnificent. The principal life is connected with taking rafts down the river. There are many rapids and a few weirs. Sometimes you can shoot them in the canoe. I

shot some, but I shot one too many. I smashed the rear part of my boat and I had to make a raft trip of it for two days, which was very interesting, living with the men and hearing about their life and adventures.

From Prague I paddled down to where there is a little town about three or four miles from the battlefield of Kulm. That battle, as you will all remember, was the sequel to the famous battles round about Dresden, where NAPOLEON smashed the allies completely in the summer of 1813, and where NAPOLEON followed his victory up as far as the little town of Pirna, which is a short way above Dresden. And there he had one of those violent attacks upon his digestive apparatus, the result of his most extraordinary gluttony, and had to turn back, leaving VANDAMME to follow over the mountains. Well, VANDAMME had engaged the Austrian and Russian army near Kulm, and apparently was doing very well, though the allies held their own fairly well. He was expecting momentarily reinforcements which had been promised by NAPOLEON, when suddenly over the brow of the mountains appeared blue coats, and there was a great hurrah and cheering amongst the Frenchmen, and they attacked with redoubled energy; but instead of Frenchmen they turned out to be Prussians under KLEIST. This Prussian general received his later title from NOLLENDORF, and a splendid monument near the palace in Berlin, by reason of having stumbled upon this place near to Kulm without having the vaguest idea that he was going to meet there anything but disaster. He was riding along with one or two of his adjutants, and with tears in his voice, he begged them to tell a fair story of his disaster, saying to them: "I know this will be a disgraceful day, but do speak the truth and say I did my duty as a soldier;" and he supposed of course that he was about to be smashed entirely. Instead of that it was *his* presence which demoralized the French and made him the hero of the battle of Kulm, a reward which he had not deserved. He was most surprised. That illustrates the many surprises there are in war, as in love.

Kulm is the first place that the canoe reached on coming down the Elbe, and it is one of the most historical places in connection with the war of the Prussians in the year 1813 against NAPOLEON. It is a very easy run from the river where you can get a trap for the excursion. There is a castle at Kulm where VANDAMME had his headquarters. I wished very much to see this castle; it was a notable place and I heard that there were some very interesting historical collections there, and I thought that by sending in my card, fortified by a note saying that I was a member of the Royal Geographical Society and of the Historical Society, the owner would let me come in. But no, he sent out word that there was nothing historical about the place, so I must off. Evidently I was there taken for a German also. At any rate, my two samples of Austrian courtesy were not encouraging.

One can see standing near that castle at Kulm the whole of that battlefield of 1813, exactly as it is described in any fairly detailed history. You can see where the Prussians came winding down

over the hills and you can appreciate perfectly how the French made their mistake. They were with their front turned to the south, fighting the Russians and the Austrians, when suddenly this army of KLEIST came down upon their rear and demoralized them. The whole situation is perfectly clear while standing at that point, and it is a most interesting battlefield to study. The Prussians, who were the victors, were so sure they were defeated, that they ran for all they were worth back away from the French; and the French were running in the same direction for the same reason. They got so inextricably confused that when night came and they had run themselves out of breath, they decided to pass the night as friends and to abide by the decision on the morrow; that whichever proved to be the conqueror should take the other in tow.

Then when we came down to the familiar battlefield of Dresden we find that the town has so grown since 1813 that of course much of it is now lost; but standing where NAPOLEON stood up, one gets a tolerable idea of the place.

From Dresden there is a charming little trip out to Bautzen, about thirty miles east of the Saxon capital, through very pleasing scenery. There the whole population still speaks Wendish, and it is the headwaters of the Spree, that runs from there through the great spongy country that furnishes all the water for those lakes about Berlin. That whole country is a paradise for a canoeist, and it is hard to think about battles and war when you have such opportunities of enjoyment there.

At Bautzen, again, one gets the country unspoilt and almost exactly as it was when NAPOLEON brought his artillery up against the position of BLÜCHER. The little heights which the Russians and Prussians occupied stand exactly there as interesting to-day as at the battle of Bautzen. The little river Spree is exactly as it was then, dividing the two forces, and one follows the road by which the Prussians and Russians retreated after that day, leaving 2,000 on the field. My visit to the battlefield was almost in its anniversary in May of 1893, after eighty years' interval, and I ate my lunch on the same spot that NAPOLEON had used to spread his carpet and dinner service before the day's engagement.

Bautzen is one of that chain of battles, as you will recollect, which commenced near Leipzig at Gross Gorschen (it is sometimes called Lützen) on May 2, 1813. There the new army of Prussia fought its first battle against NAPOLEON. Each claimed the victory; but from Lützen they retired in good order to Bautzen where they fought on the 20th and 21st of May. The allies, with only 24,000, checking NAPOLEON with 75,000. They kept fighting these drawn battles and retired in order, and it must have been in reference to these battles that some witty French soldier remarked: "A few more such victories and we are lost." It was at that battle of Lützen that SCHARNHORST was wounded in the leg, and it was from that wound that he died in Prague a month or two afterwards.

When I was working in the German General Staff archives at

Berlin I was shown one of the last letters ever written by SCHARNHORST, and I asked permission to have it photographed, thinking that possibly I could use it in the historical work I was engaged upon at the time. It was done for me and, as far as I know, this is the only *fac-simile* of that letter. It was my intention to present it to your institution if you thought it worth while to take charge of it. [Cheers.]

I have perhaps an exaggerated feeling about SCHARNHORST on account of the amount of work that he had cut out for him in merely keeping in his position. The King disliked him as he disliked every man who was energetic. FREDERICK WILLIAM III. was surrounded at that time by the old style of courtiers who advised always to do nothing, to leave things as they were; and SCHARNHORST was a quiet, patient reformer, who yielded to them at the moment, but always kept this purpose in view and finally produced the reform which to the King seemed pestiferous revolution. FREDERICK WILLIAM opposed universal service in the German army, because he said it would arm the people against their sovereign. He said his crown would be worth nothing if the people had arms, and he wanted only a small select army of guards which might protect him against the radicals at home.

Lützen first gave the "Iron Cross" its significance. It may be interesting just to note here the evolution of the "Iron Cross," and I think you will see the connection at once. There is the cross of the old Religious Order of the German Knights. They were a sort of pious, freebooting lot who got a license from the Pope to colonize and evangelize wherever they could without interfering with other people, mostly up along the Baltic. They built castles and kept the people in order. They were just as pious as the Boers, and I think treated the natives in about the same rough and ready way. This ancient German order is very popular in Germany, and when it came to adopting some popular medal it was readily suggested that there should be a revival of that order. GNEISENAU wished an insignia exclusively for the new levies of volunteers, the militia, the rural soldiers, so as to stimulate the pride of citizens; but it had no reference to the army in general; and as the country was wretchedly poor the mere manufacture of medals was a very serious item. The cross was to consist simply of two pieces of black and white ribbon sown upon the coat. This was in the year 1811, so the design of the "Iron Cross" preceded by two years the date commonly assigned to it. The King opposed the original design because it appeared to him that there was something democratic about it; there was something which he thought was undermining, or subversive of authority; and so when the war did break out he created the "Iron Cross" in its present shape, as a military medal for regulars as well as volunteers.

Iron at that time was in Germany an exceedingly popular symbol, for it indicated the terrible struggles that they had gone through. "Blood and Iron" was then a watchword.

In Germany to-day the credit for conceiving and instituting the

"Iron Cross" is given to FREDERICK WILLIAM III., but I cannot find evidence for this. It seems to me that GNEISENAU deserves this honor.

The German General Staff has produced monumental works in commemoration of the War of 1870, and the battles of FREDERICK THE GREAT. As yet, however, they have not published the history of this War of 1813; perhaps because it was so much of a disgrace to their own army and because the King played so very poor a figure.

In this little sheet that I hold in my hand, less than *Punch* in size, you see the *fac-simile* of the principal newspaper of Germany in 1813. It has four pages and it contains the "Address to *My People*" on the opening of the war against NAPOLEON; and "*To My Army*" there comes the decree establishing the "Iron Cross." It is a curious little thing—it shows, one may say, how the modern newspaper has evolved from it. And this is also significant, because to-day the German Emperor makes his addresses first to the army and last to his people; which would imply that in those days they had more need of the people and so they put the people first.

Here below Dresden is a little place called Torgau, which is now mostly known on account of the "Torgauer March," but near there was born GNEISENAU at a little village called Schildau. It is eight or nine miles from the railway and, I think, as many from the river. I drove over there with the man that carried the post, and he was a very communicative man. So I asked him about GNEISENAU, but he had never heard of him, and this was in the intelligent country of Saxony. I was a little discouraged by this, because I had hoped to learn from him the house where GNEISENAU was born. I knew that it was at an old inn called the "Gold Mug," or something of that kind; and GNEISENAU was born under very romantic circumstances.

It was in the year of 1759, I think, when FREDERICK THE GREAT's army was driving back the Austrians from Torgau. GNEISENAU's father was an artillery lieutenant in the Austrian army and he had run away with the young lady who afterwards became GNEISENAU's mother. During the hurly-burly of that winter's campaign, little GNEISENAU was born in this old inn of Schildau. On the ground floor the walls are at least four feet thick. The house is no longer an inn, but the home of a miller, who has nothing but a cheap lithograph to indicate the interest that attaches to the place. There is not the slightest outside indication that anyone takes an interest in the house, or that anybody makes patriotic pilgrimages to that village of Schildau. One would suppose that the house would be purchased by the nation or, at least, that a plate on the wall would call attention to the great man who here first saw the light.

That night I went to visit the parson of the place, and as he had been newly appointed he was exceedingly energetic and interested. He had never heard about GNEISENAU having been born there, but he produced his church books and looked it up; and then allowed me to take a photograph of the entry in that book according to the



christening. This photograph I have here, and I should like to add this to your other historic treasures [applause]. I feel as though I was purchasing your applause [laughter]. But the historic interest of this is that it gives the complete and obvious reason why GNEISENAU's mother does not appear on the register of her son's baptism. There was, as you will see by this, no officer of importance present at the ceremony. It was evidently a painful ordeal. She hurried off with her all too heavy, if not unhallowed burden, and the child fell from her arms at night (whether intentionally or by accident we shall never know) and would have been run over by the next artillery wagon if some kindly soldier had not picked it up and brought it to the mother again. Whether it was a welcome return I do not know either. Little GNEISENAU's mother soon died of shame, neglect and suffering, and he was farmed out to some peasants in the neighborhood. But the father, whose name was NEIDHART, soon forgot to make payments, and the little boy was set to attending geese in order to earn his bread.

One day a peddler or a tramp came by there begging and the little boy had nothing to give him. But he said he had at home a hymn book of his mother's; so he ran back and got the hymn book and gave it to the tramp, and the tramp took it and tried to raise some money on it. But the person to whom the tramp first brought the book was suspicious; and upon examining it discovered the names of his mother's parents. By that means the child became known, and pretty soon a coach and four drove up and took the little boy away, and he was educated and lived to become BLÜCHER's chief of staff. He discovered, or somebody discovered for him by a process of reasoning which is quite beyond my faculties, that his ancestors had had a castle called Gneisenau somewhere in past ages. On the strength of this shady knowledge he assumed the new name and dignity. When he grew up he entered the Prussian army and found that it was customary under the GREAT FREDERICK that officers should either be noble or, at least, claim nobility—about the origin of which they were not very particular in those days. So he at once changed from NEIDHART to GNEISENAU.

The uninitiated is a little puzzled to discover why he never called himself "of Schildau," but preferred to be entered as "of Torgau," when he went to the University of Erfurt at the age of sixteen. It seems that Schildau has a reputation for uniting all the "sillies" of Germany. Whenever you tell an outrageous story about a fool it is always somebody from Schildau, and the name of "Schildauer" is a synonym for all that is absurd. They still tell the story about a woman of Schildau who had a cow, which she desired to pasture upon the town walls, but strangled the beast in her efforts to pull it up. Another story refers to a house that was supposed to be on fire. The people rushed out with their buckets and pumps, and squirted water over the house and finally discovered that it was no fire at all, but merely the reflection of the moon upon the window panes, and so on *ad infinitum*. All such stories in Germany are attributed to Schildauans. But such trifles as these were enough to

affect history, and so make people for a long time believe that GNEISENAU was born, not in Schildau, but in Torgau. Fortunately this fac-simile *here* is able to give us the true birthplace and birthday of the only citizen of Schildau who was not made to be laughed at.

The battlefield of Leipzig will always be interesting; although it is such an enormous task to get about it that one forgets what one saw first, when the last field is reached. One is shown the spot where PONYATOSKI, the plucky Pole, was drowned, in the river which is little larger than a big ditch. Then one sees the narrow dyke, which is the only means of getting from Leipzig across on to firm land again, where the French armies chased and chased along after they had been beaten, reminding one of those horrible scenes in the Conquest of Mexico. Close to Leipzig are those flat plains of Lützen which seem to have been made especially for battles or maneuvers. Not only was the battle of Gross Görschen fought there, but FREDERICK THE GREAT's big battle of Rossbach and GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS's big battle of Lützen; and it forces upon one the conclusion that this is essentially the military and political center of Germany. It became early the central city for intelligence—it was the center of the book trade, and every road from every part of Germany seemed to go through Leipzig. It is amazing, as a matter of geography, the number of people who have to go through Leipzig in getting about Europe. The roads from Vienna, Warsaw, Copenhagen, Paris, Hamburg, Rome, all seem to lead through Leipzig. While engaged upon that part of my history, I could not help wondering that Leipzig was not made the capital of the German Empire in 1871. If you will draw a circle around Leipzig you will see that it includes Denmark and the borders of Poland, Vienna, Prague, Munich, the borders of France and Belgium. In fact it is almost the center of a circle which takes in the whole of Germany, and I take it that the German Emperor to-day would have had an easier task in the government of that great Empire if Leipzig had been made the capital. It would have moderated that feeling of dislike between south and north Germans. Berlin is still essentially a Prussian capital, and in cities like Munich and Dresden the people pay grudging homage to Berlin as the capital of their Empire. But that is political.

At Lützen the country is so flat that it is very difficult to discover the historic features of the battlefield without great pains. The villages are so exactly alike as to be confusing, like trees in a forest.

The headquarters of NAPOLEON on May 1, 1813, are occupied to-day by officials of the government. I dined at the *table d'hôte* with various local functionaries who took interest in the object of my visit, but not one of them apparently knew much about that part of the country. I suppose the reason was that they had been appointed from other districts. But there is one point that can be identified very satisfactorily, and that is the only rising ground, if I can speak of rising ground in a plain that appears to be flat—a slight elevation where NAPOLEON massed his artillery towards the

close of the day. Here it was that NAPOLEON is described as having for a moment turned to his aid-de-camp with a look that meant to say: "Do you believe that my star is going down?" He had never yet met troops that could face him as these troops did; it was a complete revelation to him after the experience of Jena in 1806, to come back to within a few miles of that field and to meet practically the same people resisting him and fighting for every inch of the ground and meeting him in hand-to-hand struggles in these little villages and showing an obstinacy and manly courage that he could not explain. That battle, although a drawn one, gave the new popular army of SCHARNHORST enormous courage for the continuation of the war. There was only one man in the whole Prussian army who despaired, and that was the King, but then he was born so.

Then we come down to another place *here (pointing to a map)* which I shall rapidly touch upon because it is now late, and that is Wartemburg. Let us once more take to our canoe at Torgau and sail down the river to where Blücher took his army across the Elbe and threatened NAPOLEON's retreat—not a decisive battle, a desperate fight in a desperate swamp. At Wartemburg I could not help thinking of some of the native villages on the African Coast embedded behind swamps. It is most difficult of access from the Elbe and is protected from the high water of the river by little dykes. The Prussians had to fight up to their waists in the mud, and the hardest work they had to get through there was at a place called the Sauanger, which means "hog wallow," a boggy hole; and they drove the enemy out there with wonderful pluck and dash—this new army of volunteers, which consisted largely of men who had never seen a battle before. It was there that the men who fought against them most obstinately were not the French, but their own fellow Germans, and from that time on, until after Leipzig, the struggle against NAPOLEON took upon itself something of the character of a civil war—Germans against Germans. The hatred of the north of Germany against the south of Germany was so intense that it was with the greatest difficulty that they could be got to give quarter.

Now at Wartemburg I think I shall lay up my canoe for the present; not because the further cruise to Hamburg is devoid of interest, but because your clock is keeping time for you—as well as for me.

In conclusion, permit me to pay a tribute to my canoe again for one advantage which it has over the bicycle or the horse or any other means for assisting the progress of a single man in a strange country; and that is that it has excellent dry storage room for maps and books and other works of reference which are so valuable. You can read and write as you go and never be fatigued. I do not know of any means of locomotion which affords the inquisitive stranger so many important advantages as does the canoe I have sought to tell you about.

By the way, on one occasion I was cruising from Potsdam along

the old line of works prepared in 1813 for flooding the country about Berlin, in anticipation of an attack by the French, when I came to a point where the water stopped and I had to carry my canoe over to a long ditch which my maps told me would connect with a point I was seeking. I found but two or three inches of water under my keel; but as I soon entered a government forest where deer abounded, I ceased to care where I was going, and followed the stream for several hours, most of which I occupied by dragging the craft over sand bars. Suddenly the forest ceased and as I glided under a bridge I saw a Prussian sentry who was fortunately looking away from me. I took no pains to attract his attention, for I found I had come out immediately at the point where the artillery experiments are made—which is an exceedingly serious thing if caught. I was apparently either a poacher or a spy, and the choice of character embarrassed me. Time commenced to drag with me. I disliked the idea of this chap on the bridge discovering me. So I lay under the bridge and watched till at last his helmet disappeared, and then I made the water boil as though the devil were blowing into it, and soon came out into a broad lake where I was once more safe.

This shows what can be seen from a canoe even without making much effort.

I thank you very much for listening to my lecture [cheers].—*Poultney Bigelow, in Royal Artillery Institution.*

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#### REMINISCENCES OF SERVICE AS AN AID-DE-CAMP.

History affords no more brilliant example of patriot and soldier than WILLIAM TECUMSEH SHERMAN. The civilized world is familiar with his grand and heroic achievements. I am proud of the privilege to rejoice that I was for a time a member of his military family; have felt and recognized the noble gentleness of his heart, and the fatherly kindness with which he watched over and directed me in the performance of my military duties. Profiting by his advice, and strengthened by his exemplary life, I was enabled to guard against evil temptations incident to camp life. Positive and firm as adamant, he yet seemed always to request rather than command a staff officer to carry a message or deliver an order to this or that commander. But when he spoke to a wavering line of men, or sought to rally a broken body of troops, his great soul seemed fairly revealed in his stern face and flashing eyes, and his words carried with them the reassuring tones of one "born to command." He seemed ever mindful for the safety of his staff officers, but oblivious to his own, nor could we often induce him to take for himself the precaution he so often enjoined upon us. He was a fearless, not to say reckless rider. He cared but little for dress. He loved his soldiers. But more than all, he loved our country and our flag. I could not well omit the foregoing preface, as I am to relate to you some personal reminiscences of service as an

aid-de-camp. I shall confine myself to some of the amusing incidents, rather than a recital of the sad scenes so familiar to the soldiers of '61 to '65.

I entered the volunteer service in August, 1861. In October was elected first lieutenant Company "G," Fifth Regiment Ohio Cavalry. Having entered the service with a firm resolve to do my part in putting down the rebellion, I at once armed myself with an "Ames saber," regulation size, a "Smith & Wesson" carbine, a brace of pistols, a belt pistol and a "bowie knife" with a seven inch blade. Immediately after the fall of Fort Donelson our regiment was ordered to report to General W. T. SHERMAN at Paducah, Ky., and as a part of his command we began the movement which resulted in the concentration of our forces at "Shiloh." Those of you who were in that part of the army at the time know something of the demands made upon the cavalry, and, without going into details, I will state that "in the middle" was the normal condition of the Fifth. Having received an order one very dark night to move my company out on a certain road to guard against a too sudden attack upon our boats, I appealed to the adjutant to send one of the other companies, as my men had been on duty all day and had just laid down to rest. The adjutant's refusal led to a war of words between us, in which I used some adjectives not found in the "tactics," and interdicted by "army regulations." The adjutant threatened me with arrest and divers other punishments if I didn't comply with the order at once. I obeyed, and with my company spent the night in the saddle, some two miles from the boats, to which we returned at daylight. That afternoon I received an order from the colonel of my regiment to report in person to General SHERMAN at 9 o'clock the next morning. In the morning I learned that the steamer "Continental," on which General SHERMAN had established his headquarters, was upon the opposite side of the river. Reporting the fact to the colonel, I was told that I would have to find some way to cross the river. I finally hired some deck-hands to take me over in a yawl, paying them five dollars for the work. I had some difficulty in finding General SHERMAN, but succeeded at last. He was on the hurricane-deck, just in front of the pilot house, smoking a cigar, and evidently absorbed in thinking of the important events then transpiring, and in which he was taking so prominent a part. I scarcely knew whether it would do for me to approach him, or whether it was not best to wait until he spoke to me. A few moments decided the matter, and I advanced upon him with some trepidation. Saluting him, I said, "General SHERMAN, I am the lieutenant of Company 'G,' Fifth Ohio Cavalry, ordered to report to you." The General eyed me very closely for a moment. I thought he was recalling to mind the language I had applied to the adjutant of my regiment, for I believed the matter had been reported to him. I learned from the General afterwards that he was wondering how I managed to bear up under so many arms, for I had *everything on*. Offering me his hand, he said, "Well, Lieutenant, how would you like to serve me as an aid-de camp?" I replied that I feared I was

not qualified to fill so important a position. He talked very pleasantly to me for a little while, explaining what my duties would be, and finally told me to think the matter over and report to him again in the morning. I started for the steps below decks, and when about half way down, remembering that he had ordered me to report to him again in the morning, and, mindful of the expense attending the execution of such orders, I called to him and said, "General SHERMAN, I had to pay some deck-hands five dollars to row me over here, and now that I am to report to you again in the morning, I'd like to know how I am to be reimbursed." He said, "Well, all right, Lieutenant; I will see about that." I returned to my command, and after consulting with my father—colonel of the Fifth, and with the members of my company, decided to accept the position. The next morning the yawl from the "Continental" came alongside, and I was handed a note from the General stating he had sent the yawl for me. I joined him a few moments later, and was introduced to the other members of his staff. A few hours later the "Continental" crossed to the side of my company boat, and my horses, servant and baggage were transferred to the "Continental." That evening General SHERMAN gave me a five dollar gold piece, and at the time I supposed it was public funds in his possession for incidental expenses connected with his command. I learned afterwards that it was out of the General's private funds.

A few days later General SHERMAN was ordered by General C. F. SMITH to take his own division and the gunboats "Tyler" and "Lexington," and proceed further up the river, and strike the Memphis & Charleston Railroad. We went up stream as far as Tyler's Landing, just within the borders of Mississippi. On our way up the gunboats were fired upon by a Confederate regiment at Pittsburg Landing, but a few shots from the "Lexington" soon dispersed them. Our designs on the railroad were foiled by the condition of the roads and high waters. Embarking again we came down to Pittsburg Landing and debarked, taking up a position about two and a half miles from the landing. Our headquarter tents were pitched a little to the rear and left of the old log meeting house, "Shiloh—a sacred spot, the name immortal." Having witnessed the grand spectacle of more than seventy steamers carrying our 30,000 troops now concentrating on this plateau, I thought we had men enough under arms to clean out the Confederacy and half of Europe. And my opinion was strengthened for a brief period by an incident that occurred a few days before the battle. General SHERMAN had ordered a review of some of the regiments and batteries of his division. In order to show up our full fighting strength, I buckled on all my equipments and rode to my place in the line of aids, to witness the review. In a little while the general turned to me and said: "Ride over to Colonel BUCKLAND's headquarters, give him my compliments, and tell him to send the Seventieth and Seventy-second Ohio regiments to this field, and," added the General, "as you pass our headquarters you had better leave your carbine and knife in your tent." On reaching my tent



I threw off the gun and knife reluctantly, but accepted the order to do so as further proof that we not only had more than enough men, but that we were too heavily armed—a delusion that was instantly dispelled on a Sunday morning. On several occasions I asked the General why he did not march us out to fight the Rebels, and just as often the General would reply: "Never mind, young man, you will have all the fighting you want before the war is over; it will come fast enough for you after awhile."

On Sunday morning, April 6, 1862, just thirty years ago to-day, the heavy picket firing began. We mounted our horses and rode along our lines till we came to the Fifty-third Ohio Infantry, and while the General was conversing with the Colonel of this regiment a volley from the rapidly advancing Rebels killed the General's orderly and one or two of the Fifty-third men. The battle was soon on in all its grand but awful fury. I am unable to give you a word painting of the awful scene. The precipitate flight of some of our troops at the first fire of the enemy; the bold, brave stand of others; the impetuous charge and countercharge; the roar of cannon, the shriek of shells, the rattle of musketry, the shrieks of wounded and dying men, filled my very soul with awe, if it were not absolute fear. I confess I felt, on more than one occasion during that early morning, that I did not want to see a battle fought as much as I had supposed; and I was very indignant at the very unceremonious manner in which the Rebels had begun the fight. But General SHERMAN's conduct soon instilled into my soul a feeling that it was grand to be there with him. During a critical moment of Sunday's battle the General's horse was shot from under him. I dismounted and gave him my horse. As he was mounting he said: "Well, my boy, didn't I promise you all the fighting you could do?" I told him I would relieve him from further obligations under that agreement. I captured another horse very soon, and riding over to where I had left the General, he was dismounted. My horse had been killed. We caught a battery horse, and the General mounted him, and in less than twenty minutes that horse was struck by a solid shot and instantly killed. The General was soon mounted on a horse that belonged to some officer who had evidently been killed or wounded. My name does not appear in the General's official report of this battle, wherein he mentions several staff officers. I never knew this for years after the war, and should not then have felt at all slighted had not my attention been called to it by an unkind criticism. I mentioned the matter in a letter to the General, stating that a line from him would be a good thing for me to leave behind with my friends that they might use it to refute all such attacks after I am mustered out. I received from him the following letter:

NO. 75 WEST SEVENTY-FIRST STREET,  
NEW YORK, Feb. 9, 1889.

*John T. Taylor, Esq., 113 N. Second Street, Leavenworth City:*

DEAR TAYLOR:—Your letter of February 6th is received. I have devolved on a clerk the labor of answering my private correspondence, but like many others you ask a letter from me personally, and you are entitled to it. In the

latter part of March and early part of April General GRANT's army occupied the plateau behind Pittsburg Landing on the Tennessee, and my division held the key point near Shiloh Meeting House, overlooking the bridge across Owl Creek, by which the main Corinth road approached Pittsburg Landing. On that plateau was fought the critical battle of the west, "Shiloh." At the very crisis of the battle of Shiloh my horse was shot dead under me, and you promptly dismounted and gave me your own horse, trusting to chance for a remount. You were then very young, not yet twenty, active, intelligent and most patriotic. I then esteemed you highly, and now that twenty-seven years have passed, my feelings towards you have never changed. I wish you and yours all the prosperity and happiness possible on this earth.

Affectionately,

W. T. SHERMAN,

*General.*

While stationed at Memphis, Tennessee, in 1862, a company of cavalry appeared on the river bank, opposite the city, bearing a "flag of truce." General SHERMAN directed me to take an orderly, cross the river in a skiff, and ascertain what was wanted. On meeting the commanding officer of the Confederates I learned that his mission was to present to General SHERMAN some papers from the commanding officer at Little Rock, asking that the wife of a major in the C. S. A., then stationed at Little Rock, might be permitted to leave Memphis, join this company and proceed to Little Rock. I delivered the papers to the General. After he had read them he told me to cross the river again, and say to the officer that unless he withdrew his command immediately he would open the batteries of Fort Pickering upon them. I delivered the order, and the "johnnies" were particular in the order of their going, but they went. I wondered why they did not take myself and orderly along. Returning to headquarters, the General gave me a letter addressed to the lady, the major's wife, and a letter from her husband, in which she was informed that he had sent the company to escort her to Little Rock. I delivered the letters to the lady. She became greatly excited, and began making preparations for leaving at once. I told her, however, that I had been instructed by General SHERMAN to say to her, that as she had chosen to remain within our lines all this time, and had kept up a secret correspondence with the enemy, as the letter proved, he would not permit her to pass beyond our lines at this time. She became furious, and gave me more than my share of abuse. The next day, to my surprise, the General told me to call on the lady and say to her that she would be taken across the river and allowed to go if she desired to do so. She replied by saying, "And you tell the General that I have changed my mind, and I will not go." I so reported to the General. He directed me to call on the provost marshal for a sergeant, four men and a hack; go to the lady's house, see that she and her baggage were placed in the hack, and the load deposited on the opposite side of the river. I will close this narrative by saying that the General's orders were carried out and that myself and command escaped with our lives, but our uniforms and the faces of one or two of the men bore evidence of the desperate struggle. On returning to headquarters, I called on the General and formally requested him in case he ever had any

more of that kind of work to be done, that he send Captain McCoy or Captain JOHN CONDIT SMITH, as that kind of work required heavy weights to be entirely successful.

While at Memphis we were joined by the Thirteenth Regiment of regulars, General SHERMAN's own regiment. The evening of their arrival a great many of the officers called at our headquarters to pay their respects to the General. In discussing Memphis and its surroundings, several officers expressed a great desire to see a cotton field. It was arranged that we were to meet at our headquarters in the morning, and I was to see that they were provided with horses and escort to a large plantation about three and a half miles out, and about two miles beyond our pickets. At the appointed time, our guests mounted on horses belonging to the General and staff, the jolly party moved out. Reaching our outpost, I held a brief conversation with the officer in command of the station, telling him of our designs on the cotton field, and, requesting him to be on the alert and render us assistance in case of an emergency, we rode on and in due time reached the field. Throwing down a section of the fence, we rode to the middle of the field, where some darkeys were at work. The officers of the Thirteenth dismounted and began to examine the cotton plants, and all had asked and received permission from the darkeys to pull up and carry away a plant full of bloom. While this was going on I was questioning the oldest of the darkeys to ascertain if any "johnnies" had been seen loitering around lately. He said a whole regiment of "dem fellers (he meant a company) had been yer nearly all night, but just at sun up dey done gone back over de hill." Looking in the direction indicated by the darkey, I saw a cloud of dust rising above the road on the hill a mile away. Calling the darkey's attention to it, he said, "Yes, sah, somethin's a comin', sartin," and in a moment the head of a column of Confederate cavalry came into view. I gave the alarm to my companions, while the old darkey shouted, "All you niggers run for your lives, cos if dem fellers kotch you here talking to dem sojers they will kill the last one of you," and away they ran for the woods. In a moment all my companions were in their saddles, and all but one had with him a large cotton plant. We started for the gap in the fence, and down the road like mad. The moment the "johnnies" saw us they put spurs to their horses, and the race for scalps on their part, and for "home and native land" on ours, began. A few shots were fired by the "johnnies," but they went wide of their mark. For a mile and a half the race was a spirited one, the horses of pursued and pursuers doing their best. I paid but little attention to the order in which the enemy were making their charge, but I did notice that my party were all doing service with the spurs, and that they were rapidly divesting themselves of the cotton plants, and occasionally a hat or cap would fall to the ground. When within a quarter of a mile from our pickets, I looked back and saw that our pursuers were out of sight, and had probably given up the chase; and what for a time seemed a very serious matter now became a very amusing

race. I cried out, "Less than a quarter of a mile to our pickets; if we can reach them we are safe, but they are right on our heels." In an incredibly short time we reached the station under such speed that it was difficult to come to a halt, and, indeed, I think two of the Thirteenth only succeeded in doing so at our headquarters' stables, nearly a mile further on. The scarcity of small change seemed to trouble the citizens of Memphis very much, and they appointed a committee to wait on General SHERMAN and ask his permission to issue city scrip, to relieve the pressure. The committee came and made their wants known to him. He listened attentively, then told them that he would think the matter over and give his answer through the columns of the city papers. The next morning the *Appeal* and *Avalanche* published a letter from the General, addressed to the citizens of Memphis, reciting the request made to him by their committee, and giving them in return a stinging rebuke for their treason, and for having declared cotton to be king. He closed his letter in these words: "I cannot authorize you to issue city scrip, but to relieve the pressure complained of I suggest that, inasmuch as you have declared cotton to be king, you tie up cotton in five, ten, fifteen, twenty-five and fifty cent packages, and pass that around for change. If cotton is good enough to be king, it ought to be good enough for change."

In the latter part of November, 1862, General SHERMAN left Memphis with 16,000 men to join General GRANT at Oxford, Mississippi. On reaching Coldwater River, about half way between Memphis and Oxford, we found the bridge destroyed, and, as the waters were very high and the current very swift, it was necessary to build a bridge before we could cross. Lieutenant Colonel MALMBURG, of the Fifty-fifth Illinois was given charge of the construction. There was quite a village on our side of the stream (its name I do not remember), composed principally of log houses, and most of them deserted. Colonel MALMBURG went to work with his men, using the logs of the houses for cribbing and the stone chimneys for anchorage, and in an incredibly short time he had two piers, composed of logs and stone, anchored in the stream midway between banks. Using more logs and the available lumber from the houses, he had by daylight a splendid military bridge, and our troops rapidly crossing. Just as the General was preparing to leave the house in which we had spent the night, two or three old gentlemen, citizens of the place, asked the General to sign a statement setting forth the value of the property taken by him for the construction of the bridge, in order, as they said, that they could recover from the United States, after a ratification of a treaty of peace between the Confederate States and the aforesaid United States. The General asked them who destroyed the bridge that spanned the stream just before we reached it. They admitted that Confederate soldiers had. "Well," said the General, "my men have built a very good bridge, have they not?" "Oh, yes," said the gentlemen, "that is a powerful good bridge to be built so quickly, and in the night time at that." "Well, then, I will tell you what to do," said the General;

"just as soon as the last man of my command has crossed that bridge you can have it; and if you will place a man in charge of it and require him to collect one dollar toll from everybody that crosses it, you will get pay for your property a great deal sooner than you will if you wait until I sign that paper," and bidding the gentlemen good morning, mounted his horse and we were away.

On the 5th of December our army arrived at College Hill, Miss. Leaving the army there, the General and staff passed on to Oxford, where we met General GRANT. The next day we returned to College Hill, and the next morning began the return march to Memphis, to prepare for the Vicksburg campaign. As we crossed our bridge at Coldwater, I remarked to the General that it was fortunate for him that the old gentlemen had not followed his advice about collecting toll, and a very unfortunate thing for them, because they lose \$16,000 which you would have been obliged to pay." "That is a fact," said the General, "but then I did not expect to return so soon." When we left Memphis for Vicksburg, General SHERMAN issued very stringent orders against civilians accompanying the expedition in any capacity. On the 26th of December the disembarkation of our troops began at a point some fifteen miles up the Yazoo River. On the morning of the 27th began the movement which resulted in a failure after six days hard fighting at "Chickasaw Bayou." I believed then, I believe now that had General G. W. MORGAN obeyed orders and taken his men into action on the 27th, the enemy's line of works would have been carried, and the capture of Vicksburg accomplished soon after. Be that as it may, the important event to which I call your attention is the following. On the 29th of December I was informed by Captain DAN CONWAY, of the steamer "Forest Queen," that the reporter for a New York paper was on board the steamer "Prairie Rose," in the capacity of assistant steward. I reported the matter to the General. He told me to investigate, and if true to arrest the man. I soon found the man and recognized him. He had been unusually severe in his attacks upon General SHERMAN ever since "Shiloh." Ordering Mr. Reporter to follow me, I marched him over to the "Forest Queen," our headquarters boat, had him placed in the hold of the boat, and charged the officer of the guard to keep him there until I ordered otherwise. I returned to our field headquarters, but before I could report my action to the General he sent me with an order to General A. J. SMITH, and, being kept constantly on the go until we gave up the struggle and returned to our boats, on the 2d of January, I had forgotten all about Mr. Reporter. After we had successfully embarked all our troops and started down the stream, I reported to the General that I had the reporter down in the hold of the boat. When the General found that I had made the arrest on the 29th he thought it was about time the fellow was given some fresh air, and ordered that he be brought up. When the reporter appeared, the General explained to him that though he was liable to be treated as a spy, and was entitled to little consideration at our hands, yet he did not know until now that I had confined him so closely, and that he would

not be sent back there, but would be kept under guard until he could be sent back to Memphis.

On the 4th of January, 1863, General JOHN A. McCLEARNAND superseded General SHERMAN, and our title of the "Army of the Tennessee" ceased to exist, and the "Army of the Mississippi" was created, divided into two army corps; one, the Thirteenth, to be commanded by General G. W. MORGAN, the other, the Fifteenth, to be commanded by General W. T. SHERMAN. "With a modesty which became a man of his high spirit and unyielding patriotism, General SHERMAN accepted the situation." Before the arrival of General McCLEARNAND, General SHERMAN and Commodore PORTER had agreed upon a plan for the reduction of Fort Hindman, or as it was called, "Arkansas Post," about forty-five miles above the mouth of the Arkansas. General McCLEARNAND, when informed of the plan, concluded to go and take with him his whole force. At 5 o'clock in the afternoon, January 9th, our boats reached NOTRIE'S farm, about four miles below Fort Hindman. During the night the artillery and wagons were taken ashore, the troops disembarking in the morning and set in motion for an investment of the fort. At 3 o'clock in the afternoon we found that we had mistaken the "lay of the land," and that a swamp and bayou would prevent our approach to the fort from that direction. We marched back to the river and then moved up the river bank to within half a mile of the fort, then bore off to the right until an investment of the fort and line of works was accomplished. The roads were in terrible condition and movements difficult, but by 9 o'clock p. m. our lines were formed as General SHERMAN desired them. The night was very dark, the enemy very vigilant. Orders were imperative that no lights or fires would be allowed for any purpose. Lieutenant-Colonel MALMBURG, of the Fifty-fifth Illinois, an inveterate smoker, while sitting on his horse talking to Lieutenant-Colonel YOST, of the Fifty-fourth Ohio, thoughtlessly filled his pipe and struck a match to light it. Instantly the "johnnies" turned a cannon on the light and a solid shot carried away Colonel YOST's left arm. General SHERMAN established his headquarters for the night at the foot of a big cypress tree, and about 10 o'clock he and the staff, except myself, spread their blankets on the wet ground and laid down for a night's rest. None of us had had a morsel of food since we left the boat early in the morning. I was hungry and decided not only to satisfy my hunger, but to contribute to the comfort of the General and staff. Mounting my horse I groped my way through the darkness back to the boat. Routing out the driver of our mess-wagon, I ordered him to hitch up and follow me. About 1 o'clock in the morning, when within a short distance of our headquarters tree, I stopped the wagon and rode on to invite the General and staff to dine with me. As I approached, the General called out to know who I was and what that wagon was doing there. I expected my answer would elicit his thanks and commendation. I told him I had brought our mess-wagon, and, if he would join me, we would have something to eat. He said, "Well, sir, you ought not to have done so; no one else has had anything



to eat since we have, and we can stand it if the troops can. Captain, send that wagon back to the boat." I rode back to the wagon and told the driver to return to the boat if he could. I followed a short distance and then ordered the driver to stop. Dismounting, I climbed into the wagon, opened one of our mess chests, struck a match, found a piece of candle, which I lighted, and pouring some of the melted tallow on the corner of the chest, planted my candle in it. Then seizing a loaf of bread I cut off a very moderate sized slice, considering the collapsed state of my "inards," and was in the act of spreading some butter, when a cannon shot from the fort came crashing through the trees, striking the ground near the mules; they started to run. The first lunge of the wagon brought down the lid of the chest and snuffed out my light, and I was tossed about among the chests in a very indiscriminate manner. I finally reached the rear of the wagon and fell through between the cover and the bed to the ground, but I held on to the bread. I returned to the headquarters tree just as the General and staff were settling down again after discussing the shot that had just been fired, and had gone past directly over their heads. I crawled into bed beside my dear companion and tent mate, Captain McCoy, and dividing my bread with him, we enjoyed eating it while I related to him in a whisper the trials and tribulation that slice of bread had cost me.

The battle was fought and won the next day, January 11, 1863. At one time during the battle we discovered that we had attracted the attention of the Confederate artillery, and the General told us to separate a little and dismount. I was near a good sized tree, and while the General was telling us to dismount, a solid shot struck the tree about four feet from the ground, and believing they would not strike that tree again, instead of dismounting I rode behind it, resting my forearm against it, I leaned my head on my arm. The General told me I had better get down. I told him I believed I was safer where I was, as the balls were skimming the ground very closely. Presently a solid shot struck the tree almost directly in a line with my head and glanced off, but I think before it had left the tree I was on the ground and spread out as flat as a flounder.

On the 13th, "the works at Fort Hindman having been dismantled and blown up," we reëmbarked and proceeded down the Arkansas to the Mississippi. Arriving at the mouth of the Arkansas our boat tied up. It was a dark, dismal, rainy day. Late in the afternoon I went on deck and found the General standing near the bell with a paper in his hand, and in reply to my question he said he was checking off the boats of our corps as they passed out of the Arkansas into the Mississippi. I took the paper and urged him to go below. He did so, after telling me to report to him the moment the last boat had passed out. I had stood there about two hours when all the boats save one had been checked off. Getting impatient at the non-arrival of this boat, I decided to report to the General. I was not very familiar with Indian names, and if I had ever heard the name pronounced, and I presume I had, I was all at sea when I came to announce it to the General. Going to the cabin, where sat

the General and all the rest of the staff, I handed him the paper, stating as I did so that all the boats were out save one. "What one?" asked the General. I replied, "The *Si-ox City*." "*The what?*" asked the General. I said "The *Si-ox City*, sir." "Oh, no, Captain," said the General, "we have no such boat as that in our fleet; that must be one of MORGAN's boats." Stepping up to him and taking the paper out of his hands, I hunted up the *Sioux City*, and pointing to the name I said, "Well, sir, if that isn't the *Si-ox City*, I'd like to know what you call it." You can imagine how they all laughed, and so did I when the pronunciation was explained to me. For a long time thereafter, when around our table or camp-fire, I was addressed by the General and staff as *Captain Si-ox*.

## PROFESSIONAL NOTES.

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### AN INTERESTING LETTER.

Soon after the publication of "Napoleon Bonaparte's First Campaign," somewhat more than two years ago, the author, Lieutenant H. H. SARGENT, Second U. S. Cavalry, received quite a number of letters from distinguished people in different parts of the world relating to his work. Among the number was one received from Hon. E. F. WARE, of Topeka, Kansas. Mr. WARE is a prominent lawyer of Topeka, and is also the author of "Some of the Rhymes of Ironquill." The letter given below was sent to the editor by Lieutenant SARGENT, and is published by Mr. WARE's permission. On account of the wit, humor, and common sense displayed therein it will, it is hoped, be found interesting to our readers, especially to those who have read Lieutenant SARGENT's first book.

TOPEKA, KANSAS, September 23, 1895.

*Herbert H. Sargent, Esq., Lieutenant Second Cavalry, U. S. A., Fort Bowie, Ariz.:*

DEAR SIR:—The writer was formerly an aid-de-camp in the volunteer service with a major-general. He had not much rank, but he had considerable observation, and, one time after the war was over, when a large war map about twenty feet square was unrolled in the parlor of the Fort Leavenworth headquarters, on the floor, and General SHERMAN and General G. M. DODGE got down on their hands and knees and crawled over it, and when one would say to the other, if such or such a man had done this, or that, or something else, "how"—to use the language of General SHERMAN—"they would have busted us wide open," the writer made up his mind that military renown and the fame of war depends largely upon what the other man *doesn't* do, and that ORPHEUS C. KERR's constant disquisition on "strategy" had as much sense in it as it had hilarity.

It is seldom that a person writes as good a book as you have written upon BONAPARTE's first campaign, and it is not frequent that an author who is so enamored of his subject can still perceive

and discuss the personal equation. Why will you not write a book on military strategy, so as to show how little generals have to do with victories, but how much circumstances have to do with defeats?

I have never believed that so vain, pompous, and flamboyant a person as was NAPOLEON, had the deep, super-human sagacity that some people attribute to him. If a high tide should wash from Chippewa River a thousand logs, one of them would possibly drift to New Orleans, and the others would be stranded on the intermediate sandbars. If that one log should have intelligence, it would tell all other logs to keep in the middle of the stream. NAPOLEON was kept in the middle of the stream for a very long period. You could write a history of NAPOLEON, his life and career, that would be marvelously interesting, if you brought into it and pictured his conspicuous luck. And you could philosophize upon the good fortune which permits one man to do what another man can not.

During the war, I saw so many unaccountable things happen; saw so many unlooked-for and surprising things take place, which the generals afterwards appropriated to themselves as intelligence and strategy, that I have but little faith in any of it. Given good, common sense, health, and luck, and any one may win; but the greatest of all these is luck.

When NAPOLEON started out he had with him the soldiers of a new regime,—men who saw the crust over them broken, and determined to crawl up through it. As NAPOLEON said, "Republican phalanxes alone are capable of actions so extraordinary." As you say on page 198, "It was the marching as well as the fighting of the soldiers that won for him so many victories against such overwhelming odds." And as you say, "In these forced marches the exertion of his soldiers was almost beyond their endurance." They marched, and fought, and marched. As at Rivoli, marching and fighting for twenty-four hours, marching again all night and the whole of the next day, and on the morning of the third, ready for battle.

This was before the American theory of fighting for three days had been invented, which was first tried at Pea Ridge and afterwards patented at Gettysburg. NAPOLEON, to start with, had soldiers that, when they were sent to take a position, took it, and when detailed as a containing force, succeeded in containing; so that, when 20,000 of them met 25,000 of the enemy, they were numerically the superior. NAPOLEON had men behind him. He was like a cow-catcher—he did not pull the train—he was pushed on to victory. NAPOLEON had good reason to say, "The French troops have acquired a great superiority over the German troops." In addition to having the troops, NAPOLEON had the physique to attend to the details. He was not obliged to sleep; he was not born tired. When he got older and grew fat, he got whipped.

The rules of strategy which you put down on pages 173 and 174 are so simple and elementary that nobody would have to learn them.

All eight of those rules are born in a man, like the power to swim. Genius in war consists of knowing when the other fellow violates the rules. NAPOLEON seemed to prefer to let the other men violate the rules, which they did on all occasions. No person, no general, ever met a series of opponents who so much violated all the rules and all the principles. He had remarkable success in having men against him who experimented and who did not do the right thing; and you set it out so admirably in your book. When NAPOLEON reached Trent, he was not aware of WURMSER's departure down the Brenta. At this place BONAPARTE should have been whipped; but good luck had it that WURMSER had sent a division directed to Verona, so that it could not be on hand. You speak of WURMSER as brave, fearless and stubborn, and say that he continued to blunder on, neither able to see his own past errors nor to comprehend the strategy of NAPOLEON. NAPOLEON committed errors such that, if the opposing soldiers had been as good fighters as the French, he would have been unsung in history. But it was error after error on the part of his opponents that gave him the victory.

You say, concerning ALVINZI, what you say of WURMSER, that he committed error upon error; and you say of him, that in the execution of his plans, he continued to multiply his mistakes. And of the Austrian commander, you account for his errors by his great age, and that all of the commanders, from first to last, not only committed errors, but continued to repeat them again and again (page 195). It is no wonder NAPOLEON supposed that he had a star and a good genius, and very properly you say, "It was the marching as well as the fighting of the soldiers that won for him so many victories against such overwhelming odds."

You also refer to the political feature of the Austrian army, and the restrictions with which it was hampered by politicians at home who knew all about how things should be done; while NAPOLEON, being given *carte blanche*, could promise his soldiers everything and give them a great deal.

The object I have in writing you so long a letter, is to express my admiration for your book and of the view which you take of things. I have no criticism to make, except that I think you put too much stress on the supposed strategy. All helter-skelter hits are successful if they succeed, and if they succeed they are strategic. I have seen so many colonels get a star because their men fought through places where the colonels did not want to go; and have seen generals brevetted because their men did things which surprised the generals, that I think a life of NAPOLEON could be written that would be absolutely truthful and contain all the glamor of a romance, and still contain a percentage less of panegyric. You have the capacity to write a history of NAPOLEON and of NAPOLEON's campaigns that would do him exact justice, and yet be exceedingly readable. It would be a story of vast good fortune, of vast luck; a story of a brave general who walked through an open door; a story of the spectacular admiration of princes and kings, as they stood around and saw this man win and become an emperor just as

easy as if everything had been lubricated for the occasion. Please write a life of NAPOLEON, showing what good luck can do for a man. Entitle it, "Napoleon and His Luck."

Yours very truly,

E. F. WARE.

### THE MYER VS. THE MORSE CODE FOR SIGNALING.

Several criticisms upon the change from the American Morse to the modified Myer code have recently appeared, in which, it is believed, the premises are mistaken. Admitting that it is objectionable and discouraging to the services to frequently change codes, it does not necessarily follow that for these reasons an unsatisfactory code should be indefinitely retained.

As is well known, in 1886 the Myer signal code, jointly used by the army and navy, was replaced, at the instance of the navy, by the European Morse code. This was in turn replaced in 1889 by the American Morse. The reasons for the latter change were, from an army standpoint, perhaps sufficient, but it soon became apparent that the code was an impracticable one for the navy, by reason of the limitations of the Ardois and other naval signaling apparatus, and an anomalous condition resulted; the army using one code and the navy another.

As this entailed upon both services the knowledge and use of two different codes, as well as the liability to confusion and error in times of active coöperation, a joint board of the army and navy, consisting of Brigadier-General A. W. GREELY, chief signal officer of the army, Lieutenant-Commander SEATON SCHROEDER, U. S. navy, and First Lieutenant GEORGE L. ANDERSON, Fourth U. S. Artillery, was appointed in 1896, to consider and recommend such alterations in signal codes and their uses as the public interests might demand.

The board unanimously recommended a return to the old Myer code, with slight modifications, the change taking effect October 1, 1896. Although this change results in the use of a satisfactory common code by both the army and navy, the army is left with two codes, the American Morse being still retained for telegraphic use.

The purpose of this paper is to show that, notwithstanding the objections to having two codes in the army, and disregarding the advantages of a common code for both the army and navy, the return to the Myer code, is from an army standpoint, an advantageous one.

The reasons which led to the adoption of the American Morse code in the army are well known. The three principal methods of military signaling are by motions with flags or torches, by flashes with heliograph or flash lantern, and by the electric telegraph. The Continental Morse code, which was suited to the first two methods, was impracticable for the third, by reason of the existing universal use of the American Morse code by the vast army of operators in



the United States. The American Morse could be used more or less satisfactorily by all three methods, and it therefore became the standard code.

This code was devised before the principles of signaling were at all understood, and has no better excuse for its existence than that the inventor of the telegraph happened to so arrange it; but it is now so universally used that it is equally impossible to remedy its defects, or to substitute any other for it.

In a signal code, simplicity is the first consideration. The American Morse code has four elements, viz: the dot, the dash, the long dash, and the space; while the Myer code has only three, the 1, the 2, and the 3. The many theoretical and practical defects in the Morse code were gotten around the best way possible in flag and heliograph signaling, but the code was never even tolerably satisfactory for either method. The existence of the space letters e, o, r, y, z, and &, necessitated a "front" in the middle of these letters, as well as at the end of words. The fact that it was a different kind of a "front" limited the range of the signaling, and required undue concentration of attention on the part of the receiver.

But it was to heliograph signaling that the Morse code was least adapted. The short flash, the long flash, and the interval in space letters, between letters, and between words, make *time* the essence of the signaling. A time element is dangerous in any system, and doubly so for such precarious work as long range heliographing. It makes the Morse code for use with the heliograph, search light, flash lantern, or fog whistle, the slowest code invented.

The advantage of the Myer code is its extreme simplicity, being a code of three elements, constructed upon sound and simple principles. The time element is eliminated. It is essentially a visual signal code, and is the most nearly perfect one in existence. There are no space letters. In flag work every motion is a positive one, either to right, left or front.

In signaling with heliograph, flash light or fog whistle, the advantage in speed is not only with the Myer code, but sounds and flashes of equal value in groups of one, two, or three, seem to lend themselves more readily to the ear and eye, than sounds and flashes of varying lengths. The concentration of attention on the part of both the sender and receiver is less than with the Morse code, and the arbitrary signals denoting the end of words, sentences and messages, are an enormous advantage as regards both reliability and speed.

In short, the Myer code is not only one of the best known and most thoroughly tried, and satisfactory, military signal codes in the world, but it is adapted to all kinds of military and naval signaling, visual and phonetic.

That a different code is to be used on military and commercial telegraph lines, is, in the opinion of the writer, no disadvantage, as it is believed that in the organization of our signal corps in the

next war, the duties of visual and electric signaling should be entirely separate.

In no art can the amateur compete with the professional, and experience has proved that the average signalist cannot become and remain an expert telegraph operator. There would seem moreover to be no advantage in the entire body of signalists being telegraph operators, as the absence of smoke from the battlefield will hereafter enable visual signaling to play a more important part, and a large force of visual signalists will be required, whose duties will be all that they can attend to.

The ends of the service will be best attained by having in the signal corps, separate telegraph sections, composed of professional operators and linemen, whose duties will be entirely the erection and operation of the field and permanent telegraph lines; the visual signalist using the Myer code, the telegrapher the Morse code, and each being master of his art.

HOWARD A. GIDDINGS,  
*Major, Brigade Signal Officer, C. N. G.*

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LIST OF ACTIONS, ETC., WITH INDIANS AND OTHER  
MARAUDERS, PARTICIPATED IN BY THE TENTH U. S.  
CAVALRY, CHRONOLOGICALLY ARRANGED—1867 TO  
1897.

1867.

August 2d, Troop F engaged a large band of hostiles on the Saline River, Kansas.

On August 1st the Indians attacked a camp of citizens, a railroad construction party on the Union Pacific Railroad, eleven miles from Fort Hays, Kansas, and killed seven men. As soon as the report reached post, the troop proceeded to the scene, took the trail of the marauders, and followed it until 10 o'clock P. M., when, owing to darkness, and having left without rations, returned to railroad camp. At 2 o'clock A. M., no rations having arrived, the march was resumed for the Saline River, and on August 2d, when near that stream, was attacked by about 150 Indians. After a severe engagement of two hours the command discovered a large herd of buffalo, as they thought, coming over a hill, which proved another large band of Indians, who promptly joined in the attack, when a retreat was ordered. After six hours of hard fighting the troop was able to strike bottom land, fifteen miles distant, where relief was obtained. The Indians numbered between 350 and 400, were well equipped with firearms and were led by two white men. A large number of the enemy were killed and wounded. In one of their dashes at the troop, in an attempt to stampede the animals, seven of the red devils failed to return with the party.

Two officers, two guides and \* thirty-four men were engaged.

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\* Troop F lost thirteen men from cholera during the months of July and August. E. L. B.

Sergeant CHRISTIE was killed and Captain ARMES and six horses were wounded.

The conduct of the men is spoken of in the highest terms. Report dated August 5, 1867, Fort Hays, Kansas.

August 21st and 22d, on Prairie Dog Creek, Kansas, Troop F and detachment Eighteenth Kansas Volunteer Cavalry had a very severe engagement with a band of about 1,000 Indians.

This command left Fort Hays, Kansas, August 12th, to scout southeast of post. On the 21st, while halted for breakfast near the above named stream, one of the videttes was attacked. An officer and thirty men were sent to scout the ravines. This detachment had gone but a short distance when it was completely surrounded by the enemy, and in the engagement which ensued lost twenty-five horses and fourteen men killed and wounded.

The main column was deployed and advancing as rapidly as possible, when suddenly a large force of several hundred Indians swooped down upon it from every direction. The command was immediately rallied, wheeled by fours, and at the gallop marched into a ravine and dismounted. Men were placed behind the banks and surrounding the horses, opened fire, the fire of the enemy passing over the backs of the animals. The noted brave, SATANTA, who commanded, made several futile attempts, accompanied with every hellish device imaginable, to capture the horses. Each charge was so stubbornly and effectually met, that about twenty saddles were emptied each time. Darkness, however, produced, at least, a breathing spell. The command then moved out in quest of the wagons, and failing in this up to 12 o'clock P. M., halted to rest.

On the 22d, at sunrise, hostilities were renewed by four or five hundred, who surrounded the wagon train, which, owing to the darkness of the night previous, had not been found. Upon rescuing the wagons, it was learned that the detachment sent out the day before to scout, whose fate is already described, was within two miles, and could not move. An officer and twenty-five men, sent to its relief, soon returned with fifteen wounded men perched on five horses, which was all that were left out of thirty.

At 11 o'clock A. M. the savages, in overwhelming numbers, renewed the attack, with the evident intention of wiping out the troops, using arrows, rifles and revolvers. The troops held their ground until sundown, at which time about 100 redskins were in sight, the main body having crossed a stream near by; these were charged and chased about three miles, whereupon the main body, to the number of about 200, returned and began recrossing the stream between the party sent in pursuit and camp. The pursuers were obliged to retire without capturing the Indians which they were after, but having, however, shot seven of them and two ponies.

After dark the troops withdrew for the post, where they arrived on the evening of the 24th, having covered 544 miles during the scout. The troops lost three men killed and twenty-eight wounded; thirty-seven horses killed and three wounded. About 150 Indians were killed.

In this combat the men were mentioned as behaving with remarkable coolness and bravery. Report dated Fort Hays, Kansas, September 1, 1867.

September 19th, near Saline River, forty-five miles west of Fort Hays, a detachment of Troop G had an engagement with a large band of Cheyennes. After a very hard struggle the Indians were driven to the winds, with a large number killed and wounded, leaving behind a great amount of war material. One horse belonging to the troop was wounded. Private RANDALL, Troop G, in company with two citizens, was wounded, and the two citizens killed by the same band just a few minutes before.

September 19th, Colonel McGRATH's camp on the Union Pacific Railroad, west of Fort Hays, Kansas, was attacked by hostiles, who were driven off in confusion by the same detachment of Troop G mentioned above.

1868.

August 11th, Troops B, C, F, G, H, I and K marched to the relief of settlers, and assisted in constructing block-houses for their protection on the Saline and Solomon Rivers and Walnut Creek, Kansas. During the month the Indians had raided the settlements on the Saline and devastated those on the Solomon River, Kansas, where, though kindly received and fed by the people, they plundered and burned houses, stole many head of stock, murdered fifteen persons, wounded two and outraged five women; two of the unfortunate women were also shot and badly wounded. A small band crossed to the Republican River and killed two persons there, but the main body returned to the Saline with two captives named BELL. Here they again attacked the settlers, with the evident intention of clearing out the entire valley. Two women who had been captured were rescued by Captain BENTEN's troop of the Seventh Cavalry.

Upon the approach of the troops the Indians made good their retreat after a parting volley from the Tenth. The rest was the usual amount of hard marching incident to such expeditions.

September 15th, on Big Sandy Creek, Colorado, Troop I had a lively engagement with about 100 Indians, led by a brother of the noted scout, GEORGE BENT. Seven soldiers were wounded. Eleven Indians killed and fourteen wounded; the chief was said to be among the missing. The troop was complimented in orders for their gallantry in this affair.

September 25th, Troop H arrived to the relief of Major FORSYTH's command, which was beleaguered on an island in the Arickaree Fork of the Republican River, Kansas. On September 17th, Major FORSYTH was attacked by about 700 Indians, and after a very gallant fight repulsed the savages, inflicting a loss on them of thirty-five killed and many wounded, the command existing on horse flesh only, for a period of eight days. Lieutenant BEECHER, Surgeon MOORE and four scouts were killed, Major FORSYTH twice wounded, and fifteen scouts wounded.

September 26th, Troop I arrived with Colonel BANKHEAD's column for the relief of Major FORSYTH's command. Twenty-six hours after, Troop H.

October 2d, Troop G rescued a train attacked and corralled by Indians, twenty miles from Fort Dodge, Kansas, on the Larned road, and conducted it to post. Three citizens killed, three wounded and over fifty mules run off.

October 18th, on Beaver Creek, Kansas, Troops H and I had a spirited engagement with a large body of Indians, in which three soldiers were wounded and ten Indians killed. Troops mentioned in orders for their gallantry, etc.

November 19th, near Fort Dodge, Kansas, a detachment of Troop A had a fight in which two Indians were killed. Some of the same band attempted to stampede the beef herd, but were driven off, with loss, by the troops from the post.

1869.

January 24th, on San Francisco Creek, Indian Territory, Private OLIVER JENNINGS, Troop K, died of wounds inflicted by an Indian the night previous.

JENNINGS was afoot, having turned his own horse over to his "bunky," who had walked a distance in consequence of his mount playing out. He mistook an Indian trail for that of the troops, which led him to the camp of the hostiles. Upon arrival, JENNINGS went straight to the fire and rendered the usual salutation, "Hello boys," as he thought, to his comrades. The response was the arrow which pierced him through the abdomen. The redskins fled. JENNINGS retraced his steps as rapidly as possible for a short distance, when he became so weak that he fell, but continued by crawling until reaching the herd of the command, about two miles, where he was found lying in the weeds, by the herders early next morning, mortally wounded.

January 29th, on Mulberry Creek, Kansas, a detachment of Troops B, F, G and K had a fight in which two soldiers were wounded and six Indians killed.

1870.

May 31st, on the Canadian River, near Camp Supply, Indian Territory, Troops H and I relieved a train that had been held since the 28th, on which date it was attacked, all the mules stampeded and one man killed by Indians.

June 2d, near Camp Supply, Indian Territory a detachment of Troops I and K had a running fight of about fifteen miles with a band of hostiles; their loss not known. Troops had two horses killed.

June 2d, *en route* to the railroad from Camp Supply, Indian Territory, Captain ARMES, being separated from his escort, was attacked and chased by the redskins, but escaped.

June 8th, on Snake Creek, Indian Territory, a supply train

guarded by Troop F, was attacked by Indians, who were repulsed after a severe fight, in which three of the braves were known to have been killed with their ponies. Two soldiers wounded.

June 9th, on Snake Creek, Indian Territory, Troop I had a fight with Indians.

June 10th, near Camp Supply, Indian Territory, Troop H was attacked by Indians who had corralled a supply train. The savages were repulsed and the train escorted to post.

June 11th, at Camp Supply, Indian Territory, the Indians attempted to stampede the horses at the cavalry camp. They were pursued by Troops A, F, H, I and K, were attacked, six Indians killed and ten wounded. Two soldiers wounded and two cavalry horses killed.

June —, near Clear Creek, Texas, Lieutenant HARMON, with a detachment of Troop M, and two citizens, had a running fight of eighteen miles with a band of robbers who had stampeded the stock belonging to a government train near Fort Supply, Indian Territory. One of the robbers was killed, ten captured, and 137 head of government mules, four horses and two wagons, were recovered.

June 17th, on Mulberry Creek, Indian Territory, Troop A buried three wood choppers, killed the day before by Indians and left horribly mutilated.

## 1871.

May 12th, Indians attacked a train on Red River, killing seven persons, wounding one and running off forty-one mules. Going to Fort Sill, Indian Territory, they publicly avowed the deed in the presence of General SHERMAN and the post commander, General GRIERSON, whereupon the leaders, SATANTA, SATANK and BIG TREE, were arrested and placed in confinement. Their followers resisted, one Indian killed and Private HAMPTON, Troop D, was wounded. Chief BIG TREE on being pointed out as one of the active spirits in the Red River affair, made a desperate effort to escape, but was captured in a running fight by the Adjutant, Lieutenant WOODWARD, assisted by a small detachment of Troop E.

September 19th, at Foster Springs, Texas, a detachment of Troop B was attacked by a large band of Indians. One soldier and one horse were killed. Two Indians killed and three wounded.

## 1872.

July 12th, on Deep River, Indian Territory, Troops A and L were attacked by a war party of Indians; results not reported.

July 15th, on Schofield Creek, Indian Territory, Troops A and L charged and destroyed an Indian village; casualties not reported.

July 22d, on Otter Creek, Indian Territory, Troops A and L were again attacked by Indians. Results not reported.

## 1873.

April 30th, near Fort Sill, Indian Territory, Lieutenant HARMON with detachment of Troops G, K and M, attacked a band of



Mexican horse thieves and captured thirty-six horses and mules, stolen from vicinity of Fort Supply, Indian Territory. One of the bandits was wounded and also one horse belonging to the troops.

April —, on China Tree Creek, Indian Territory, a detachment of Troop K attacked a war party of Indians and wounded one.

August 31st, near Pease River, Texas, Troops E and I were attacked by a war party of Indians; one Indian wounded.

September 30th, at Mesquite Flats, Texas, Troops E and I attacked a band of hostiles, recapturing nine stolen horses.

December 5th, on Elm Creek, Texas, Lieutenant TURNER with a detachment of Troop D, overtook a band of twenty cattle thieves, killed four and captured sixteen of them, and recovered about one thousand head of cattle.

1874.

February 2d, on Home Creek, Texas, a detachment of Troop A, was attacked by a war party of Indians, and one horse belonging to the troops was wounded.

February 5th, on Double Mountain Fork of the Brazos River, Texas, after nine days' march, part of which was performed in severe and distressing weather for men and horses, Troops D and G encountered a band of hostile Indians, attacked and practically destroyed it. Eleven Indians were killed, sixty-five head of stock captured and the camp destroyed. The troops were complimented in orders for their gallantry.

April —, on Lancaster River, Texas, the camp of Troop A was attacked by hostiles and Private WILLIAM H. HUTTON wounded.

May 2d, between Red River and Big Wichita, Texas, a detachment of Troop K attacked a war party of Indians, who were forced to abandon all their stolen property to prevent capture.

August 22d and 23d, at Wichita Agency, Indian Territory, Troops C, E, H, and L, had a severe fight with about four hundred hostiles, Comanches and Kiowas, who had taken refuge with the friendly Indians located at the Agency. The hostiles attempted to burn out the Agency and the camps of the friendly Indians, in which the troops were posted, but were defeated in their designs. Four enlisted men were wounded and four horses. The loss of the Indians is estimated at sixteen killed and wounded.

October 24th, on Elk Creek, Indian Territory, Troops B and M surprised a Comanche Indian Camp and charged it. The hostiles displayed a white flag and surrendered themselves as prisoners; sixty-nine warriors, besides two hundred and fifty women and children, together with about fifteen hundred to two thousand horses were captured.

October 24th, upon Pond Creek, Indian Territory, Troops H and L struck a fresh trail of 200 ponies and Kiowa Indians, pursued it rapidly over 100 miles and drove the hostiles in, compelling them to surrender to the number of forty-five Kiowas and fifty head of ponies at Fort Sill, Indian Territory.

October 29th, about thirty miles west of Fort Sill, Indian Territory. Private ALFRED PINKSTON, Troop M, killed a Kiowa Indian chief in personal combat.

November 8th, near McClellan Creek, Texas, Troops B, C, F and H, were detached to pursue the band attacked by Lieutenant BALDWIN, Fifth Infantry, the same day. This command chased the Indians for a distance of ninety-six miles, having several skirmishes with the rear guard of Indians and capturing a number of ponies and mules, the latter packed, which the Indians had abandoned in the flight.

December 7th, Troop D, and a detachment of Troop M attacked a band of Southern Cheyennes on Kingfisher Creek, Texas, and captured thirteen warriors and the same number of squaws.

December 28th, Troop D and a detachment of Troop M, followed a band of Cheyennes for eighty miles to the North Fork of the Canadian River, and captured the entire band, consisting of fifty-two Indians with seventy ponies.

1875.

April 6th, at Cheyenne Agency, Indian Territory, Troops D and M had a severe engagement with Indians in which eleven Indians were found dead and twelve soldiers were wounded, one of them mortally. At the close of the campaign of 1874-5 against the allied tribes, orders were received to select from among them the principal ringleaders who had incited or led bands of hostiles in the recent outrages, to be sent to the seacoast and there be kept in confinement, for a time at least. BLACK HORSE, one of the Cheyennes thus to be disposed of, broke from the guard while being shackled and ran directly towards the camp of his people. He was pursued, fired upon by the guard and killed, when a general engagement took place, lasting several hours.

May 5th, at Battle Point, Texas, a detachment of Troops A, F, G, I and K, attacked a band of Indians, wounded one and captured his pony.

July —, Troops A and C surprised and captured two Indian villages, of seventy-two lodges, while detached from Colonel SHAFER'S column on the Staked Plains in Texas.

September 13th, near the Fresh Fork of the Brazos River, Texas, some Indians attacked the camp of Troop G, and attempted to stampede the herd, but were promptly discovered and driven off.

November 5th, Troops G and L attacked a band of Indians near the Pecos River, Texas, killed one Indian and captured five, together with twenty head of stock.

July 7th to December 9th, Troops A, C, F, G, I and L, were engaged, without cessation, scouting the Staked Plains in Texas after Indians and other marauders. This duty was arduous, marches toilsome, over arid and sandy plains. Water was scarce and often salt. On one occasion the troops were fifty-eight hours without the precious fluid.

1876.

April 10th to August 29th, Troops B, E and K formed part of the expedition operating in Texas, through the country bordering Coahuila, Mexico. The country scouted over was one presenting peculiar difficulties for the operations of troops—part of it practically unknown, with no good guides obtainable, broken and rough and characterized in general by great scarcity of water and grass.

July 30th, Troop B participated in the attack upon a band of hostile Lipan and Kickapoos, near Saragossa, Mexico. Ten Indians were killed, four were captured, together with about one hundred head of stock. The village, which consisted of about twenty-five lodges, with all supplies, was destroyed.

August 12th, Troops B, E and K surprised an Indian village and destroyed ten lodges well supplied with provisions, blankets, etc., and captured sixty head of horses and mules, in the Santa Rosa Mountains, Mexico.

1877.

January 10th, Troops B, D and F pursued a band of Indian cattle thieves to the Santa Rosa Mountains, Mexico, and struck their camp, which had been abandoned by the hostiles in great haste, leaving behind a large amount of provisions, camp equipage, etc., all of which was destroyed by the troops.

May 4th, Troop G, had a sharp fight with a band of Comanche Indians, near Lake Quemado, Texas, killing four and capturing six, together with sixty-nine head of stock. Twelve large and a number of smaller tepees with their contents, viz: powder, lead, shells, loading implements, dried meats, blankets, and supplies of all kinds were burnt. One soldier was killed in the attack. This command also destroyed three more lodges and their supplies in Cañon Rescata on the 6th. During the spring of 1877 this troop alone garrisoned the post of Fort Griffin, in northwestern Texas. Indians from the Indian Territory, leaving the reservation and establishing a base on the Staked Plains, made marauding expeditions, south and east against the settlers, then advanced far beyond the chain of military posts. Troops had previously been almost entirely withdrawn from that part of the State for use on the Mexican border, where trouble was supposed to be imminent. The settlers, knowing this, had collected to the number of about forty, and had assumed the offensive for the purpose of breaking up the Indian camp on the Plains, but had been met near the edge of the Plains by the Indians and compelled to retire, returning to the settlements with startling reports of the strength and audacity of the Indians. The troop, being obliged to leave sufficient men to guard the public property at the post and to perform indispensable duties, started on an expedition against Indians. Having again to reduce this already small force by a guard for the wagon train left near the edge of the Plains, they, with scarcely more than a score of men, penetrated that wild and little known region, in search of an enemy whose strength was estimated at twice their own. After several days of tireless search,

the Indian village was found, but unfortunately two miles distant, with no hope of a nearer approach without discovery. They charged at full speed over that distance into the midst of the camp, with the result already stated. Some of the hostiles escaped with their arms, but most of them barely with their lives. This blow put a stop to all annoyance from that quarter.

June —, Troop H pursued a war party of Indians to the Guadalupe Mountains, Texas, and forced them to abandon a considerable number of their stock.

August 5th, Troop B attacked a band of forty-four filibusterers from Mexico, on the Prendicia River, Texas, and captured the whole party with all their stock and arms.

September 29th, a detachment of Troop C pursued a small band of hostiles to their camp near Saragosa, Mexico, where they were attacked. Four Indians were captured, also twelve horses and four mules. The camp with all its equipage was destroyed.

November 29th, Troop C after a very long march succeeded in surprising ALSATA's band of hostiles near the Carmen Mountains, Mexico. A charge by the troops dispersed the Indians in every direction, with loss of their camp equipage, seventeen horses, six mules and some arms. One soldier was wounded. Five Indians were known to have died afterwards from wounds and exposure.

#### 1878.

April 15th, a detachment of Troop K pursued to the Carriso Mountains, Texas, a band of Mescalero Apaches who had stolen twelve mules from a train near Fort Davis.

April 15th, a detachment of Troop B pursued a band of Indians who had killed a mail rider near Escondido Station, Texas; the trail was followed six days and the mail found, but the marauders could not be overtaken.

#### 1879.

July 27th, a detachment of Troop H had a fight with Indians at the Salt Lakes near Carriso Mountains, Texas; three Indians were wounded, two of them mortally, and ten ponies were captured. Two enlisted men were wounded.

#### 1880.

The Mescalero Agency, at the Fort Stanton Reservation, New Mexico, had largely served as a base of supplies and recruits for the raiding parties of VICTORIA, and it was determined to disarm and dismount the Indians there. The Department of Texas being required to furnish her quota of the force, the colonel, staff, non-commissioned staff, detachment of the band, Troops D, E, F, K, and L, composed the expedition.

On March 31st, while passing Pecos Falls, Texas, learning of the stealing of stock from citizens in that vicinity the night previous, a detachment of Troops F and L was sent in pursuit. On April 2d they overtook the Indians, one of whom was killed and eight head of stolen stock recovered.

April 9th, Troop K, while detached from the column attacked a camp of Indians at Shakehand Spring, killed the chief of the band, captured five, and between twenty and thirty head of stock. They destroyed the camp and recovered a Mexican boy, named COYETANA GARCIA, who had been taken captive by the Indians.

On April 16th, the forces having duly arrived at the Mescalero Agency, the attempt was made to disarm and dismount the Indians, when a desperate effort was made by the savages to escape. Ten warriors were killed, some forty more escaping. About two hundred and fifty Indians, men, women and children, were taken into the Agency. From twenty to thirty guns, carbines and pistols were captured from the braves and turned over to the agent.

April 20th, a detachment of Troop L pursued a band of hostiles to Sacramento Mountains, New Mexico, and attacked them; one Indian was killed and others supposed wounded. Five horses were captured. Indian killed was identified as the one who captured the boy recovered by Troop K.

July 30th, General GRIERSON, with a small party, was attacked by VICTORIA's Indians between Quitman Cañon and Eagle Springs. A detachment of Troop G came up, engaged the hostiles, and held them in check until the arrival of Troops C, G and A, when in a very severe engagement lasting four hours, seven Indians were killed and a large number wounded, and the braves driven across the Rio Grande. Private DAVIS, Troop C, and ten horses were killed. Lieutenant COLLADAY, Private PRESCOTT, Troop G, and five animals were wounded.

August 3d, near the Alamo, Texas, a detachment of Troops C, G and H had a running fight for fifteen miles with Indians, in which a number of them were killed and wounded, together with a few ponies. Private TOCKES, Troop C, killed, and Private LONDON, Troop G, wounded.

April 3d, Troop K pursued a band of hostiles to the top of the Sierra Diablo and captured VICTORIA's supply camp, which consisted of about twenty-five head of beef cattle, a substitute for bread made of Maguay and other plants, berries, etc., and a large amount of beef on pack animals. The braves were pursued toward the Guadalupe Mountains.

August 4th, a detachment of Troops F and L, while following a trail into a cañon north of Bowen Springs, Guadalupe Mountains, was suddenly attacked by the Indians. The soldiers held their position for two hours. Private WM. TAYLOR, Troop F, and several horses were shot; loss of Indians unknown.

August 6th, Troop F pursued a band of Indians toward the Sacramento Mountains. In the several skirmishes two Indians were killed and a few ponies shot and captured.

August 6th, at Rattlesnake Springs, Texas, Troops A, B, C, G and H again struck VICTORIA's braves, who after a sharp skirmish fled with the utmost haste toward the Rio Grande, hotly pursued by the troops and again driven into Mexico. Four of the hostiles were

known to have been killed in the attack and many wounded. Private HARDY, Troop H, missing in action.

October 29th, a party of from thirty-five to fifty Indians, supposed to be a remnant of VICTORIA's band, attacked a picket party of twelve men from Troops B, I and K, and killed Privates BURNS and MILLES, Troop B, Corporal BACKUS, Privates GRIFFIN and STANLEY, Troop K, at Ojo Calienta, Texas.

1886.

January 3d, Sergeant EVANS and Private LAWSON, Troop C, were killed in Gayleyville Cañon, Arizona, by an Indian scout.

May 3d, Troop K attacked GERONIMO's band of Apaches in the Pineto Mountains, Mexico. After a hot fight they succeeded in driving them from their position, with a loss of two killed and one wounded. About thirty head of stock were abandoned by the hostiles in the flight. Corporal SCOTT was severely wounded and Private FOLLIS killed.

May 31st, Troop A struck NATCHEZ's band of Apaches, on the Rio Bonito, near Fort Apache, Arizona, captured all their stock and saddles, and pursued them south. One Indian was wounded.

October 18th, Troop H had a running fight with Chief MANGUS and his band in the Black River Mountains, Arizona, and after a chase of fifteen miles captured the entire party, thirteen in number, with all their stock and supplies.

1887.

March 10th, Lieutenant SEWARD MOTT died of wounds received in the line of duty, inflicted the day previous by a Tonto Indian.

May 27th, five enlisted scouts at San Carlos, Arizona, absented themselves, proceeded to the San Pedro Valley and killed an Indian there belonging to another band. A number of other Indians accompanied the scouts and were concerned in the affair. On the evening of June 1st the party returned and the scouts were disarmed by the agent and ordered in confinement. A commotion arose among a number of the band who were standing near by and who fired several shots, one of which seriously wounded the chief of scouts. During the excitement that followed this disturbance the five scouts effected their escape, and with their friends disappeared. The party (seventeen in number) were at once pursued by a detachment of Troop B, then in camp near the scene. This detachment was soon joined by another of Troop L from Fort Grant, Arizona, and on June 11th the camp of the renegades was surprised and all their horses, equipments, etc., captured near the crest of the Rincon Mountains, from which point the hostiles made their way back to San Carlos afoot, hotly pursued by the troops, where they all surrendered by the 23d. Two citizens were killed by the savages during their flight.



1889.

May 11th, near Cedar Springs, Arizona, a detachment of Troops C and G, guarding the paymaster, was attacked by highwaymen. The robbers succeeded in getting away with the funds, but not until nearly every man of the detachment was disabled. Nine enlisted men were wounded, two of them twice. Of this affair Major WHAM says: "I was a soldier in GRANT's old regiment during the entire war; it was justly proud of its record of sixteen battles, and of the reflected glory of its old colonel 'the great commander,' but I never witnessed better courage nor better fighting than shown by these colored soldiers on May 11, 1889, as the bullet marks on the robbers' position to-day abundantly attest." Report dated 29th August, 1889.

1890.

March 2d, a party of five drunken Indians killed a freighter by the name of HERBERT, ten miles west of Fort Thomas, Arizona. Immediately upon receipt of the news scouts from San Carlos and a detachment of Troop K from Fort Thomas, were ordered in pursuit; upon arrival of the forces under Lieutenants WATSON and CLARKE at the scene, they were united and the trail found and persistently followed for several days and nights. On the 7th they overtook the marauders on Salt River, where a hard fight ensued, in which two Indians were killed and three captured, one of whom was badly wounded. A detachment of Troop I was in at the attack and did good service.

The following extract is taken from the Department Commander's annual report, 1890: "This is one of the most brilliant affairs of its kind that has occurred in recent years, and has had a very quieting effect upon, and will no doubt prove a lasting lesson to the Indians at the San Carlos Agency."

1891.

January 13th a Chiricahua renegade killed a man at SMITH's ranch, near Fort Bowie, and was pursued by Lieutenant CLARKE's detachment over the Chiricahua Mountains, and on the fourth day overtaken in his camp. This bold marauder, however, escaped with his squaw in the rocks and eluded the pursuers. The camp, which was well supplied, was burned.

1896.

Troops C, D and I, and a detachment of Troops G and K were engaged in rounding up Canadian Cree Indians for deportation, during the months of June, July and August.

In addition to the incidents cited in the foregoing chronological statement, the regiment has participated in numerous affairs, attacks, etc., in the performance of police duties on Indian reservations, enforcing civil laws, guarding mails or escorting supply trains through the Great West, to give the details of which space forbids. Suffice it to say that the history of the regiment shows that it has never hesitated to face danger when called upon for any duty.

## SOME RIDES OF NOTE.

August, 1877, Adjutant R. G. SMITHER, with the non-commissioned staff and band, marched from Fort Concho to Bull Creek, Texas, to the relief of Troop A, which was reported on the Staked Plains in a suffering condition, both men and horses dying from exhaustion caused by want of water—about 160 miles within sixty-one hours. Actual time of marching not known.

August 5, 1880, General GRIERSON with Troops A, B, C, G and H, left camp ten miles south of Van Horn Wells at 3 A. M., and reached Rattlesnake Springs, Texas, sixty-five miles distant across the mountains, at 11:45 P. M., same date, several hours in advance of the Indians who had preceded them some hours.

Summer of 1886, Captain LERO with Troop K, marched twenty miles in two hours, in pursuit of hostiles. Details not obtainable. General Field Orders No. 12, Department of Arizona, 1886.

September, 1886, Lieutenant C. P. JOHNSON, with detachment L, and company of Indian Scouts, in pursuit of JOSE and party who had escaped after the surrender of GERONIMO, marched from San Luis Pass, Mexico, to San Dones, northwest of Ascencion, Mexico, seventy-four miles within eleven hours. Gait: Jog trot. Halts: Ordinary. In January, 1887, this same officer on a similar mission with detachment Troop L, fifteen men and twenty-two packs, marched from Ascencion, Chihuahua, Mexico, across the mountains to the Bavispe River, Sonora, Mexico, within twelve hours, a distance of seventy-four miles. Gait: Walk and trot. Halts: Ordinary.

June, 1887, Lieutenant C. P. JOHNSON, Lieutenant J. B. HUGHES, with fifty odd men of Troops B and L, in pursuit of KIDD and party, marched eighty-eight miles in twenty-two hours, part of which was over a rugged country and the thermometer at San Carlos registering  $114\frac{1}{2}^{\circ}$ . Gait: Trot and gallop. Halts: Two, one of two and one four hours. Actual time of marching, sixteen hours. Part of this command under Lieutenant JOHNSON marched from Pantano, Arizona, to Sanford's Ranch, thence to Torre's Ranch, and thence back to Pantano, forty-six miles in seven and one-half hours. Gait: Walk, trot, gallop and full gallop.

October 15, 1888, Captain S. T. NORVELL, with Troop M, left Fort Bayard, N. M., in pursuit of a raiding party from Fort Stanton, picked up the trail at Santa Rita, followed it southeast to Brockman's Mill on the Miembres, thence to Fort Cummings Road; touched the Rio Grande at Santa Barbara, continued down to Colorado, and on through San Andreas Mountains to White Water, one hundred and sixty-five miles, where the raiders were captured, within seventy-two hours. Gait: Walk. Actual time of marching not known.

March 6, 1890, Sergeant ALEX. CHEATHAM and two privates of Troop I, in charge of six pack mules with supplies for Lieutenants WATSON and CLARKE, left San Carlos at 11 o'clock P. M., and marched to a point northwest from there on Salt River, Arizona, by

a little before sunrise, a distance of about forty-five miles, and from that time, sunrise to sunset that day, a distance of about the same, making about ninety miles from 11 o'clock at night to sunset the 7th. The last half of the night ride was over a rough mountain trail, and the whole of the next day was over an extremely rough country, the roughest part of Arizona in fact, up and down, very steep and rocky mountain ridges where the horses had to be led nearly all day. Sergeant CHEATHAM arrived at Lieutenant WATSON's camp just as he was pulling out, so had no rest at all after his night ride, not even dismounting, and none of course during the day, as it is a matter of history that the marauders of whom the command was in pursuit were overtaken on that day and killed or captured.

April, 1894, Lieutenant-Colonel PERRY, with Adjutant SMITH, N. C. S., Troops B, E, G and K, left Fort Custer about 9:00 P. M., for Custer Station, Montana, to intercept if possible a part of COXEY'S ("Commonwealers") contingent, which had stolen a Northern Pacific Railroad train at Butte City, Montana, and were *en route* to Washington, D. C. The command forded the Big Horn River, which at that season of the year was full from melting snow from the numerous mountain streams, and is treacherous at all times; was doubly so then owing to *intense darkness*. The crossing was, however, accomplished without serious mishap, and the command reached Custer Station, thirty-five miles away, shortly after 1 o'clock A. M.

June 15, 1896, Lieutenant L. HARDEMAN left camp of Troop C, one mile west of Havre, Montana, with Corporal W. JOHNSON, Trumpeter SULDER and five privates of the troop and one civilian interpreter, at 4:30 P. M., for Chinook and vicinity, to intercept a large body of Cree Indians reported making their way toward the Dakota line. The detachment marched five miles north of Fort Belknap Agency and returned to camp at 10:15 P. M., 16th instant, having covered a distance of over one hundred and ten miles within thirty hours. Gait: Walk and trot. Halts: One of four and one-half hours, after the first thirty miles. Actual time of marching, about twenty-five hours.

A ride made by Lieutenant ROCKENBACH, Sergeant ANCRUM and fifteen men of Troop C, during the roundup of Cree Indians, is well worthy of mention.

On June 16, 1896, information was received at the camp of Troop C, Tenth U. S. Cavalry, near Havre, Montana, that a number of Cree Indians who had been rounded up during the day had escaped. The Lieutenant was ordered to intercept them. As he had ridden about fifty miles that day he concluded not to start till next morning, and spent the evening in Havre getting what information he could as to their probable route. Rumors as to the course taken by the Crees were about as numerous as the dogs hovering about the average Indian village. As the most authentic news pointed to the northwest, it was decided to take that direction. At 5:30 A. M., 17th, the detachment, fully armed and equipped, with three days' rations in

saddle pockets, accompanied by an interpreter, left camp, marching up Milk River about seven miles, thence in a northwesterly direction; about 11 o'clock A. M. turned due north, and at 1 P. M. north-east; thence to a point where Black Coulee crosses the road to Maple Creek; thence to the lake where Black Coulee ends, on the east bank of which the command bivouacked at 7 P. M. The march was resumed at 4 o'clock A. M. in extended order, at 100 yards intervals. At 7 A. M., having marched about fifteen miles, the left skirmisher signalled that the trail had been struck. The command quickly assembled, orders given to adjust equipments, etc., and to follow at the trot, when Lieutenant ROCKENBACH and the interpreter started on the trail at a lope (about ten miles per hour); so eager, however, was the detachment to be in at the death, that some persuasion had to be used to prevent it from keeping up at the gallop. The West Fork was soon crossed, the Middle Fork came in view, and about 10 o'clock A. M. the interpreter exclaimed, "Cattle!" which proved to be the stock of the Indians of whom the detachment was in quest. The game was discovered in a horseshoe bend of the creek. The detachment having come in sight, was signalled to keep away from the creek, and every precaution taken to hold the prey, which consisted of twenty-five Indians, forty-three head of stock, thirteen wagons and carts, and dogs galore. The Indians refused to return, claiming that they were across the international boundary line, but the Lieutenant found, by intersection on peaks of the Bear Paws, that they were on the Middle (sometimes called the North) Fork, about one mile south of the line. He was also familiar with the country, from the fact that he had been over the same map-making the summer before, and told the Crees that they would have to return, and pointed to the carbines in hands of the detachment surrounding them on the crest of the hillock above, as an evidence of the fact. One of them, an old man, refused to go, striking himself on the head and drawing his hand across his throat (signifying Assiniboine), and uttered, "No go." This the Lieutenant understood to mean, "You can break my head and cut my throat, but no go," and told him that he be d—d if he would not do both, if necessary. The spirit, or object of the journey, having been virtually accomplished, it was decided to rest until next morning, when the fact was developed that many of the men had found their saddle pockets too large for three days' rations and had provided for them promptly on bivouacking the *first night*. The fact was also apparent that the stock of provisions belonging to the Indians was being rapidly depleted, from unmistakable evidence along the trail. It was also noticed that there were a few dogs less in sight than had accompanied them in their flight a day or so previous. This circumstance, and the nearness of the Canadian line, prompted the Lieutenant in taking up the return march, which he did at 1 o'clock P. M., rejoining the troop at 9 A. M. next day, having been absent fifty-one and one-half hours all told, marching 152 miles in thirty-two hours, without a sore back or lame horse.

Although it has been conceded by all well informed people that

the days of campaigning with the noble red man have ceased, and which is practically true, however it would be unjust to all concerned should this sketch close without reference to the long and tedious marches, and the hardships incident thereto, incurred in the execution of executive orders in the deportation of Canadian Cree Indians by Troops I and D, commanded by Captain S. L. WOODWARD and Lieutenant J. J. PERSHING. These commands operated on different lines to the one end and marched 1,689 miles. The reports of the operations of these troops were, unfortunately for the regimental headquarters, handed to the officer under whose immediate orders they were acting.

Many of the arduous rides made by detachments in response to appeals for protection from the early pioneers who had sought homes in the great unknown West, were not recorded; and while many of the old-timers tell of them in fervent and descriptive speech, we are, for the lack of data, forced to omit any further mention of them, than to say that an hour's talk with any one of the participants is indeed a rare treat, with opportunities for obtaining it being daily lessened by the Great Destroyer, the scythe of Time.

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A member of the Association wishes information on the following subjects: "Leather, its Care and Preservation; effect of Different Agencies Upon it; its Manufacture." "Black and Tan Leather." "Saddles; especially Cavalry Saddles."

Information on the last two subjects is easily obtainable from Major CARTER's "Horses, Saddles and Bridles," DWYER's "Seats and Saddles," and No. 11, Vol. III; No. 26, Vol. VII, and No. 32, Vol. IX of THE JOURNAL. An exhaustive article on the first subject is much desired.

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*Editor U. S. Cavalry Journal.*

DEAR SIR:—Will you be kind enough to correct in the next issue of THE JOURNAL an error which crept into my article in the September number, "Some Notes on English Cavalry," regarding the feed allowance of hay. It should read *two and a half* pounds for morning and noon stables, and *seven* pounds for the evening.

Very truly yours,

H. EDWARDS FICKEN.

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#### STEEPLE CHASING IN SWEDEN.

A sketch of the course with the nature of the obstacles is appended herewith. All courses are over turf. While the obstacles are varied in their nature, there is not one that the ordinary cavalry horse can not take, provided he has had average training. If a country as small and relatively as poor in cavalry as Sweden is can successfully maintain such excellent cavalry sport as I have on two

occasions—1895 and 1897—seen at Stockholm, it would certainly seem that our own could. There are few, if any, better ways of fostering a cavalry spirit, and at the same time a desire on the part of officers to have good mounts, than by encouraging steeple chasing.

In distinction to flat racing it by no means disposes horses to bolting, for the simple reason that the rider must always have his mount well in hand, prepared to turn here or there, to jump a ditch or a hurdle, etc. As to danger there is but a small element if both horse and rider be properly trained. This was shown by the events at Fort Riley in the spring of this year, as well as the events at Stockholm and St. Petersburg which I have frequently witnessed.

I have taken the steeple chasing in Sweden, especially because in quantity of cavalry it more nearly resembles our own. Officers of all European armies ride steeple chases.

*Distances.*—In my opinion it is a mistake, for cavalry reasons, to make the courses too short. To say that a cavalry horse can not be trained to carry his rider at a good stiff pace a couple of miles is to admit a great weakness on the part of a branch of the service that may in actual service be required to do more than twice that distance in moving from one flank of a position to another. The pace must naturally be slower than were the course much shorter, but inasmuch as pace is only relative and all the horses are on the same footing, it makes no difference of importance.

The following gives the distances and obstacles in the several races:

## FIRST DAY.

*First Race*—(2500 Metres)—Obstacles: 11, 12, 13, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13.

*Second Race*—(4500 Metres)—Obstacles: 8, 9, 7, 11, 16, 13, 5, 6, 7, 11, 14, 2, 1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 11, 12, 13.

*Third Race*—(4000 Metres)—Obstacles: 11, 14, 15, 1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 11, 14, 2, 1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 11, 12, 13.

*Fourth Race*—(5000 Metres)—Obstacles: 8, 1, 2, 3, 7, 9, 4, 5, 6, 7, 11, 14, 15, 1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 11, 16, 13.

## SECOND DAY.

*First Race*—(3200 Metres)—Obstacles: 13, 5, 6, 7, 11, 14, 15, 1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 11, 16, 3.

*Second Race*—(3000 Metres)—Obstacles: 1, 6, 7, 11, 14, 15, 1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 11, 16, 3.

*Third Race*—(4500 Metres)—Obstacles: 8, 9, 7, 11, 16, 13, 5, 6, 7, 11, 14, 2, 1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 11, 12, 13.

*Fourth Race*—(3500 Metres)—Obstacles: 13, 8, 1, 6, 7, 11, 14, 15, 1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 11, 16, 13.




In this connection it would seem that all lieutenants at large posts should receive instruction in equitation. Especially does this seem desirable at the cavalry and light artillery school, where all officers are mounted. For pure cavalry work it is reasonable to think that Riley should take and hold a good lead over all other places.

Since my return to Europe I am more than ever convinced that our cavalry surpasses in mobility any I have seen, and on the whole its equipment is lighter and in many respects more practical than any other.

The quality of the riding, however, of our mounted officers is very uneven as is also the manner of riding. The latter has, I think, been noticed by many. While considerable latitude should be allowed, there should be limits. In a word, it does not seem that the average of horsemanship among our officers is as high as it should be.

In Sweden all cavalry lieutenants are required to pass through the Officers' Cavalry School at Strömsholm before being promoted to captain. This course lasts a year, and during that time officers are not only given careful instruction in all kinds of riding, but they are required to train young horses for the cavalry service from the beginning—including longe, gaiting, jumping, etc. In this training the officer gets more real practical knowledge of horses and horsemanship than he can learn in any other way. This work should, however, be done under the supervision of a specially qualified officer. The new horses continually coming to the regiments would furnish sufficient material to work on.

OFFICERS' STEEPLE CHASE COURSE, NEAR STOCKHOLM, SWEDEN.




1. Stone wall.
2. Earth bank.
3. "English hurdle" (fence, ditch and hedge).
4. Hurdle with water jump.

5. "Irish bank" (banquet).
6. Fence, ditch and hedge.
7. Earth bank, with hedge and ditch.
- 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13. Hedges.

14. Hedge with ditch.
15. Hedge with fence.
16. Open ditch.
- C, C. Stables.

## IMPROVED ALUMINUM-MOUNTED SABER (BERLIN).

WEIGHTS.		
U. S. Trooper's:	German Trooper's:	U. S. Officer's:
3 lbs. 6 ozs.	(Aluminum)	(Fancy, Light)
	2 lbs.	2 lbs. 11 ozs.



NOTE.—The ring of the German saber is stationary to prevent rattling. The length and weight of blades varies between limits, to suit the user.

Differs from German Regulation in having —

1st. Seamless drawn scabbard of aluminum (alloy) weighing  $8\frac{1}{2}$  ounces. U. S. trooper's weighs 1 lb.  $3\frac{1}{2}$  ozs.; U. S. officer's (fancy) weighs  $15\frac{1}{2}$  ozs.

- 2d. Guard of Aluminum.  
 3d. Grip of improved form of vulcanized rubber.  
 4th. Clutch to hold saber in scabbard.

A


B

C

Projection  
for grip  
of finger.

Push  
Button.

Clutch.



- A. Chain saber sling (French), only worn on foot.  
 B. Attachment for saddle, used altogether mounted (French and German).  
 C. Method of attaching bridoon to the same buckle that carries the curb-bit (German).

FREDERICK S. FOLTZ,  
*Lieutenant, First Cavalry.*

## FAIR LEATHER EQUIPMENTS FOR CAVALRY.

At a meeting of the Post Lyceum, held at Fort Robinson, Nebraska, on November 1, 1897, the following subject was proposed for discussion, the officers having previously been notified, viz: "Is it advisable to have fair leather equipments for the cavalry service?" The result of this discussion was so unanimously in favor of the fair leather equipments, that the secretary of the lyceum was requested by the officers present to forward a brief synopsis of the discussion to the Adjutant-General U. S. Army, for his information, and respectfully requesting that the subject be referred to the commanding officers of the different cavalry regiments, with a view of testing the sense of the officers upon it, looking ultimately to a change in this respect, if the Adjutant-General should deem it advisable.

Of the seventeen officers present, fourteen were strongly in favor of fair leather equipments; two argued in favor of fair leather, but were of the opinion that it had not been as yet sufficiently tested; one was in favor of black leather.

The subject was discussed mainly from three standpoints; 1st. The known defects of the black leather equipments; 2d, The wearing qualities of the fair leather; 3d, The appearance of the fair leather.

Briefly, on the first point, the following was observed: That whatever polish or dressing is used on the black leather, it will rub off the saddle, especially in the rain or when the men are perspiring freely, and thus ruin the clothing; that the polishes used by the men to shine the leather appear to cause it to rot, thus materially diminishing its durability; that with the dressings used, dust accumulates rapidly on the saddle and sticks to it.

On the second point, the fact was cited that many European armies have adopted the fair leather equipment, and they appear to give satisfaction; that cowboys throughout the West use fair leather saddles which wear well and at the same time are subjected to the hardest usage, and often without using any dressing at all upon them; that packers in the army use fair leather saddles which receive very hard usage; members of the lyceum mentioned instances of where they themselves used fair leather saddles with excellent results, also fair leather bridles; individual cases known to them were also cited tending to the same opinion; cases were cited of the wearing ability of tan leather shoes. An experimental saddle issued to Troop "A," Ninth Cavalry, some four years ago was shown to the officers present. It had a fair leather seat, stirrups, straps and hoods. This saddle had been in continual use since received. The leather was in excellent condition and strong. In this connection, however, it was the opinion of all present that all of the leather should be fair, instead of part fair and part black; also that the bridles should be fair leather.

On the third point some objection was raised on the ground that after fair leather equipments had been used some little time they

would turn darker, thus causing the equipments to present a varied appearance when new saddles should be issued a few at a time. It was thought that appearance was secondary to serviceable wear and tear; but that this could probably be remedied by oil being rubbed into the leather of new saddles, thus causing them at once to take on a darker color.

It was further suggested that in all probability the leather could be kept in excellent condition and clean by simply using castile soap as a cleansing material.

W. S. WOOD,

*First Lieutenant and Adjutant, Ninth Cavalry.*

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It seems not inappropriate, under existing circumstances, for the Association to reiterate its policy as set forth in the JOURNAL for March, 1896, viz:

"It has always been the endeavor to avoid any friction with, or antagonism of other branches of the service, but the Council stands ready at all times to set forth, in a proper light, the true interests and wishes of the cavalry arm without fear or favor."



## BOOK NOTICES AND EXCHANGES.

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THE CAMPAIGN OF MARENGO. Lieutenant H. H. Sargent, U. S. A.  
A. C. McClurg & Co., Chicago.

Those who have been fortunate enough to read "Napoleon Bonaparte's First Campaign," by the same author, will naturally expect his later work to be one of great merit; and in this they will not be disappointed.

For the benefit of those who may not have all the details of fact fresh in their memories, the general military situation is carefully described. The discouragement of the French "Army of Italy," due to bad management, inadequate supplies of almost every kind, and numerous reverses in the field; the elation of the Austrian troops in the same theater for the exactly opposite reasons, their greatly superior numbers, and the assistance they might expect from an English fleet, and from a land force then in Minorca. All these, and many other particulars, having an important bearing upon the operations of the approaching campaign, are pointed out.

The general strategic situation, as viewed from the standpoint of either party, is given a very full discussion; the principal possibilities of action open to each party are noted, as well as the main opportunities for both that would probably result in case certain lines of action were adopted. The relations of the several possible theatres to each other; and the probable effect of operations in each upon the general result are set forth in the clearest manner. Finally, the plans that were actually adopted by each party are explained and discussed at length.

The operations of Massena in Italy, and those of Moreau in south Germany, may be regarded as Bonaparte's first movements; and as such, in their larger features, and also in many of their details, they were part of his great plan; and, in these, a certain measure of success was absolutely necessary to enable him to begin the execution of that part of the general plan of which he had decided to assume personal direction. These operations are accurately described and fully explained, and the bearing of each upon the general subject made plain.

Notwithstanding some errors, Moreau's operations in Germany had finally succeeded sufficiently to warrant Bonaparte in beginning his own movement into Italy; and the operations of Thurreau, Suchet, and especially the skillful and heroic defense of Genoa by Massena had drawn so much of Melas's strength toward Genoa and the Var and had so occupied his attention that Bonaparte's great object of establishing his army on Melas's communications was accomplished without serious fighting.

The means are indicated by which the First Consul, though numerically inferior by 40,000 men upon the entire hostile front, yet contrived to have a numerical superiority in south Germany long enough to secure the defeat of the enemy there. Some of these troops, together with the "Army of Reserve," were then transferred across the Alps, completely surprising Melas, who, like the Aulic Council, had wholly discredited the very existence of this force; and who, even when it was only a few miles distant, was not yet convinced. The skillful maneuvers by which Melas was kept in doubt as to Bonaparte's real object and by which he was induced to keep his forces scattered until too late to attack Bonaparte at certain critical moments, are also described and explained.

The ruses and pretences by which the enemies of France were led to believe that the "Army of Reserve," so ostentatiously announced, was a myth, until it was actually in the midst of the theater of its intended operations, constitute an instance of "deceiving the enemy" possibly more remarkable than anything of its kind in the whole range of military history.

The almost incredible foresight which enabled Bonaparte, in Paris, months in advance, to predict almost the precise movements that his enemy would make and to select the very spot where the decisive battle would be fought, and which almost savors of the supernatural, really indicate only the transcendent genius for war of this greatest strategist of all time.

Throughout these operations, we see that Bonaparte constantly kept open as many possibilities of action as possible; and we observe his fondness for "interior lines," or such an arrangement of his troops that he could concentrate sooner than his enemy. The foregoing points and many others that might not, perhaps, occur, even to a student of history, are brought out clearly in the copious "comments" that terminate each chapter.

Like all military men the author has an intense admiration for Bonaparte's generalship. But he does not allow it to blind him to the fact that he had vast personal interests at stake in this campaign; nor to the fact that some things were done which we, in full possession of all the facts, recognize as errors. Upon this point he says:

"It will be borne in mind that it is easy for any one, having a fair knowledge of the science of war, to point out, after the event, the mistakes that were made. During active operations confusion and doubt are constant factors that cannot be ignored by a commander. Neither Bonaparte nor his officers knew, or could know, the facts as we know them to-day. Thus the

military student is able, after months of study, to point out the errors made by a great master of war. He approaches the subject from a different point of view from that of the commanding general. He writes in the light; Napoleon marched in the darkness. He has the details of the campaign at his finger's end; Napoleon had to form his conclusions from the doubtful information at hand. Thus it is that mediocrity can criticise what genius alone can conceive and execute.

"Again, it must be remembered that the really great soldier is not he who never makes a mistake, but he who, in the aggregate, makes the fewest mistakes. In war the conditions are such that a commander cannot, by any possibility, always know the truth. He must often decide momentous questions on the spur of the moment, basing his decisions on unreliable information, obtained mostly from reports and rumors. 'Speak to me of a general who has made no mistakes in war,' says Turrene, 'and you speak of one who has seldom made war.' 'In the profession of war,' says Napoleon, 'the game is always to the one who makes the fewest mistakes.'

"In whatever way strategy is employed," says Colonel Maurice, 'surprise and concealment are essential to success. On this account it will continually happen, in selecting a line of operations or a scheme of campaign, that the most important point of all is to carry out just what an enemy does not expect. Very often successful campaigns, the method which has been subsequently much criticised, have owed their success to the facts that, from a nice calculation of time and distance, the successful general has seen that he could carry through an operation dangerous in itself, but sure not to be the one expected by his opponent."

For the second time the author has produced a most excellent treatise upon a subject of world-wide interest. So careful are his statements of fact, and so accurate his reasoning and his application of military principles, that his work might be used as a text book; and yet he has so far avoided technical terms, excepting those in common use, and has employed such an entertaining style that the work will be read with interest and pleasure by many whose acquaintance with military matters is of a merely casual character. Upon the whole, this work, considered as a strategical study, is, perhaps, the most comprehensive and the most generally satisfactory that has ever appeared in the English language upon this subject.

W. A. S.

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LIFE OF NAPOLEON. Baron Jomini. Translated from the French by Major General H. W. Halleck. Two volumes, with an Atlas. Hudson-Kimberly Publishing Co., Kansas City, Mo.

The importance of Jomini's "Life of Napoleon" to the military student can scarcely be overestimated, and few have gone very far in the pursuit of military knowledge without referring to this treatise. The reference might not have been intentional on the part of the student, in fact he may have given some other author credit for the information he has gained of Napoleon and his operations; but it is nevertheless true that most writers have drawn largely from Jomini, and in this way most students are more or less familiar with his writings.

A work of such a standard nature needs only to be described in regard to the manner in which the publisher presents it. As the work is but a reprint, without change or comment, the faithfulness

of the copy, the typographical work and the atlas are of paramount importance.

In looking over the two volumes of text, it is seen that nothing has been omitted. The typographical work is excellent, the print being large and the lines well spaced. At the head of each page is the title of the chapter making reference an easy matter. Each separate subject in a chapter has its title in capitals, a convenience that all students must certainly appreciate.

The reproduction of the plates is exact and great effort seems to have been made in the "tooling out" process to not remove a single point or line shown on the originals. The plates are clear, easily read, printed on heavy map paper, and where color has been used to represent troops, care has been taken to put the representation in its proper place.

The cost, depending upon the binding of course, appears to be very moderate and well within the reach of all those desiring the work.

I would not say that every army officer should have the work in his library, for I might as consistently admonish a Christian to procure a Bible; but I hope that I will be pardoned for saying that this is a rare opportunity, and that those who take advantage of it will be wise.

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DRAWINGS BY FREDERICK REMINGTON. R. H. Russell, New York.

This book is a collection of a large number of Remington's best drawings, and contains the following:

1. Forsythe's Fight on the Republican River, 1868—The Charge of Roman Nose.
2. Coronado's March—Colorado.
3. The Missionary and the Medicine Man.
4. Hunting a Beaver Stream, 1840.
5. The Hungry Winter.
6. Fight Over a Water Hole.
7. When His Heart is Bad.
8. A Citadel of the Plains.
9. On the Northwest Coast.
10. The Sheep Herder's Breakfast.
11. The Gold Bug.
12. An Overland Stage—Indians Coming in With the Stage.
13. The Well in the Desert.
14. The Borderland of the Other Tribe.
15. Her Calf.
16. A Government Pack Train.
17. The Charge.
18. The Pony War Dance.
19. The Coming Storm.
20. His Death Song.
21. Protecting a Wagon Train.
22. The Water in Arizona.
23. Government Scouts—Moonlight.
24. A Crow Scout.
25. A Mountain Lion Hunting.
26. Coyotes.
27. Hostiles Watching the Column.
28. Satisfying the Demands of Justice—The Head.
29. Sketch-Book Notes.
30. The Punchers.
31. Riding Herd in the Rain.
32. Mexican Vaqueros Breaking a "Bronc."
33. A Sun Fisher.
34. A Running Bucker.
35. Riding the Range—Winter.
36. Snow Indian, or the Northwest Type.
37. Nez Percé Indian.
38. A Cheyenne Warrior.
39. A Greaser.
40. A Captain of Infantry in Field Rig.
41. A "Wind Jammer."
42. Cavalry Column Out of Forage.
43. Half-Breed Horse Thieves of the Northwest.
44. A Misdeal.
45. Over the Foot-Hills.
46. Taking the Robe.
47. Cowboy Leading Calf.
48. Cow Pony Pathos.
49. The Cavalry

Cook with Water. 50. A Modern Cavalry Camp. 51. Fox Terriers Fighting a Badger. 52. High Finance at the Cross-Roads. 53. Sketch-Book Notes. 54. The Indian Soldier. 55. The Squaw Pony. 56. U. S. Dragoon, 1847. 57. A Scout, 1868. 58. U. S. Cavalry Officer on Campaign. 59. A Reservation Indian. 60. Solitude. 61. The Twilight of the Indian.

Owen Wister, in his notes concerning the drawings, says:

"I have stood before many paintings of the West. Paintings of mountains, paintings of buffalo, paintings of Indians—the whole mystic and heroic pageant of our American soil; the only greatly romantic thing our generation has known, the last greatly romantic thing our continent holds; indeed the poetic episode most deeply native that we possess. Long before my eyes looked upon its beautiful domain I studied the paintings; but when Remington came with only a pencil I forgot the rest! And now, I have seen for myself, and know how he has caught alive not only the roped calf, or the troop cook sucking his comfortable corn-cob, the day-by-day facts of the wilderness, but the eternal night also, the pity and the awe of that epic life. He has made them visible by his art, and set them down as a national treasure. Look at the Pony War Dance. That wild fury of religion, that splendor of savagery clashes down to us from the Stone Age. If you will open the Old Testament where Joshua delayed the course of the sun, or they blew down a city wall with a trumpet, you will come upon the same spirit. Look at the Medicine Men and the lightning. Again man's untamed original soul communes with a god of vengeance and terror. Is it not like Elijah and the fire-stroke from heaven upon the altar? Then turn to the sheep-herder's breakfast. Unless you have known that solitude, no words of mine can tell you how Remington has been a poet here. With some lines and smears on paper he has expressed that lotus mystery of the wilderness. He has taken a ragged vagrant with a frying pan and connected him with the eternal. The dog, the pack saddle, the ass, the dim sheep in the plain, those tender outlines of bluffs and ridges—it is the Homer of the Old Testament again; time and the present would have no part here."

To those in the army who have served in the West the drawings will recall with vividness many things they have seen. The realistic "Charge of Roman Nose," "The Government Pack Train," "The Charge," "The Cheyenne Warrior," "The Pony War Dance," will recall scenes familiar to many of our cavalymen. The faithfulness of execution in regard to details has made Remington famous in the army, for there is no class of men so quick to see an oversight of this kind. The soldier's life consists in attending to details, and this nicety he looks for in all classes of work.

Aside from the realism and exactness the poetry is not lost on him. These pictures will excite no end of admiration at the messes and clubs. Although Remington is personally acquainted with few in the army, the army is well acquainted with him through his drawings, and will appreciate and take great pleasure in looking over this collection.

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EXTRACTS FROM AN INFANTRY CAPTAIN'S JOURNAL. By Major von Arnim. Translated by Major C. J. East. Published by Hudson, Kimberly & Co., Kansas City, Mo.

Among the causes that have placed the valuable military writings of von Arnim beyond our reach for twenty-five years have

been poor translations, incomplete and unsatisfactory maps, few leads and small print. The last mentioned was the most powerful reason of them all, for it is perfectly evident that anything that is worthy of being printed at all is also worthy of fair type and space. Perhaps also military men, outside of Germany, have required all this time to prepare themselves for new ideas on the subject of military training. In the present edition the most serious objection to former English reprints of this work does not appear, and our present tendencies in military education make it a fit time to offer a practical method for effectively training a company in skirmishing and outpost duty, in a limited time and under unfavorable circumstances.

Von Arnim follows the method of the brilliant Verdy du Vernois in teaching principles by their application, which has completely revolutionized all former ideas on the training of troops. The book has gone through many editions in Germany and may be regarded as one of the military classics of the day. Such difficulties as may be found in the text, the maps, etc., will call for extra time and study, which will do no harm. E. S.

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LIFE OF GENERAL U. S. GRANT. Colonel Church. G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York.

Writing a biography of General Grant in the year 1897 is a formidable undertaking. Everybody who ever wrote anything about anyone has written about Grant. Colonel Church, however, has attacked his subject with vigor and success. The Putnams made a very judicious choice of their author, who has brought a most unusual equipment to bear on his work. A soldier of the war that made Grant famous, a veteran editor of a leading military newspaper, a forcible, intelligent and discriminating writer, and an intimate acquaintance of the subject of the biography, ought to write a good life of his hero, and the Colonel fulfills anticipations. Of course, very much appears in this book that has already appeared elsewhere; equally, of course, much is omitted from this one volume that will be found in larger lives of Grant, but Colonel Church's large acquaintance among General Grant's contemporaries, both in the army and civil life, has given him a great opportunity for collecting anecdotes, impressions and reminiscences of General Grant of which he has made skillful use.

Colonel Church is frequently philosophical in the treatment of his subject. In an early page of his book he deduces with inexorable logic the probability of young Grant's brain having been reached by the good old-fashioned back-stairs process in vogue among the flogging school masters of the '30's.

It is interesting to note that a famous sailor saved the great soldier from drowning when the great soldier was gotten up to kill in a Marseilles blouse with red stripes. This was not the least of the services Rear Admiral Ammen rendered his country.

Of course, Grant's wonderful horsemanship comes in for ex-



tended mention. This quiet boy was a perfect dare-devil on a horse, as the anecdotes demonstrate. At West Point Grant was recognized as the embodiment of frankness, persistence and determination. He was not much on ethics, and was nearly a tail ender in "artillery drill." It will not be safe to make too radical deductions from either of these facts.

Professor Mahan's very appreciative estimate of Cadet Grant is quoted; also Professor Davies' reported remark, "I tell you that the smartest man in the class is little Grant."

Grant, like everybody in the old army, or rather unlike everybody in the old army, *occasionally* took a drink of liquor, and one drink was all he ever had time to take at once. He was extremely temperate except when he took this one drink, which usually floored him. His commanding officer "got down on him" and Grant, separated from his family by the exigencies of the service, disheartened and disgusted, resigned, *but not under pressure*. This was after the Mexican War, and after most honorable, intelligent and gallant service.

General Grant's vigor, firmness and humor in dealing with his volunteer regiment at the opening of the war are engagingly narrated. His several campaigns are rapidly, but clearly sketched. Grant was drinking Mississippi River water while the wire pullers were shrieking about Grant's drunkenness, and a bibulous officer, visiting Grant's headquarters, could not get even a smell of something to drink during the Vicksburg campaign. But Grant was rapidly getting to the point where none could molest him or make him afraid. Poor, jealous, fidgety, finical, old General Halleck wrote him a very handsome letter when Vicksburg fell, despite Grant's frequent infraction of the "rules of war." Colonel Church does not, in terms, criticize General Grant's sledge hammer assaulting tactics of the Wilderness campaign, but quotes an extract from General Francis A. Walker's "History of the Second Army Corps" with apparent approval, and this extract is, in effect, a criticism of such tactics—but this is old straw. The author, however, makes the obvious point that Grant lost fewer men in ending the war in Virginia than had been lost in accomplishing nothing by his predecessors in command. Of course, the simple, straightforward soldier could not, and did not make a model President. The author knows this and says it.

Grant's utter inaptitude for business, his trustfulness, amounting to gullibility, his business failure, the sad darkening of his later years, his glorious struggle with the only foe that ever beat him are all portrayed by a sympathetic, loyal friend.

Colonel Church keeps always before the reader a picture of the man Grant—an utterly simple-hearted, modest, steadfast character, free from anything approaching egotism or ostentation, a man of objects, not objections, with only one ambition, and that to serve his country.

The book is gotten up in the well known style of the Putnams; is well bound, and printed on good paper, with plenty of clear maps unconfused by unnecessary detail.

J. A. C.

**THE MORE DESTRUCTIVE GRASSHOPPERS OF KANSAS.** Department of Entomology, Kansas University. J. S. Parks, Topeka, Kan.

The losses caused by native grasshoppers in certain parts of the State, especially in localities where alfalfa is produced on a large scale, furnish the special reason for this publication.

The subject is treated under: Observations Made in the Field; Life History and Habits of the Insects; Remedies, Natural and Artificial. Under "Artificial Remedies" comes a good discussion of alfalfa and the grasshopper. Then follows descriptions of the more destructive forms, with five plates of twelve figures, fully explaining the text.

The subject is presented in a simple, popular manner, easily understood by the average reader. It is becoming more and more evident that intelligent farming is the only successful way of securing full returns from the soil. The Department of Entomology has done the farmers a great favor by placing this publication before them in such a manner, since we understand the pamphlet may be had by sending address and a one-cent stamp to pay postage.

**HAND BOOK OF THE ANNEXATION OF HAWAII.** Lorrain A. Thurston. A. B. Morse & Co., St. Joseph, Michigan.

This pamphlet is designed to digest and concentrate for the information of the busy man the principal arguments for and against annexation; the replies to objections thereto; and to furnish a brief description of the people, laws, finances, educational system, resources and civilization of the country proposed to be annexed, and such documentary evidence as is necessary to the full understanding of the issues involved.

Fully indexed and illustrated.

**JOURNAL OF THE ROYAL UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION.** September, October, November, 1897.

1. Military Essay for the Gold Medal Competition. 2. Rapid Cable Laying for War Purposes. 3. The Defects of Our Military Financial System. 4. Fire Discipline. 5. The Formation of an Adequate Reserve of Trained Seamen. 6. On the Instruction of Our Soldiers to Shoot Under Active Conditions of Service. 7. Army Chaplains as Military Historians and Diarists. 8. The Training of Men With the Colors in Relation to their Subsequent Employment in Civil Life. 9. Between the Chiese and Adige. 10. Unification of Time at Sea.

**REVUE DE CAVALERIE.** September, October, 1897.

1. The Cavalry at the Battle of Eylau. 2. The Cavalry in the Austrian Maneuvers of 1896. 3. Cavalry Fighting on Foot. 4. Study on the Advance Cavalry of Armies—War of 1866 in Austria. 5. Tandem Mounted. 6. The Cavalry in the Maneuvers of 1897. 7. The Controlling Idea of the Employment of Cavalry—The Prin-

ciple of Freedom. 8. Looking Amongst the Remounts. 9. From Bautzen to Plaswitz, May, 1813. 10. The Trotter in the Army. 11. The Lancers of the Guard and Its Third Dragoons at Gravelotte. 12. The Tandem Mounted.

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JOURNAL OF THE UNITED STATES ARTILLERY. September, October, 1897.

1. The Probability of Hit when the Probability of Error in Aim is Known. 2. A Reply to the Report of a Board on Seacoast Mortar Fire. 3. The Theoretical and Practical Training of the Light Artillery Gunner. 4. Indirect Fire. 5. History of the Seacoast Fortifications of the United States.

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PROCEEDINGS OF THE UNITED STATES NAVAL INSTITUTE. No. 3, 1897.

1. Torpedoes in Exercise and Battle. 2. Washington's Forgotten Maxim. 3. The Consolidated Mess of the Crew of the U. S. S. Indiana. 4. The Sailor in the Revolution. 5. The Development of Smokeless Powder. 6. The Naval Policy of America. 7. Notes on the Yacht Defender.

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PROCEEDINGS OF THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION. October, November, 1897.

1. With the Turks; The Battle of Domokos. 2. With the Greeks: The Artillery at Domokos. 3. The Nile Cataracts. 4. An Episode in the Siege of Sevastopol. 5. Mountings for Coast Artillery. 6. Laying With a Clinometer. 7. Fighting Books.

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JOURNAL OF THE MILITARY SERVICE INSTITUTION. September, 1897.

1. Readiness for War. 2. Federal Duty and Policy. 3. The Enforcement of Civil Law. 4. Relation of the Soldier to Politics. 5. Things We are Forgetting. 6. Notes on Light Artillery Material. 7. Training of Company Cooks.

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THE MAINE BUGLE. October, 1897.

1. History of Co. "F," Twenty-sixth Maine Regiment. 2. Four Brothers in Blue. 3. Reunion of Veteran Associations. 4. Cavalry Societies of Armies of the United States. 6. Echoes.

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THE INDIAN FENCING REVIEW. July, 1897.

1. Indian Fencing Association. 2. L'Arme Blanche. 3. Infantry Sword Exercise of 1895. 4. Bayonet Fencing. 5. A Soldier's First Impressions in Battle. 6. Cuts and Points.

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THE IOWA HISTORICAL RECORD. October, 1897.

1. A Memory of Jennette Robertson Higley. 2. Address. 3. Hard Times. 4. A Soldier Saint. 5. An Old Cemetery.

REVUE DU CERCLE MILITAIRE.

MILITAER WOCHENBLATT.

THE BREEDERS' GAZETTE.

THE RIDER AND DRIVER.

THE MILITARY GAZETTE.

OUR DUMB ANIMALS.

## PRIZE ESSAY.

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### I.

At a special meeting of the Executive Council of the Cavalry Association, held March 8th, to consider the subject of a prize essay, the following resolution was adopted:

*Resolved*, That the Cavalry Association undertake the production of a history of the American cavalry, which shall be brought out in the form of a series of historical essays, to be published in the JOURNAL.

At a meeting of the Council held December, 1897, it was —

*Resolved*, That the Cavalry Association does hereby offer a prize of \$100.00 in cash each for the second and third essays of the series.

The prizes will be awarded under the following conditions:

1. The competition to be open to all persons.
2. The essays must not exceed 30,000 words.
3. Three typewritten copies of the essay will be sent in a sealed envelope to the Secretary on or before July 15, 1898, if the second essay; or January 15, 1899, in case of the third essay.
4. The essay will be signed *only* with the *nom de plume* adopted by the author. A sealed envelope bearing the *nom de plume* on the outside, and enclosing full name and address, must accompany the essay. This envelope will be opened in the presence of the Council after the decision of the Board of Award has been made.
5. The successful essay shall become the unconditional property of the Cavalry Association, and will be published in the CAVALRY JOURNAL.
6. The second essay shall receive honorable mention, and, if desired by the Council, shall, upon payment of \$25.00 to the writer, become the unconditional property of the Cavalry Association.
7. The prize shall be awarded upon the recommendation of a Board, consisting of three suitable persons chosen by the Executive Council, who shall be requested to designate *the essay deemed worthy of the prize* and also *the essay deemed worthy of honorable mention*.

Should members of the Board determine that no essay is worthy of the prize, they may designate one deemed worthy of honorable mention. Should the Board deem proper, it may recommend neither prize nor honorable mention.

The recommendations of individual members of the Board will be considered by the Council as strictly confidential.

In determining the essay worthy of the prize, the Board will consider, *first*, historical accuracy; *second*, professional excellence; *third*, literary merit.

## II.

The subject selected by the Council for the second essay of the series is as follows: "The History of the American Cavalry Previous to the Civil War."\*

The subject selected for the third essay of the series is as follows: "The History of the Cavalry of the Army of Northern Virginia (Confederate) During the Civil War."†

## III.

The names of the Boards of Award will be announced in the issues of the JOURNAL next preceding the dates upon which the essays are due.

For further information address the undersigned.

E. L. PHILLIPS,  
*Second Lieutenant Sixth Cavalry,*  
*Secretary,*  
*Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.*

\*NOTE.—The subject is intended to include organization, armament, equipment, etc., as well as the operations of the cavalry. It will go back to the beginning of the Revolution.

†NOTE.—The subject is intended to include organization, armament, equipment and supply, as well as the operations of the cavalry. It is intended that this essay will be a counterpart to Essay 1, and will be a corresponding history of the Confederate Cavalry in the East, which was opposed to the Federal cavalry, whose history is included in the essay.

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## BOARD OF AWARD.

The Prize Essays due January 15, 1898, will be submitted to a Board of Award composed of:

General J. H. WILSON, of Wilmington, Del.

General FITZHUGH LEE, of Havana, Cuba.

MOSES COIT TYLER, Professor of American History in Cornell University.



## THE UNITED STATES CAVALRY.

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### FIRST CAVALRY—COLONEL ABRAHAM K. ARNOLD.

Adjutant, W. S. SCOTT.

Quartermaster, G. H. MACDONALD.

HEADQUARTERS, FORT RILEY, KANSAS.

*Troops*—*F* and *K*, Fort Riley, Kan.; *A* and *I*, Fort Huachuca, Ariz.; *E* and *H*, Fort Sill, O. T.; *B* and *D*, Fort Reno, O. T.; *C* and *G*, Fort Sheridan, Ill.

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### SECOND CAVALRY—COLONEL GEORGE G. HUNTT.

Adjutant, R. E. L. MICHIE.

Quartermaster, H. H. SARGENT.

HEADQUARTERS, FORT WINGATE, N. M.

*Troops*—*E* and *K*, Fort Wingate, N. M.; *A*, *C*, *D*, *F*, *G* and *H*, Fort Riley, Kan.; *B* and *I*, Fort Logan, Colo.

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### THIRD CAVALRY—COLONEL S. B. M. YOUNG.

Adjutant, T. R. RIVERS.

Quartermaster, J. W. HEARD.

HEADQUARTERS, FORT ETHAN ALLEN, VT.

*Troops*—*A*, *B*, *D*, *H*, *I* and *K*, Jefferson Barracks, Mo.; *C*, *E*, *F* and *G*, Fort Ethan Allen, Vt.

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### FOURTH CAVALRY—COLONEL CHARLES E. COMPTON.

Adjutant, C. STEWART.

Quartermaster, G. H. CAMERON.

HEADQUARTERS, FORT WALLA WALLA, WASH.

*Troops*—*A* and *G*, Fort Walla Walla, Wash.; *E*, Vancouver Barracks, Wash.; *F*, Boise Barracks, Idaho; *B*, *C*, *I* and *K*, Presidio of San Francisco, Cal.; *D* and *H*, Fort Yellowstone, Wyo.

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### FIFTH CAVALRY—COLONEL L. H. CARPENTER.

Adjutant, J. M. JENKINS.

Quartermaster, J. T. HAINES.

HEADQUARTERS, FORT SAM HOUSTON, TEXAS.

*Troops*—*D*, *E*, *F* and *K*, Fort Sam Houston, Tex.; *B*, Fort McIntosh, Tex.; *C* and *I*, Fort Clark, Tex.; *G*, Fort Brown, Tex.; *H*, Fort Ringgold, Tex.; *A*, Fort Bliss, Tex.

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### SIXTH CAVALRY—COLONEL SAMUEL S. SUMNER.

Adjutant, R. L. HOWZE.

Quartermaster, G. H. SANDS.

HEADQUARTERS, FORT MYER, VA.

*Troops*—*A*, *E*, *G* and *H*, Fort Myer, Va.; *B*, *C*, *F* and *K*, Fort Leavenworth, Kan.; *D* and *I*, Fort Robinson, Neb.

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### SEVENTH CAVALRY—COLONEL EDWIN V. SUMNER.

Adjutant, W. A. HOLBROOK.

Quartermaster, W. H. HART.

HEADQUARTERS, FORT GRANT, ARIZONA.

*Troops*—*B*, *C*, *E* and *F*, Fort Grant, Ariz.; *I* and *K*, Fort Huachuca, Ariz.; *A* and *D*, Fort Bayard, N. M.; *G* and *H*, Fort Apache, Ariz.

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### EIGHTH CAVALRY—COLONEL J. M. BACON.

Adjutant, M. F. STEELE.

Quartermaster, C. C. WALCUTT.

HEADQUARTERS, FORT MEADE, S. D.

*Troops*—*A*, *B*, *D*, *E*, *F*, *G*, *H*, *I* and *K*, Fort Meade, S. D.; *C*, Fort Yates, N. D.

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### NINTH CAVALRY—COLONEL DAVID PERRY.

Adjutant, W. S. WOOD.

Quartermaster, J. H. GARDNER.

HEADQUARTERS, FORT ROBINSON, NEB.

*Troops*—*A*, *C*, *E*, *G*, *H* and *K*, Fort Robinson, Neb.; *B* and *F*, Fort Du Chesne, Utah; *D* and *I*, Fort Washakie, Wyo.

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### TENTH CAVALRY—COLONEL GUY V. HENRY.

Adjutant, M. H. BARNUM.

Quartermaster, L. HARDEMAN.

HEADQUARTERS, FORT ASSINIBOINE, MONT.

*Troops*—*C*, *D*, *F*, *G*, *H*, *I* and *K*, Fort Assiniboiné, Mont.; *A* and *E*, Fort Keogh, Mont.; *B*, Camp Merritt, Mont.

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The Adjutants of Regiments will please notify the Editor of changes in the Regimental Staff, and in stations of Troops.

## CAVALRY OF THE NATIONAL GUARD.

NOTE.—The following have no mounted troops: Alaska, Arizona, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, North Carolina, South Dakota, West Virginia, Vermont, Wyoming.

### ALABAMA.

FIRST CAVALRY SQUADRON—MAJOR JAMES T. BECK.

Adjutant, Captain A. G. Forbes.

Quartermaster, Captain J. F. Burns.

HEADQUARTERS, CAMDEN.

Troop "A," Montgomery, Captain W. F. Joseph; Troop "B," Camden, Captain W. P. Burford; Troop "C," Selma, Captain V. P. Atkins; Troop "D," Birmingham, Captain J. B. Morson.

### ARKANSAS.

Troop "A," Panola, Major M. C. House; Troop "B," Jacksonville, (Commanding Officer unknown).

### CALIFORNIA.

Troop "A," San Francisco, Captain Chas. A. Jenks; Troop "B," Sacramento, Captain John Cooke; Troop "C," Salinas, Captain Michael J. Burke; Troop "D," Los Angeles, (Commanding Officer unknown.)

### COLORADO.

FIRST SQUADRON OF CAVALRY—MAJOR JOHN CHASE.

Adjutant, First Lieutenant A. H. Williams.

Quartermaster, (None.)

HEADQUARTERS, DENVER.

Troop "A," Leadville, Captain Frank M. Goddard; Troop "B," Denver, First Lieutenant Wm. G. Wheeler.

### GEORGIA.

FIRST REGIMENT OF CAVALRY—COLONEL WILLIAM W. GORDON.

Adjutant, Captain Wm. G. Harrison.

Quartermaster, Captain Albert S. Eichberg.

HEADQUARTERS, SAVANNAH.

FIRST SQUADRON, FIRST REGIMENT—MAJOR PETER W. MELDRIM.

HEADQUARTERS, SAVANNAH.

Troop "B," McIntosh, Captain Willard P. Waite; Troop "E," Johnston Station, Captain Joseph W. Hughes; Troop "G," Darien, Captain Benjamin T. Sinclair; Troop "I," Jesup, Captain Harry W. Whaley.

SECOND SQUADRON, FIRST REGIMENT—MAJOR JAMES J. BREWER.

HEADQUARTERS, OLIVER.

Troop "A," Savannah, Captain Beirne Gordon; Troop "C," Springfield, Captain Daniel G. Morgan; Troop "D," Sylvania, Captain Jesse T. Wade; Troop "H," Waynesboro, Captain William H. Davis.

FIRST BATTALION OF CAVALRY (INDEPENDENT)—MAJOR JOHN M. BARNARD.

Adjutant, First Lieutenant John D. Twigg. Quartermaster, First Lieutenant Robert Dohme.

HEADQUARTERS, LAGRANGE.

Troop "A," Augusta, Captain Albert J. Twiggs; Troop "B," Atlanta, Captain J. Stapler Dozier; Troop "C," LaGrange, Captain Thomas J. Thornton; Troop "D," Hamilton, First Lieutenant John M. Bruce.

## ILLINOIS.

## CAVALRY SQUADRON—MAJOR EDWARD C. YOUNG.

Adjutant, Captain Pierrepont Isham. Quartermaster, First Lieutenant Milton J. Foreman  
HEADQUARTERS, CHICAGO.

Troop "A," Chicago, Captain Paul B. Lino; Troop "B," Bloomington, Captain Will P. Butler; Troop "C," Chicago, Captain Metullus L. C. Funkhouser; Troop "D," Springfield, Captain John S. Hurt.

## MASSACHUSETTS.

## FIRST BATTALION OF CAVALRY—MAJOR HORACE G. KEMP.

Adjutant, First Lieut. Walter C. Wardwell. Quartermaster, First Lieut. Sullivan B. Newton.  
HEADQUARTERS, BOSTON.

Troop "A," Boston, Captain D. A. Young; Troop "D," Boston, Captain William A. Perrins; Troop "F," (Independent), North Chelmsford, Captain Elisha H. Shaw.

## MISSISSIPPI.

## FIRST SQUADRON OF CAVALRY—MAJOR J. H. COOKE.

Adjutant, First Lieutenant B. B. Hardy. Quartermaster, First Lieutenant D. W. Outlaw.  
HEADQUARTERS, ARTESIA.

Troop "A," Crawford, Captain J. J. Prowell; Troop "B," Sessumsville, Captain A. F. Young.

## MONTANA.

Troop "A," Billings, Captain J. C. Bond; Troop "B," Bozeman, Captain J. F. Keown.

## NEBRASKA.

Troop "A," Milford, Captain Jacob H. Culver.

## NEW HAMPSHIRE.

Troop "A," Peterborough, Captain Charles B. Davis.

## NEW JERSEY.

First Troop, Newark, Captain Frederick Frelinghuysen; Second Troop, Red Bank, Captain John V. Allstrom.

## NEW MEXICO.

## FIRST BATTALION OF CAVALRY—MAJOR T. P. GABLE.

Adjutant, First Lieutenant W. E. Griffin. Quartermaster, First Lieutenant E. B. Linnen.  
HEADQUARTERS, SANTA FE.

NOTE.—The battalion is now undergoing reorganization. It is to contain four troops.

## NEW YORK.

## SQUADRON "A"—MAJOR CHARLES F. ROE.

Adjutant, First Lieut. John Isaac Holly. Quartermaster, First Lieut. Louis V. O'Donohue.  
HEADQUARTERS, NEW YORK CITY.

First Troop, New York City, Captain Oliver B. Bridgman; Second Troop, New York City, Captain Howard G. Badgley; Third Troop, New York City, Captain Latham G. Reed; Troop "C," (Independent), Brooklyn, Captain Bertram T. Clayton.

## OHIO.

Troop "A," Cleveland, Captain Russell E. Burdick.

## OREGON.

Troop "B," Gresham, Captain Charles Cleveland.

NOTE.—Another troop, to be called Troop "A," will soon be organized, and a squadron organization will be completed.

## PENNSYLVANIA.

Philadelphia City Troop, Philadelphia, Captain John C. Groome; Governor's Troop, Harrisburg, Captain Frederick M. Ott; Sheridan Troop, Tyrone, Captain C. S. W. Jones.

## RHODE ISLAND.

## FIRST SQUADRON OF CAVALRY—MAJOR ALEXANDER STRAUSS.

Adjutant, First Lieutenant Thomas Child. Quartermaster, First Lieutenant Miles H. Ray.  
HEADQUARTERS, PAWTUCKET.

Troop "A," Pawtucket, Captain Edward T. Jones; Troop "B," Providence, Captain Wm. A. Maynard.

## SOUTH CAROLINA.

## FIRST BRIGADE OF CAVALRY—BRIGADIER-GENERAL JOSEPH L. STOPPELBEIN.

Adjutant-General, Major T. G. Disber.

Brigade Quartermaster, Major R. H. Sweeney.

HEADQUARTERS, SUMMERVILLE.

## FIRST REGIMENT OF CAVALRY—COLONEL W. J. CAUSEY.

Adjutant, Captain A. R. Speaks.

Quartermaster, Captain T. E. Ulmer.

HEADQUARTERS, HAMPTON.

Troop "A," Brunson's, Captain R. A. Brunson; Troop "B," Varnville, Captain W. M. Steinyer; Troop "C," Brunson's, Captain G. M. Bowers; Troop "D," Stafford's, Captain R. M. Daley; Troop "E," Stafford's, Captain K. S. Long; Troop "F," Peoples, Captain H. E. Peoples; Troop "G," Gillisonville, Captain J. E. Robinson; Troop "H," O'Katie, Captain W. N. Barnes; Troop "I," White Hall, Captain S. A. Marvin.

## SECOND REGIMENT OF CAVALRY—COLONEL G. P. ALLEN.

Adjutant, Captain R. C. Roberts.

Quartermaster, Captain W. A. Collett.

HEADQUARTERS, ALLENDALE.

Troop "A," Barnwell, Captain J. A. Hays; Troop "B," Dunbarton, Captain P. M. Carter; Troop "C," Allendale, Captain A. W. Owens; Troop "D," Edgefield, Captain L. R. Brunson; Troop "E," Edgefield, Captain J. R. Blocker; Troop "F," Orangeburg, Captain J. A. Riley; Troop "G," Cedar Grove, Captain R. T. Newman; Troop "H," Hamburg, Captain J. P. De-laughter.

## THIRD REGIMENT OF CAVALRY—COLONEL J. R. SPARKMAN.

Adjutant, Captain H. L. Smith.

Quartermaster, Captain W. C. White.

HEADQUARTERS, GEORGETOWN.

Troop "A," Bonneau's, Captain J. A. Harvey; Troop "B," St. Stephens, Captain E. T. Guerry; Troop "C," Georgetown, Captain H. T. McDonald; Troop "D," Jedburg, Captain C. H. Wilson; Troop "E," Conway, Captain L. D. Long; Troop "F," Lake City, Captain J. J. Morris; Troop "G," Georgetown, Captain J. H. Detyens.

## SECOND BATTALION OF CAVALRY—LIEUT.-COLONEL D. W. BRAILSFORRE.

Adjutant, (Unknown.)

Quartermaster, (Unknown.)

HEADQUARTERS, PANOLA.

Troop "A," Eutawville, Captain Jeff D. Wiggins; Troop "B," Panola, Captain R. C. Richardson; Troop "C," Silver, Captain J. H. Dingle; Troop "D," Holly Hill, Captain R. F. Way, Jr.

## NORTH DAKOTA.

Troop "A," Dunseith, Captain George W. Tooke.

## UTAH.

Troop "A," Salt Lake City, Captain Joseph E. Caine.

## TENNESSEE.

Cavalry Troop, Nashville, Captain George F. Hagar.

## TEXAS.

## FIRST CAVALRY REGIMENT—COLONEL J. R. WATIES.

Adjutant, First Lieut. James M. Burroughs.

Quartermaster, First Lieut. Frederick Rhodes.

HEADQUARTERS, HOUSTON.

Troop "A," Austin, Captain L. H. Younger; Troop "B," Houston, Captain C. Towles; Troop "E," Dallas, Captain F. V. Blythe; Troop "F," Denison, Captain E. A. Hammond; Troop "H," Gainesville, Captain John A. Hulen.

## VIRGINIA.

Troop "A," Richmond, Captain E. J. Euker; Troop "B," Surry, Captain Geo. A. Savedge.

## WASHINGTON.

Troop "A," North Yakima, Captain Marshall S. Scudder; Troop "B," Tacoma, Captain Everett G. Griggs.

## WISCONSIN.

Troop "A," Milwaukee, Captain William J. Grant.